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Chapter 1
Introduction
For every sex crime that occurs, there is at least one victim and one offender. In the
1970s and 1980s, the women’s movement made a call for justice, requiring law enforcement to
punish offenders for sexual crimes with the standard sanctions given by law enforcement, such
as jail, prison, and parole or probation (Schechter, 1982). In the early to mid-1990s, policies were
written that added an additional sanction specific to sex offenders: sex offender registration and
community notification (Terry & Ackerman, 2009). The goals of this additional was for law
enforcement and citizens in the community to know the offender’s crime and place of residence,
once the person was released from jail or prison. Over time, these policies began to require that
pictures of the offender be made available to the public. By knowing the physical characteristics
and place of residence, it was intended that citizens in the community would be able to protect
themselves and their families from potential harm from these offenders.
Some researchers and advocates have questioned whether the sex offender registry
reduces these potential harms to the community (Prescott & Rockoff, 2008). Legal challenges
have questioned the constitutionality of these sanctions, on the grounds of cruel and unusual
punishment, ex post facto, and violate offenders’ right to due process of the law (Costigliacci,
2008). Others have suggested clearer boundaries for the types of offenders who are included on
the sex offender registry, as some individuals on the registry have not committed a sexual
offense (Ceglian, 2004). Finally, there are unintended consequences from public registration, that
some would argue act as barriers to an offender’s rehabilitation (Levenson, et. al., 2007; Farkas
& Stichman, 2002; Tewksbury, 2005). Due to these many counter debates, one can see that there
are two sides to the issue of sex offender registration and notification policies: that, a) citizens
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have a right to live a life free of harmful sexual crimes, and b) the policies that have been written
to address this social problem have not been effective at reducing sex crimes, while causing harm
to registered sex offenders.
This dissertation studied social movement organizations (SMOs) that advocate for the
rights and needs of those required to register as sex offenders. Before embarking on information
about these organizations, I discuss sexual violence as a social problem, followed by a
presentation of the types of sexual crimes that can put one on the sex offender registry. These
two points need to be looked at to lay the groundwork for the aims of this study and the research
questions.
Sexual Violence as a Social Problem
Sexually violent behaviors have been a part of the social world throughout history
(Friedman, 1993). The impact that sexual violence has on a victim can be severe. Victims often
experience posttraumatic stress disorder or similar symptoms, such as fear, flashbacks,
aggression, panic and anxiety disorders, and phobias (Burgess & Holstrom, 1974; Campbell,
Dworkin, & Cabral, 2009). Victims have been known to have their daily functioning disturbed in
educational and employment settings, as well as within the victim’s intimate and interpersonal
relationships (West, 1991). Furthermore, victims who report such experiences to friends, family,
law enforcement, or mental health providers may also experience secondary victimization when
those they report it to do not believe the victim, or minimize the violence (Campbell & Raja,
1999). Sexual violence can have a varying impact on the life of a victim. Some individuals suffer
severe consequences, while others experience comparatively minimal difficulties. The resulting
impact that an offense has on a victim is moderated by the nature of the assault and the
relationship that the victim had with the offender (Marshall, et. al., 2006). These consequences
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for victims necessitated legislation that would sanction offenders for their violent behavior,
resulting in justice for the victim. In the United States, it was not until the 1970s that sexual
violence became a social problem that resulted in criminally enforced penalties (Friedman,
1993).
Since the 1990s, crime policy related to sexual offenses has been driven by the most
abhorrent cases: those committed by strangers against children. The definition of, and extent to
which a culture protects “childhood” has changed with the process of industrialization.
Previously, children had toiled in the fields beside their parents to meet the very basic needs of
life. After industrialization, with the creation of the middle class, children were not exposed to
the hardships of life to the same degree that they had been previously. Children were also
gradually removed from the labor force. Developmental psychologists, such as Erikson, propose
that children, from birth to adulthood, develop through a series of stages, with different
milestones and expectations for each stage. In the mid-nineteenth century, social movements
advocated for the protection of children through the implementation of social welfare programs,
such as public schools and the juvenile justice system (Best, 1990). In this way, children were
separated from adults, and their protection became vital for survival of the family and cultural
promotion.
The modern movement to protect children in the United States began with the childsavers of the late 1800s (Platt, 1969) and the movement to define physical child abuse began in
the early 1960s (Kempe, et al., 1962). These two movements came to the aid of children who
were being victimized by adults. Best (1990) argues that child-saving movements, like other
movements in the United States, are based on a claims-making process which uses persuasive
techniques, such as data and cultural values, to garner support for a cause. The child-saving
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movement has gained wide-spread support and has stipulated that child abuse would no longer
be tolerated in the United States.
The child-saving movement, during the 1970s, frequently included sexual abuse as one of
many types of child abuse (Weisberg, 1984). The term sexual abuse was initially defined as
incest and molestation, but grew to include child pornography and prostitution. In the 1980s,
child abuse continued to be widely received as an important social problem, with media attention
on actual cases and also through the production of cultural artifacts such as literature and movies
(Best, 1990). In the same decade, some controversy arose related to the cultural consensus on
sexual abuse. Highly publicized cases of ritual child sexual abuse were criticized for the
inappropriate use of child questioning techniques and weak evidence (Best, 1990). The
documentary, Witch Hunt, highlights one of these cases that occurred in Bakersfield, California,
where several families were torn apart by allegations and false convictions of child sexual abuse
towards many adults who were later found to be innocent (Hardy, 2008). Since this time, the
child-saving movement has been shaped and influenced by a range of stakeholders and activists
who have viewed the issue from various standpoints: criminological, cognitive psychology,
treatment, and feminist (Whittier, 2009).
The child-saving movement in the U.S. addresses a very important social problem: that
children deserve to live a life free of violence, and that offenders should be punished for their
crimes. The cases discussed above, where false accusations caused damage to families and
communities, are unfortunate as they distract from the premise that children should be protected
from sexual harm. However, it is also important to be aware that sometimes social policies, and
those who enforce them, can overreach in their efforts to protect children. This social problem
has led to efforts to protect the public, both children and adults, from sexual crimes. The goal of
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social welfare policy is to address this problem with policies that are effective at reducing such
crimes (Mears, 2007).
Types of Sex Offenses
Today, there are many types of sexual behaviors that are considered sexual offenses. In
the United States, The U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, defines two types
of sexual offenses involving sexual contact with victims: rape and sexual assault. Rape is defined
as actual or attempted forced sexual intercourse, whereby “force” can mean physical force or
psychological coercion (DOJ, 2010). Intercourse is described as penetration with an offender’s
body parts or a foreign object, into a victim’s body. Sexual assault is defined as attacks, actual or
attempted, that involve unwanted sexual contact between a victim and offender that does not
include penetration. Sexual assault may or may not involve force, and includes behaviors such as
grabbing or fondling. Both definitions are inclusive of various victims: males, females, same-sex
or opposite-sex. Additionally, both definitions include verbal threats as an offense (DOJ, 2010).
The common theme found in sexual assault and rape is that there is the use or threat of
force used with sexual contact. Additional offenses that are considered to be sex crimes, that do
not include contact between individuals, include: child pornography, exhibitionism, indecent
exposure, and voyeurism, or include threat of force or actual force (i.e. statutory rape). The
viewing of child pornography is an offense which falls into the category of sexual crimes;
however, it differs from sexual assault and rape because there is no contact between a perpetrator
and victim, and there is no use of force or attempted force involved when viewing such images.
Thus, the act of possessing, selling, receiving, sending, or transmitting child pornography
through the internet or email is considered a sex crime. Individuals who produce child
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pornography are charged with the crime that was committed during the production of the images
(i.e. rape, sexual exploitation of a child, etc.).
Adults and adolescents can also be convicted of sexual offenses not involving force or
attempted force in a sexual act. Hines and Finkelhor (2007) suggest that statutory rape cases,
cases in which one party is under the legal age to consent to sexual activity, differ from forcible
rape or sexual assault because there is a willingness to participate in sexual activity on the part of
the minor. While the individual over the age of consent is still committing a sexual offense for
having sexual contact with a minor, the case is different because force was not included. The age
at which a minor becomes legal to consent to sexual activity varies across the United States.
Prior to the beginning of the 19th century, the most common age of consent in the United States
was 10 years old; however, over the past century this age has steadily increased with the
evolving definitions of childhood (Garfinkle, 2003). Today, the majority of states set the age of
consent at 16 years old, and all states place the age of consent between 14 to 18 years old (Posner
& Silbaugh, 1996). Cases become controversial when they involve an offender who is of a
similar age to that of the identified victim and include a sexual act that appears to be consensual
by both parties (Colb, 2004; Garfinkle, 2003).
Individuals convicted of rape, sexual assault, the viewing of child pornography and
statutory rape are charged with a sex crime. Depending on the laws of the state where the crime
was committed, they may serve a prison, jail or probation sentence. Along with these sanctions,
they are also mandated under federal law to publicly register as sex offenders. Additionally,
other non-sexual crimes that are mandated to sex offender registration include: kidnapping and
false imprisonment (SORNA, 2008). While they are not sexual in nature, conviction for these
crimes requires that the perpetrators be placed on national and state sex offender registries
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(Costigliacci, 2008).

At a minimum, registration requires convicted offenders to make a

quarterly appearance to local law enforcement authorities to register their name, place of
residence, and provide a current photo. This personal information is available to all citizens
through community notification laws.
The goals of sex offender registration and notification (SORN) policies are to deter future
offenses from happening to innocent people living in the community and to have a social control
mechanism over offenders once they have been released from prison. Previous studies have
highlighted the lack of effectiveness in reaching these goals (Prescott & Rockoff, 2008), legal
cases which suggest that these policies are unconstitutional (Costigliacci, 2008), and the
collateral consequences that registered sex offenders and their families have endured from these
policies (Comartin, et. al., 2010; Levenson, et. al., 2007; Tewksbury, 2005); however, there is a
paucity of research regarding groups of individuals who are organizing and creating a collective
voice to change these policies.
Social movement organizations (SMOs) have been established in many states across the
country to block the passage of laws that excessively hinder offenders’ quality of life, once they
have re-entered the community. Some of these organizations are also attempting to create
alternative policies that may be more effective in reaching the intended goals of SORN policies:
to reduce recidivism among offenders living in the community. Impacting policy is a complex
process, which is greatly influenced by the political environment in which organizations are
embedded. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to investigate:
1. SORN SMOs, to understand the capacity they have to bring about change in the political
arena (McCarthy, Smith, & Zald, 1996).
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2. The messages SORN SMOs use to persuade policy decision makers and the public to
change SORN policies (Snow, 2007).
3. The most important past and current policy goals of each state’s SORN SMOs.
4. The strategies that SORN SMOs use to reach their goals of policy change (Harvard
Family Research Project, 2009).
5. If SORN SMOs have different goals and strategies for juvenile registered sex offenders,
compared to adult registered sex offenders.
Research Questions
The goal of this study was to understand what SORN SMOs are doing to bring about
policy change in their respective states. This researcher was particularly interested in the
differences in the way that SMOs frame their cause when discussing juvenile registrants,
compared to adult registrants. The following research questions were designed to address this
goal:
1. What organizational factors, including structure, resources, issue framing, and perceived
stigma, are associated with SORN SMOs reporting successful achievement of a policy
goal? What do SORN SMOs do to increase the capacity of their organization to
implement advocacy strategies in an effort to reach their desired policy outcome goals?
2. What strategies do SORN SMOs use that they perceive had an impact on a successful
policy outcome? What strategies do SMOs use to reach their current goals? What
adaptive strategies have resulted in an SORN SMO’s perceived effectiveness towards an
identified policy outcome? What barriers have SORN SMOs experienced when trying to
reach their policy outcomes? How has stigma impacted the work of these organizations?
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3. Are there differences in how SORN SMOs frame the SORN policy issues when
advocating for policy changes specific to registered juvenile sex offenders? Are there
differences in how SORN SMOs frame the SORN policy issues when trying to persuade
different audiences for mobilization, such as potential or current members, policy
decision-makers, and the public? What role does stigma play in how organizations frame
their issue?
4. How do SORN SMOs use opportunities in the political environment to make progress
towards their policy outcome goals?
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Sex Offender Registration & Public Notification Policies
In 1990, the state of Washington instituted the first registration and community
notification policy (Terry & Ackerman, 2009). From this policy, federal and state policies spread
across the country, resulting in various forms of sex offender registration and community
notification policies. The federal policies that guide the adoption of state policies are based on
the Jacob Wetterling Act, Megan’s Law, Pam Lychner Act and the Adam Walsh Act.
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Predator Program.
In 1994, Congress passed the Wetterling Act as a means to manage sex offenders once they
exited prison and were living in the community. This mandate required all states to implement a
registry of everyone convicted of a sex offense. Under this policy, the offender’s registration
information was not made available to the public and was managed and used by law enforcement
only. The penalty for states that chose not to comply with this mandate was a 10% reduction in
Byrne Formula Grant Funding, which comes from the federal government (Terry & Ackerman,
2009).
Megan’s Law. Two years later, in 1996, the Wetterling Act was amended with the
passing of Megan’s Law. This amendment required that states make the registration information
of sex offenders available to the public (Sample & Evans, 2009). While all states implemented
Megan’s Law, the federal law did not give detailed instructions regarding the implementation
process; therefore, there is great variation across states’ sex offender registries (Fitch, 2006).
This variation includes seven components: a) the use of assessments to determine the risk of each
offender to commit a future crime, b) the method used to disclose the offender’s information to
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the public, c) the differentiation between offenders placed on a public registry and those on a
non-public registry, d) the information collected and published about offenders, e) resources
allocated to local agencies that implement and manage the registry, and f) sanctions given to
individuals that do not comply with registration requirements (Fitch, 2006).
States also varied on the handling of registration and notification policies for juvenile and
young offenders. As of 2005, 32 states permitted or required juveniles to register as sex
offenders. Half of these states (16) allowed for a juvenile court judge’s discretion as to the
registration for each case, while the other half (16) give no discretion to a judge. The remaining
states do not apply Megan’s Law to juveniles (Szymanski, 2005). By 2009, the number of states
that registered juvenile offenders had increased to 38 (Terry & Ackerman, 2009).
Pam Lychner Act 1996 and the Jacob Wetterling Improvement Act of 1997. Two
amendments to the Wetterling Act occurred within the same year as Megan’s Law: The Pam
Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996 and the Wetterling
Improvement Act of 1997. The Pam Lychner Act created a nationwide database of sex offenders
that was compiled at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The Wetterling Improvement
Act of 1997 required that offenders moving to a new state, or those working or going to school in
a state other than their place of residence were required to register with law enforcement in the
new state, as well as their state of residence (SMART, 2011).
The Adam Walsh Act. In 2006, The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act was
signed into law by President George W. Bush. Along with other provisions, this law set national
standards for registration and notification requirements. This act established a tiered system of
offenders, based on the level of risk that each offender poses to the community. Risk to the
community is determined by the offense committed that put the offender on the registry,
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(SORNA, 2008) rather than being based on an offender’s risk level after receiving treatment and
rehabilitation services. The three risk tiers are: high, moderate and low. High-risk offenders are
required to register for life, while moderate- and low-risk offenders are required to register for 25
and 15 years, respectively. This act mandates that all states register juvenile sex offenders 14
years of age and older, and that their personal information be made available to the public (Terry
& Ackerman, 2009). The Adam Walsh Act also allowed states to lower this age limit if they
chose (Young, 2008). Caldwell, Ziemke, and Vitacco (2008) used the assessment for assigning
the risk tier to sex offenders among a sample of 91 juvenile sex offenders. They estimate that
approximately 70% of juveniles arrested for sexual offenses each year would be placed in the
high risk tier; thus resulting in lifetime registration. All states were supposed to comply with the
Adam Walsh act by July 27, 2011; however, at deadline, only 14 states had done so: Alabama,
Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada,
Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Wyoming.
Goals of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Policies. SORN policies are two
sanctions, among others, that are given to individuals convicted of sex crimes. The identified
goals of SORN laws are: a) to keep the community safe, b) to act as a social-control mechanism
for monitoring offender behavior, and c) to deter offenders from future offenses (Carlsmith et al.,
2007; Farkas & Stichman, 2002; McAlinden, 2005).
In criminology, classical theory (Beccaria, 1963), reintegrative shaming (Braithwaite,
1989), and, for a sub-population in this study, the philosophy of the juvenile justice courts
(Trivits & Repucci, 2002) offer different vantage points from which to view these policies.
SORN policies are based in classical theory, which suggests that there is a deterrent effect when
the cost of a criminal sanction outweighs the rewards from committing a crime. Deterrence and
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classical theory stem from a utilitarian philosophy, which seeks to maximize happiness in
society. Since crime and sanctions decrease happiness for society and offenders, both should be
kept to a minimum; thus, the sanctions given to offenders should be just enough to deter future
criminal behaviors (Bentham, 1962; Erickson, et. al., 1977). However, the SORN SMOs would
argue that SORN policies go beyond deterrence by adding a level of stigmatism that deters
offenders from participating in their community.
Unlike classical theory, reintegrative shaming theory seeks to integrate offenders into
their community in a non-stigmatizing way. Reitan (1996) writes, “In its simplest form, the
reintegrative theory holds that criminal behavior represents a breach or absence of community,
and the justifying purpose of punishment is to help restore community at the breach or establish
community where it is absent” (p.58). Thus, reintegrative theory suggests that offenders should
be given opportunities to engage with their community as a means to overcome their feelings of
exclusion, as well as a strategy to reduce future criminal behavior. Braithwaite (1989) suggests
that stigmatizing sanctions result in increases in crime, while reintegrative responses can be used
to control crime. Thus, the assumption is that criminal behavior can be overcome by integrating
offenders into their community in a meaningful and purposeful way. Connolly and Ward (2008)
have designed a treatment philosophy for sex offenders which is congruent with reintegrative
theory.
The philosophy behind the juvenile court speaks to the distinction between adult and
youth offenders, in that juvenile courts are based on the premise that youth are less culpable for
their crimes than adults (Repucci, 1999). The driving theory behind sanctions given to youth was
that of rehabilitation (Trivits & Repucci, 2002). Rehabilitation theory suggests that individuals
who commit crimes have psychological issues that need to be addressed. To prevent future
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criminal behavior, offenders should be provided treatment and education to correct these issues.
Like deterrence, rehabilitation is based on a utilitarian philosophy, which promotes the level of
happiness for all within a society, by deterring future crimes in society and helping offenders
move past their pervious mistakes.
With the passing of Megan’s law, which brought about registration and notification
requirements for juveniles, some of the protections offered to youth under the philosophy of the
juvenile court were removed. Juvenile courts had previously intended to keep juvenile cases
from the public record, so that the youth would not be stigmatized by their adjudication. Public
registration has opened up what once was confidential information. These protections were
designed so that children could learn from the wrongs they had committed in the past and move
into adulthood with a clean record. Thus, there is a competing philosophical debate between
rehabilitation theory under the juvenile justice philosophy and the movement to register juvenile
offenders under Megan’s Law and the Adam Walsh Act.
Additionally, a theory by Bottoms (1995), called popular punitivism, discusses the role
that the media, the public, and politicians have in the formulation, and continuation, of criminal
sanctions. High-profile media coverage of crime has driven the public to call on politicians for a
more punitive style of justice. Politicians have chosen to be tough on crime to meet the demands
of their voter/constituents. The combination of political decision makers drafting and passing
policies based on the public’s fear about high-profile criminal cases is called “popular
punitivism” (Bottoms, 1995). This theory points out that the missing link in punitive style justice
is the evidence and knowledge of those who study and work with offenders. When such policies
are drafted, they lack research evidence suggesting whether the policy has been, or is likely to
result in the desired outcomes (Zgoba & Bachar, 2009). This theory is important for
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understanding how the barriers that are experienced by SMOs in the political arena. Politicians
are motivated by the approval of their constituents, regardless of whether scientific research
suggests these actions will effectively reduce these crimes from happening.
Criminological theories offer rival and conflicting justifications for the use or non-use of
SORN policies. Under classical theory, registration and notification deter current and potential
offenders from committing a sexual crime. However, reintegration theory and juvenile-justice
philosophy contest the use of registration and notification, because there is an assumption that
these policies hamper offenders’ ability to move on with their lives, once they have gone through
rehabilitation, especially juvenile offenders. Popular punitivism presents a position that
politicians have become more punitive in crime policy as a response to the fears of the public,
rather than basing decisions on expert knowledge. All of these theories underlie the
environmental dynamics and beliefs of the stakeholders involved in SORN SMOs, and they also
inform the worldviews of powerful decision makers. SORN SMOs that are advocating for
changes to these policies must focus their energy on multiple facets of the issue, appealing to the
public’s sympathies for the unconstitutionality of these laws for all offenders, but especially the
harms that can be done to juvenile offenders. They must also point to the research evidence,
which highlights the inconsistencies between the stated goals and outcomes of these policies.
Assumptions of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Policies. SORN policies
are based on several assumptions about sex offenders. First, since the intended goal of these
policies is to keep the community safe from further offenses, there is an assumption that sex
offenders are likely to commit other offenses. However studies that have followed up on sex
offenders who have received treatment, show that recidivism rates are low, compared to other
types of violent offenders (Fortune & Lambie, 2006; Hanson & Bussiere, 1998; Letourneau &
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Armstrong, 2008; Quinn et al., 2004; Reitzel & Carbonell, 2006; Turner, 2002). A review of
sexual recidivism rates for youth who received treatment shows an average of 10% (range 0% 42%) (Fortune & Lambie, 2006). A meta-analysis of 61 follow-up studies of sexual recidivism
offense rates was on average 13% (N=23,393) (Hanson & Bussiere, 1998). This meta-analysis
found that sexual offense recidivism was higher for different types of offenders and for those
who did not complete treatment.
The existence of these registries gives the public the perception that registries allow
residents to avoid dangerous individuals (Freeman-Longo, 1996) and to give law enforcement
officials a tool for managing sex offenders in the community. These policies were intended to
protect the public from sexual violence by raising awareness of the offender’s presence in the
community (Farkas & Stichman, 2002). This gives the perception that citizens need to avoid
individuals in the community who are unknown to them. However, the majority of offenders
who commit a sexual crime against a child are not a stranger to that child. They are more likely
to be a family member (76%) or friend (90%) of the child’s family (Finkelhor, 1994; Snyder,
2000). This holds true for adult victims, as well. Women who have been victims of rape or
sexual assault are likely to know their offenders (Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000). Therefore, some
authors suggest that those who view the registry may have a false sense of security (Malesky &
Keim, 2001).
Unintended Consequences of Registration and Notification. Recent research has been
conducted on the consequences of SORN laws, which has found that sex offenders have endured
forms of harassment, isolation, violence, and in some rare cases, homicide, as a result of public
registration (Human Rights Watch, 2007; Levenson, et. al., 2007; Tewksbury & Lees, 2006).
Tewksbury (2005) completed 121 surveys with registered sex offenders that assessed these
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collateral consequences that result from their photo and personal identifying information being
made public over the internet. In this study, 16.2% of registered sex offenders stated that they
had been assaulted, 47% were subject to harassment, 45.3% were denied or lost their places of
residence, and 42.7% lost employment. A new addition to registration information, under the
Adam Walsh Act, is the inclusion of the registrant’s work address (SORNA, 2008). This
additional information may result in offenders losing their employment, as business owners will
not want to have a reputation for hiring sex offenders. The stigma attached to sex offenders is
strong, and businesses do not want to be associated with an employee who is on the sex offender
registry.
These collateral consequences result in lower levels of engagement with one’s
community via social isolation, shame, stigmatization, and ostracism, factors which are
associated with the potential for a person to reoffend (Craun & Kernsmith, 2006; Levenson et al.,
2007; Prescott & Levenson, 2007; Presser & Gunnison, 1999). This is supported by a multi-state
evaluation study by Prescott and Rockoff (2008), which identified that registered sex offender
recidivism rates do not decrease due to public notification and registration policies. Concerns
have also been raised that unintended consequences may result for both victims and members of
their families, such as increasing offenders’ fear of seeking treatment and making victims of
intra-family offenses more hesitant to report crimes (Edwards & Hensley, 2001). A limited body
of literature indicates that negative consequences of registration requirements not only accrue to
the registrants, but also to their families and friends (Comartin, et. al, 2010; Levenson et al.,
2007). Empirical evidence shows that sex offender management policies are counterintuitive to
the stated goals, as it has increased non-sexual recidivism rates for those placed on sex offender
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registries (Prescott & Rockoff, 2008). Additionally, Zgoba and Bachar (2009) did not find a
decline in sexual reoffense rates after SORN policies were implemented in New Jersey.
Challenges to Registration and Notification Policies. The constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, ex post facto, and due process of the law
have been used in court cases challenging SORN laws (Finn, 1997; Lewis, 1996). Providing
photos and personal identifying information of sex offenders to the public violates personal
privacy and has been considered to be cruel and unusual punishment (Griffin & West, 2006).
Additionally, the shaming and ostracism that results from community notification can also be
considered cruel and unusual punishment. Ex post facto cases have arisen, based on the fact that
individuals convicted of sex offenses prior to the passing of Megan’s Law were required to
register as sex offenders (Smith v. Doe, 2003). Since this law was created “from after the action”
of their offense, the constitution would suggest that these offenders should not have been
required to register under this law. Courts have rarely upheld such challenges to registration and
notification laws, generally noting that they are not a form of punishment (Smith v. Doe, 2003).
In 2010, the Ohio Supreme Court (State v. Williams) found registration and notification policies
to be punitive in nature, and, therefore, a precedent was set to open up these policies for further
constitutional challenges.
In reaction to the collateral consequences and the human and constitutional rights
violations felt by registrants, groups comprised of registrants, their family members and
professionals from the criminal justice and treatment fields have begun to organize a social
movement to amend or eliminate SORN policies. The definition, history, and characteristics of
this social movement are discussed below.
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Social Movement Organizations (SMOs)
What are SMOs? Advocacy practice in social work, defined by Hoefer (2006), is when
a social work professional, “takes action in a systematic and purposeful way to defend, represent,
or otherwise advance the cause of one or more clients at the individual, group, organizational, or
community level, in order to promote social justice (p.8)”. Additionally, political scientists have
defined SMOs as groups of individuals that make, “…public interest claims either promoting or
resisting social change that, if implemented, would conflict with the social, cultural, political, or
economic interests or values of other constituencies and groups (Andrews & Edwards, 2004;
p.481)”. These quotes display two common elements: one of morality (“social justice” &
“values”) and another of change; thus, suggesting that advocacy is a change process that
promotes one’s values. Additionally, when advocacy takes place among a group of individuals, it
is thought to have elements of organization. Thus, SMOs are made up of groups of individuals
with shared values, seeking to change a policy or to support the group’s cause. These
organizations have many names across social science disciplines: public interest groups,
advocacy organizations, non-profit organizations (Andrews & Edwards, 2004; Sabatier, 1991)
and policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 2003). For the sake of this paper, the term SMOs will be
used to encompass all of these terms.
History and Current Focus. SMOs in the United States have been a cornerstone of
social activism throughout the last few centuries: from abolition and prohibition, to the women’s
and civil rights movements in the 1960s, to today’s work for the rights of sexual minorities and
worker’s unions. Andrews and Edwards (2004) note that, since the 1960s, there has been
exponential growth in SMOs. These authors suggest political reasons for this recent growth,
which include: congressional reorganization, the move to deregulate government agencies, and
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ideological polarizations. Additionally, there are theoretical reasons for growth in SMOs: social
instability, economic affluence which has created opportunities for individuals to push their
opinions and agendas, cultural shifts to postmodern values or neo-institutional values, and a call
for new and innovative ways of managing governmental institutions (Andrews & Edwards,
2004). In today’s political arena, SMOs work to influence government as a counterbalance to
corporate influences, by promoting the needs of citizens.
Goals and Strategies for Change. SMOs use many activities and strategies to achieve
their desired goals or impacts. The ultimate vision of any SMO is to have a positive impact on
services, systems, or the social or physical conditions for their target population (HFRP, 2009).
These impacts are generally related to policy or capacity goals of the organization. The greatest
level of achievement for a SMO is to make a change throughout the policy stage process: policy
development through the proposal process, placement on the political agenda, policy adoption
through statutes, policy blocking, policy implementation, policy monitoring and evaluation, and
policy maintenance (HFRP, 2009; Ripley, 1985). Their work may impact policies that are under
discussion in the political arena. They may propose new alternatives to current policies, or they
may attempt to block policies that deter progress towards their goals (Kingdon, 2003).
Influencing policy can take on different strategies and tactics, depending on the point of
intervention in the policy process: during agenda setting, when seeking policy alternatives, or
when a policy is being implemented. During agenda setting, a SMO should focus on shaping and
gaining public support through media campaigns and public protests (Andrews & Edwards,
2004). Policy alternatives are undertaken when amendments to existing policies are sought.
Previous research has shown that having a large network of organizations may influence this
process, and that these networks include not only interested citizens, but also governmental
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bureaucrats who specialize in the implementation process, legislators, and researchers (Sabatier,
1991). During this time, lobbying, testifying, drafting legislation and regulations, and educating
the public and reporters have been beneficial. Additionally, depending on the issue, protests are
also influential (Andrews & Edwards, 2004). There is some evidence to show that SMOs can use
political endorsements during elections as a negotiating tool for favorable policies.
SMOs also have a role during the monitoring and implementing of policies. Monitoring
appropriations may lead to better outcomes (Smith, 1973) and ensure that the enforcement of
policies is followed through by governmental bureaucrats. SMOs examine how the policy is
translated into reality, at what time, and in what locations. SMOs can act as watch-dogs to ensure
that policies are implemented correctly, so that beneficiaries of the policy receive the intended
outcomes.
Policy change is a difficult and long-term process (Rothenberg, 1992), and thus there are
additional, shorter-term outcomes that are the focus of many SMOs. These include an increase in
the organization’s capacity to change policy and also minor changes in the political arena.
Shorter-term policy change can include: a) bringing awareness to the issue through media
coverage and issue reframing, b) changing attitudes that lead to an increase in public or political
will and c) increasing the perceived importance of the issue. A SMO may also focus on their
capacity to achieve these shorter-term and long-term policy changes by building partnerships and
alliances, increasing or diversifying funding and donors, and bringing more visibility to the
organization (HFRP, 2009; Reisman, et. al., 2007). Thus, short-term and long-term outcomes can
be used to focus the activities of the organization.
Members of the organization focus on two types of strategies for change: those that are
specifically related to policy and politics, and those related to outreach (HFRP, 2009). Strategies
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in the political arena include: analysis and research, education, legal advocacy, proposal
development, lobbying, and building relationships with decision makers. For outreach, members
may be involved in coalition and network building, grassroots mobilization, rallies and marches,
voter education, public service announcements and other forms of media engagement, electronic
social media campaigns, briefings, testimony, presentations on the issue, demonstration projects
or pilot programs, and polling advocacy (Brueggman, 2002; HFRP, 2009; Reisman, et. al.,
2007). All of these strategies build support for the goals of the organization, either through
public support or the support of policy decision makers.
Organizational Resources. SMOs have three types of non-material resources at their
disposal: a) moral, b) socio-organizational, and c) human resources, otherwise known as
members (Andrews & Edwards, 2004; Cress & Snow, 1996; Hardcastle & Powers, 2002;
Kingdon, 2003).
Moral Resources. Moral resources are the social justice claims made to motivate
individuals for change. These claims tap into an individual’s sense of societal “wrongs” that the
target population is suffering from; or conversely, the organization may make moral claims about
the ways in which we should act as a society (Andrews & Edwards, 2004; Cress & Snow, 1996).
Socio-organizational Resources. Social-organizational resources are tools used to
mobilize members to action. These can include both the method and process of mobilization.
SMOs can range in structures from highly differentiated roles and responsibilities to more
informal structures with shared decision making (Smith, 2000). The methods used to organize
and motivate members can occur through many different technologies, such as telephone, email,
social networking sites and word of mouth. For example, an email to the list of members
suggesting that they write to their legislators about an upcoming bill is a trademark of SMOs.
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With new technologies, such as social networking, this resource has become more efficient and
effective (Diani, 2000). Successful mobilization is achieved by extending membership and
support via coalitions and networks. These networks can result in a larger membership and allow
for access to more resources. However, depending on how they are maintained, networks and
coalitions may also constrain mobilization processes (Andrews & Edwards, 2004).
Human Resources. The greatest resource that a SMO has is its members, either paid or
volunteer, who organize, recruit and build relationships to make progress towards the goals of
the group. SMOs generally have members who are directly and indirectly impacted by policies
(Sabatier, 1991; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Generally, those involved have some personal or
professional stake in a specific policy. Individuals in a SMO generally have at least one of three
traits: 1) they have a personal or professional investment in the issue, and can speak on behalf of
the organization, 2) they are well known for their political ties or their ability to negotiate, or 3)
they are persistent in their goal to achieve a positive policy outcome (Hardcastle & Powers,
2002; Kingdon, 2003). Motivation for participation in SMOs can stem from three factors: a)
rationality, b) emotive, and c) normative. The retention of members is most likely to occur if
they are receiving something for their participation (i.e. recognition, new knowledge, or a sense
of belonging); thus, incentives are critical to keeping members in a SMO (Rothenberg, 1992).
Just as members expect to receive some form of incentive to maintain their participation, the
SMO places requirements on their members. These can include dues, engagement in joint actions
and/or representation at policy and planning meetings.
In any SMO, a critical component involved in human resources is the level of cohesion
among the members regarding their moral position (Kingdon, 2003). Members must have a
united voice on a given issue. If dissention among members arises, division and confusion will
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occur, generally resulting in a less effective campaign. In order to achieve a cohesive, effective
organization, attention must be paid to two dimensions: task and process (Hardcastle & Powers,
2004). The task is related to the content of the policy alternatives the organization is working
towards; the process is how the organization works together, their nature and interactions. Group
processes either enhance or distract from the task achievements. Cohesive organizations share
information openly, have common ways of looking at the issue, and build strong relationships
among group members. Fragmented organizations, which lack cohesion, may contradict,
replicate or undercut the work of others in the group, and are less likely to handle conflict within
the organization effectively (Kingdon, 2003).
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Chapter 3
Research Focus
This study investigates SORN SMOs. Social movement theories will be discussed as a
means for understanding the characteristics of social movements and how they operate in the
political environment (McAdam & Scott, 2005; Zald & Ash, 1966). Social movement theories
include two foundational theories: collective behavior (McPhail, 1991) and collective action
(Olson, 1965). There are three major schools of social movement theory: resource mobilization
(Zald & Ash, 1966), political process or opportunity (Kingdon, 2003), and cultural-cognitive
approaches (Snow, 2007). In recent years, social movement and organizational theories have
integrated their perspectives. Thus, researchers studying social movements have incorporated
components of organizational theories.
Social Movement Theory
Social movements are defined by Della Porta and Diani (1999) as, “informal networks,
based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about conflictual issues, through the
frequent use of various forms of protest” (p.16). Two foundational concepts constitute the base
from which social movement theories have been drawn: collective behavior and collective
action. Three major schools of social movement theory have spun off from these foundations:
resource mobilization, political process, cultural-cognitive approaches.
Collective Behavior & Collective Action. Those who study collective behavior are
interested in crowds, fads, response to disasters, panics, and social movements (Marx &
McAdam, 1994). Collective behavior was initially defined as irrational behavior of groups living
at a time of social unrest (McPhail, 1991). Eventually, there was a move away from the irrational
basis of collective behavior to a more rational reaction to social unrest, through the use of
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organizations. Olson (1965) defined the strategic use of organizations to bring about social
change as collective action. With an attention on organizations to bring about social change, the
three aforementioned theories arose across different disciplines.
Resource Mobilization. The theory of resource mobilization began with Zald and Ash in
the mid-1960s. They were the first researchers to turn the study of social movements towards a
focus on the internal workings of the organization. They specifically investigated how
organizational arrangements either increased or decreased the groups’ ability to survive and
bring about social change (Buechler, 1995). This theory put a focus on the process and structures
within the organization (McAdam & Scott, 2005). Zald and Ash found that, over time,
organizations became legitimate entities as they accumulated resources and built hierarchical
structures to conduct the work needed to sustain a social movement, and to further mobilize their
members (Zald & Ash, 1966). They argued that movement organizations are influenced by the
environment in which they operate; this suggests a dynamic relationship where organizations
achieve greater outcomes when they adapt to the constraints placed on them by the environment
(McAdam & Scott, 2005).
Resource mobilization theory focuses on the ability of an organization to maintain its
work over time. The availability of resources for collective action is a dominant focus of SMOs,
as they are generally operating with insufficient resources; especially organizations in the earlier
phases of development (Zald & Ash, 1966). Resource mobilization also focuses on
organizational structure. Resource mobilization theory focuses on the ways that SMOs change
over time. In many cases SMOs can expect change as they accumulate greater resources (e.g.,
time, skill, money), as opposed to a decentralized structure with inclusive membership, and few
professional staff members (McAdam & Scott, 2005).
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Resource mobilization theory is useful when studying organizations which seek to reform
SORN policies, because many of them are new to this process. To become a legitimate entity in
state-level policy processes, they must organize their members effectively, through structures
and processes generally used by organizations that have been sustained over time. Conversely,
there is evidence that organizations that become excessively bureaucratic are unlikely to remain
loyal to the goals of the organization, which is replaced by sustainability goals. Therefore, these
organizations want to maintain a level of structure and decision-making processes that are goaldirected and flexible in the policy environment.
Political Process/Opportunity. Different from resource mobilization theory and its
focus on the internal aspects of the organization, political process or political opportunity
theorists turned their focus outward, to the political environment. Charles Tilly was the first
theorist to shift away from a social-psychological understanding of social movements to one of
political opportunity and power (McAdam & Scott, 2005). SMOs can be constrained by
competing organizations or the government, when their associated interests begin to be in
conflict (McPhail, 1991). Tilly emphasized the importance of the opportunities an organization
has to pursue its interests and the impact that powerful decision-makers have on the
organization’s level of effectiveness. SORN SMOs are competing with the interests of society, as
these policies seek to protect individuals living in the community from registered sex offenders.
Key decision makers, such as politicians, have a desire to protect these interests. Therefore, these
organizations are operating in a difficult political environment.
McAdam (1996) highlights four opportunities that may stimulate a social movement, two
of which apply to SORN SMOs. These organizations have been formed as a reaction to
excessive harm to offenders and their families, what McAdam (1996) calls, “suddenly imposed
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grievances” (p.25). Since the constitutional challenges to registration policies have now been
upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court, an additional opportunity is now under consideration: “a
glaring contradiction between a highly salient cultural value and conventional social practices”
(p. 25). In regards to SORN policies, there is a contradiction between the cultural values outlined
in the U.S. constitution and the breaches of these constitutional rights derived from the desire to
protect individuals in the community. These two political opportunities are the foundation of the
SORN SMO movement.
While there are political opportunities that can stimulate a social movement, there are
also political opportunities that will impact the strategies that organizations employ to
accomplish their policy goals. First, the relative openness of a political system, which determines
if voices of the public are included in political decision making, will determine if an organization
is able to play a role in the policy process. Second, the stability or instability of the political
alignments that are operating at any given time within the political system, such as partisanship,
are also likely to determine how an organization chooses to align itself to gain access to key
decision makers. Third, is the presence or absence of elite allies. Organizations are more likely to
be heard if they have elites as supporters of their cause, such as long-term politicians or the heads
of bureaucratic institutions. Fourth, is the repressive or non-repressive action that the state has
taken towards SMOs (McAdam, 1996; Tarrow, 1996). The openness and non-repressive nature
of a state government, stability among politicians at the state-level, and the presence of or
connection with key decision makers are all likely to increase the effectiveness of SORN SMOs.
Conversely, there are also ways that social movements can create political opportunities
(Tarrow, 1996). They can expand their opportunities by innovating, or using different, strategies.
Social movements can also expand opportunities for other challenging organizations by sparking
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competition. SMOs may also make opportunities for key decision makers to take up the issue as
their allies (Tarrow, 1996). All of these opportunities play a role in how organizations generate
political opportunities. SORN SMOs may create a political opportunity for their interests by
calling on a key decision maker to claim that, while protecting the safety of all citizens is a key
priority, these policies may be too far reaching, leaning toward unconstitutionality. Additionally,
they may find new techniques for finding common ground with politicians or seemingly
competing organizations, such as victims’ advocacy groups. These organizations are stimulated
and influenced by political opportunities, but they can also create opportunities that are necessary
for public policy change.
Cultural-Cognitive Approaches. Social movements have also taken on a social
constructionist approach to studying the cultural meanings that are assigned to collective action
efforts (Buechler, 1995). Social movements make claims about a social problem that are
specifically crafted to gain empathy for their cause (Hutchinson, 2007). Thus, they frame their
position in a way that promotes a positive interpretation of the problem and its rationale, and
their selection of alternatives (Caniglia & Carmin, 2005). These approaches have been used to
investigate the collective values, beliefs and ideas toward external group members and among
actors within a social movement.
Zald (1996) outlines six ways in which the framing approach has been used in the social
movement literature. Organizations use cultural images and values to construct the meaning of
their cause, which is intended to set the tone for policy changes. They construct meaning out of a
critical event which highlights contradictions in a policy. SMOs may also use the framing of
meaning as a strategy to interpret the social problem, assign blame, or as a means for
mobilization. Frames can also be used out of a reaction to a challenger’s frame of the social
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problem. Bystanders outside of a social movement or the countermovement may only receive
information about a social problem through mass media; thus, the way in which the movement or
problem is portrayed in the media will greatly influence the level of support a movement can
garner from the general public. Finally, framing intersects with the two theories discussed above:
political opportunity and resource mobilization. Framing can garner more resources for a SMO
and framing can also be used to create political opportunities towards policy change. The
technique can also be used to open up a political opportunity; conversely, a political system can
use framing to close out a social movement (Zald, 1996). Thus, it is important to understand that
all three of the predominant theories in social movements intersect and join to create situations in
which social movements can be helped or hindered toward their outcomes and goals.
SORN SMOs construct their frames or messages by drawing from their personal
experiences, either from registrants or family members of registrants. Using personal appeals,
along with research evidence, they cultivate a message calling for more balanced and fair
sanctions. Due to the moral nature of the counter-claims from groups being protected by these
policies, the organization’s message must reach a wide audience that is likely to be unaware of
the affected families’ personal experiences. For political decision makers, the agreement with the
claims that this social movement makes will most likely go against the desire of their
constituency; therefore, the SMO should include further messages that are targeted at the high
cost associated with implementing these policies. In order for these organizations to gain support
and agreement with their claims they must tailor their message to multiple audiences.
Research Questions
1. What organizational factors, including structure, resources, issue framing, and perceived
stigma, are associated with SORN SMOs reporting a policy goal that was achieved?
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What do SORN SMOs do to increase the capacity of their organization to implement
advocacy strategies in an effort to reach their desired policy outcome goals?
2. What strategies do SORN SMOs use that they perceive to have had an impact on a
successful policy outcome? What strategies do SMOs use to reach their current goals?
What adaptive strategies have resulted in an SORN SMO’s perceived effectiveness
towards an identified policy outcome? What barriers have SORN SMOs experienced
when trying to reach their policy outcomes? How has stigma impacted the work of these
organizations?
3. Are there differences in how SORN SMOs frame the SORN policy issues when
advocating for policy changes specific to registered juvenile sex offenders? Are there
differences in how SORN SMOs frame the SORN policy issues when trying to persuade
different audiences for mobilization, such as the potential or current members, policy
decision-makers, and the public? What role does stigma play in how organizations frame
their issue?
4. How do SORN SMOs use opportunities in the political environment to make progress
towards their policy outcome goals?
Conceptual Framework
There are many factors to consider when evaluating the perceived influence of SMOs on
policy outcomes. Evaluation studies of successful organizations are limited, (Whelan, 2008) and
the literature regarding the policy process suggests that policy change is a complex and
unpredictable process (Kingdon, 2003). Thus, it is difficult to fully represent a comprehensive
list of variables and their associated dynamics. Based on the review of social movement theories,
the conceptual model presented here presumes that an organization’s progress towards state-level
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policy change is partially tied to other indicators in the environment. The political environment,
the social and economic conditions, public discourse and judicial decisions all play a part in how
policy is shaped and developed.
Figure 1 visually represents the idea that SORN SMOs that are advocating for SORN
policy changes are embedded within a state where other factors also influence SORN policies.
This study investigated the structure, processes, resources, membership and strategies of SORN
SMOs, and the perceived impacts on policy outcomes related to SORN policies. Additionally,
this researcher inquired about the interactions that SORN SMOs have with their state’s political
environment.

Figure 1. Conceptual Model
*SMO= Social Movement Organization
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*SORN= Sex offender registration and notification

There are many organizational factors that were surmised to impact the progress that
SMOs are making towards their desired policy outcomes. These factors include: history,
leadership, members, structure, processes, resources, strategies, and the utilization of
opportunities that arise in the political environment (see study variables for the operationalization
and conceptualization of these factors).
The history of an SMO is related to its length of operation. The length of time in
operation will suggest time for more progress and goal attainment. A long history in a political
system may give rise to more visibility for the cause (Kingdon, 2003), legitimacy and credibility
of the organization (UNICEF, 2009), and a stronger adherence to the mission and message of the
organization (Boleman & Deal, 2003).
Like other organizations, SMOs may be more effective when the structure differentiates
the roles of the members, and processes are established to integrate the work of different
members (Boleman & Deal, 2003). The membership of the organization is critical to its success.
Members’ motivation for involvement in the organization, the skills they bring to the
organization, the contributions they make, and their feelings of connectedness to the issue and
other members may impact the effectiveness of the advocacy efforts (Knippenberg,, et. al.,
2004). The moral, socio-organizational, and human resources available to the organization may
also impact the progress it is able to make towards its goals (Andrews & Edwards, 2004;
Hardcastle & Powers, 2002; Kingdon, 2003).
Most importantly, SMOs may be more effective at impacting policy change depending
upon the type of strategies they use, or their ability to adapt strategies to different political
situations (Klugman, 2010). As with any intervention, the frequency and quality of strategies

34

used to make change are clearly important to the understanding of effective policy change.
McCarthy, Smith and Zald (1996) list a range of strategies that SMOs use to have their issue
placed on the political agenda: from the public agenda, to the media, the legislative agenda and
the executive branch.
As previously noted, the policy process is unpredictable, with many variables influencing
the state’s political environment. Additional variables that may provide rival explanations for
barriers or successes related to changes in SORN policy include: major judicial decisions, social
and economic conditions of the state (Hofferbert, 1990) and public discourse regarding sex
offenders (Klugman, 2010).
Currently, states are severely cutting their spending, and thus state budgets may be
driving policy decisions. States are writing and amending policies so that government programs
are more cost effective. A cost analysis conducted in New Jersey revealed dramatic cost
increases associated with maintaining the sex offender registry. When it was initially
implemented in 1995 it cost just under $600,000. In 2006 it cost almost $4 million (Zgoba &
Bachar, 2009). These costs may drive decision-makers to change policies regarding sex offender
management. Additionally, some states (Arizona, California, New York and Texas) have decided
that the costs to comply with the mandates in the Adam Walsh Act are too costly (see Caygle,
2011; Greenblatt, 2010; Lui, 2011). Many states did not comply with the requirements of the act;
therefore, they have lost 10% of their federal Byrne Funding. This reduction in law enforcement
funding may also open up an opportunity to reduce the enforcement of punitive policies related
to ex-offenders.
The public discourse, which demonizes sex offenders, influences the way that policies are
written in order to manage sex offenders in the community (Lynch, 2002). High profile cases of
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sex offenders who have committed heinous crimes against children, which most often included
the murder of the child, heavily covered by the news media, have resulted in a public outcry for
policies that harshly punish sex offenders. Therefore, this population has been subjected to more
punitive sanctions, as politicians attempt to placate the electorate. Unfortunately, the basis for
these policies has been built on myths about sex offenders (Quinn, et. al., 2004). The difficulties
associated with changing public opinion are a critical impacting factor for this study. Politicians
are not likely to vote for reducing policies that have support among their voters.
Additional exogenous variables that likely impact a change in public policy for SORN
are court decisions that challenge registration policies (ex. John Doe vs. State of Alaska). The
constitutionality of these policies has been challenged in the Supreme Court and also within state
supreme and appellate courts. These decisions could lead to opportunities to change registration
and notification policies in the legislative branch.
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Chapter 4
Methods
This dissertation uses qualitative research methods because it explores a type of SMO
that has not been introduced in the research literature. The individuals within SORN SMOs are
unique, due to the high level of stigmatization that they experience. Qualitative methods were
also chosen because a depth of information was needed to answer the research questions (Rubin
& Babbie, 2010). Likewise, the flexibility offered by qualitative methods was necessary to
explore topics unidentified prior to data collection (Padgett, 1998). Thus, semi-structured
telephone interviews were used to gather information from SORN SMOs. Many studies of social
movements have used qualitative interviews (see Blee and Taylor, 2002). Interviews have been
suggested: a) for understanding human agency in organizations that are interacting in the
political environment (Morris, 2002), b) to garner a full description of the messages created by
movement actors to mobilize others for change (Gamson, 1998), and c) when investigating
founders of SMO, because a description of new fields and the associated activities of “nascent
entrepreneurship” in SMOs can be gained (Minkoff & McCarthy, 2005).
When using qualitative methods it is important to consider the role of the researcher. A
researcher generally fills one of four roles: a) a complete participant, b) participant-as-observer,
c) observer-as-participant, or d) complete observer (Blee & Taylor, 2002; Rubin & Babbie,
2010). For this dissertation, the doctoral candidate is a participant-as-observer. Under this role,
the participants are notified that the doctoral candidate is a member of a similar organization (i.e.
“participant”) and that research is being conducted during the interview (i.e. “observer”). To
build rapport and trust with the leaders, participants were told about the researcher’s role in a
similar organization. However, there is a methodological consideration that study participants
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could modify their answers to the interview questions; by being more forthcoming with
responses or presenting the organization as more productive or effective than was actually the
case. There is also a risk to the objectivity of the dissertation with the doctoral candidate’s
involvement in a similar organization, particularly the risk of over-identification with the
participants. This doctoral candidate holds the role of consultant for updated research regarding
SORN policies and also educates policy makers. While I am an advocate for more effective
SORN policies, I am not personally impacted by these policies; which gives room for a more
detached relationship with the participants than someone who is personally impacted.
Additionally, interdisciplinary triangulation (Padgett, 1998) was used to minimize this threat to
the trustworthiness of this dissertation: two dissertation committee members were chosen based
on their discipline (Criminal Justice) and research expertise (Violence against Women), to
critically evaluate the doctoral candidate’s potential biases.
Research Design
As previously mentioned, the research questions were addressed using a qualitative
research design and employing a semi-structured telephone interview. SORN SMOs were
analyzed for the inputs and activities that were used to achieve their desired policy outcomes (see
figure 2). This process lens was chosen to investigate SORN SMOS to see the path that these
organizations take to achieve desired policy outcomes.
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Figure 2. Proposed Model
A semi-structured interview was used over the telephone because it allowed a large number of
concepts to be included, which could be clarified by the researcher as the interview unfolded.
The telephone interview was used for data collection because participants lived across the
country, and it allowed respondents to focus on their verbal responses without needing to
formulate typed or hand-written responses.
The interview instrument was designed to be responsive to SORN SMOs that are in
various phases of development: by inquiring about previously achieved policy goals as well as
current policy goals and projects surmised to result in achieving a policy goal. Additionally, the
instrument was semi-structured so that the respondents could give a wide range of experiences
related to the policy process. This gave a space for all leaders to discuss the activities of their
organizations, regardless of their level of success. Therefore, organizations that had been in
operation for many years were able to share their outcomes related to organizational capacity,
strategies and policy outcomes. Emergent organizations were also able to report their early stages
of development by responding to questions about capacity building projects and any strategies
they have implemented towards policy outcomes. The dissertation interview process also
included organizations with various levels of advocacy intensity. SORN SMOs that were heavily
involved in advocacy work and those that were only lightly involved could respond to the
instrument. The instrument was also designed to include the various types of SORN policies,
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such as: the Adam Walsh Act, residency restrictions, policies that control the movement of
registered offenders on holidays (ex. Halloween bills), etc.
The instrument was created by this doctoral candidate because of the exploratory nature
of this dissertation. A preliminary version of the instrument was first piloted with twelve SORN
SMO leaders. These pilot interviews were done at an annual meeting of the Reform Sex
Offender Laws’ (RSOL) national organization. The conference organizers sent email addresses
of organizational leaders who were attending the conference. This doctoral candidate sent emails
to these leaders requesting a time to meet with them during the weekend conference. This was an
informal meeting to get a basic understanding of these organizations in relation to their length of
operation, organizational structure, the organization’s members, strategies and messages they use
to advocate for policy changes, and details related to their state’s SORN policies.
Substantial changes were made to the instrument based on the findings from these
preliminary interviews, additional research conducted by this doctoral candidate, and feedback
from the dissertation committee members. First, questions were added to the instrument about
the relationship between the sex offender population stigma and the policy changes the
organizations were attempting to make in their respective states. Second, the questions in the
preliminary interview which asked about the organization’s message were expanded to include
the organization’s mission and counter-arguments made when confronted by challengers. Third,
the membership section of the instrument was expanded to include questions about the
contributions of professionally-motivated members and other organizations that the SORN SMO
networks with to achieve desired policy outcomes. Fourth, additional questions were asked to get
a sense of the organizations level of formalization. The previous version of the instrument only
asked about non-profit status, while the second version included questions about formal
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organizational documents, such as an organizational charter, bylaws, and also about business
meetings and subcommittees. Fifth, the questions about advocacy strategies previously asked as
stood alone. After the preliminary interviews, these questions were asked in conjunction with the
most successful policy outcome that the organization had achieved in its history. For example,
instead of asking if they had used a particular strategy, they were asked about a previously
achieved policy outcome, and then asked about the strategies used to achieve this outcome.
Likewise, when asked about current goals, they were asked about the strategies they were using
to achieve their current goal. Sixth, questions were added to the instrument about the SORN
SMO’s use of political opportunities that may have helped the organization achieve a past policy
outcome. A similar question was asked about the current goals of the organization. Finally,
questions were added to the instrument about the projects SORN SMOs were currently
undertaking to build the resources of their organizations.
After these changes were made, a second version was piloted with a different SORN
SMO leader prior to data collection for this dissertation. The purpose of the second pilot was to
determine: a) if the new questions made sense to the leader, b) if the questions flowed in a
logical manner, and c) to see how long it would take to complete the interview. Minor
adaptations were made to the instrument after this pilot was completed. There were some
concerns about study fatigue (i.e. length of the interview); therefore, questions were removed
which asked the number of times strategies were used because they did not contribute to the
research questions guiding this dissertation. Additionally, the pilot instrument included two sets
of questions about the advocacy strategies the organization had used: one specifically focused on
policies related to juvenile and youthful offenders and the other for policies related to all types of
registered offenders. In the final instrument these questions were asked about the general
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population of registered offenders. Since only minor revisions were made to the instrument after
this pilot interview, the responses from it were included in the results. The final instrument was
used as a discussion guide. The participants willingly responded with relevant comments which
showed that the questions on the instrument were relevant to their work and the context in which
they were operating. They did not state or suggest that the questions being asked were irrelevant.
Procedures/Protocol. After the human investigation committee approved the instrument
(Protocol number: 1109010163), an email was sent to each leader requesting their participation.
This email included a study information sheet (see appendix B), which described the study’s
purpose, and the benefits and risks if the individual chose to participate. Interested individuals
were asked to contact the doctoral student to participate in the study. Two follow-up emails were
sent, two and four weeks after the first email, in an attempt to increase the number of
respondents (Rubin & Babbie, 2010). For individuals who agreed to participate, the researcher
sent a pre-interview document that gave participants an overview of the questions they would be
asked during the interview (see appendix C). This overview gave them a chance to consider the
questions and to contemplate a thoughtful response prior to the scheduled interview. The
individual who was a part of the pilot interview suggested that this might be helpful to others
participating in the dissertation. Participants were also sent a document with four lists, related to:
a) policy outcomes, b) advocacy strategies, c) organizational knowledge, and d) organizational
skills (see appendix D). The policy outcomes gave an overview of the types of goals that SMOs
set as policy goals, such as blocking, amending, developing or monitoring a policy. Advocacy
strategies included a range of activities that SMOs may have chosen to implement in order to
achieve the policy goals. These could include strategies related to their membership, such as
grassroots organizing and mobilization; strategies geared towards the public, such as education
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campaigns or media stories; or strategies directed toward policy makers, such as lobbying and
policy maker education. The organizational knowledge list was included to ask leaders about the
background information that their organizations need to understand the current policies and to
create an effective argument for policy change. The organizational skills lists outlined the
interpersonal skills needed to communicate the position of the organization to individuals outside
of the organization. These lists were given to the participants before the interview, so that the
interviewer and the participant would have a shared understanding of the topics that were going
to be discussed.
At the beginning of the interview, each participant was asked to verbally consent to
participation. Consent for participation was determined when the participant completed the
telephone interview. Leaders were provided with a $20 gift card incentive for their participation.
They were notified of this incentive in the study information sheet. It is unlikely that the
incentive biased the responses, as the majority of participants were surprised when they received
the incentive. All of the interviews were completed by this doctoral candidate. At the beginning
of the telephone interview, participants were asked if the interview could be audio-recorded. All
participants agreed. Additionally, the doctoral candidate took notes over the course of the
interview.
Important Aspects
This dissertation considered the inputs, activities, and outcomes of SORN SMOs (see
figure 2 on page 47). The inputs included the current structure, processes, and resources of the
SORN SMOs, as well as capacity building projects. Activities are the strategies used to bring
about policy change. Strategies commonly used by SMOs include: a) grassroots organizing and
mobilization, b) electronic and social networking outreach, c) polling the public, d) voter
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education, e) briefings, presentations and public education, f) coalition and network building, g)
media coverage, h) policy analysis and research, i) lobbying and policy maker/candidate
education, j) legal advocacy or litigation, k) demonstration projects or pilot programs, l)
endorsement of political candidates, and m) rallies and marches (HFRP, 2009; see appendix D
for more description). The outcomes are the policy goals that the SMO seeks to attain. These
include: a) policy blocking, b) placement on the policy agenda, c) policy development, d) policy
adoption, e) policy implementation, f) policy monitoring and evaluation, and g) policy
maintenance (HFRP, 2009). Logically, the inputs of the organization would have a strong effect
on future strategies. Therefore, current and future capacity of the organization influences the
strategies that are implemented, and these strategies influence the policy outcomes that the SMO
was able to achieve.
Time Frame of Policy Goals. Sex offender registration laws have been in development
across the country for almost 20 years. Thus, state legislatures have adopted these policies at
different times and in different ways. The Adam Walsh Act attempted to standardize registration
and notification policies across the country (SORNA, 2008); however, to date (03/2012) only
one-third of US states have complied with the act. Based on the differences that exist across
states, SMOs have different goals when it comes to their proposed ideas for change. For
example, a state that initially adopted sex offender registration policies that did not require the
registration of youth under the age of 18 may not have the same goal as a state that places young
offenders on the public registry. For this reason, this research focuses on the organizations’
previous and current policy goals related to registration and notification for both adults and
young sex offenders. Leaders were not given a timeframe when considering the most successful
policy goal in the organization’s history.
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Inputs
History. Historical information was collected about the organizations. The dates they
were established were used as the starting point. It is assumed that SMOs that have been in
existence for a shorter period of time will differ from those who have been operating for a longer
period of time in: organization formalization and resources, strategies used, and policy outcomes
achieved. The questionnaire included the reason that the organization was started as an indicator
of the organization’s mission.
Capacity. Participants were asked about the current capacity of the organization and
capacity building projects for the active members. Capacity comprises the knowledge and skills
of the membership, as well as the infrastructure of the organization. The knowledge needed to
achieve policy outcomes is specific to SORN policies, such as the reason these policies were
originally created and the impacts the policies have on different stakeholders (i.e. victims,
registrants, communities, and the state). Additionally, leaders were asked about alternative
courses of action that policymakers should consider to achieve the intended goals of SORN
policies (Bardach, 2005). total of eleven knowledge questions, with the response options that
included: a) no knowledge, b) limited knowledge, c) moderate knowledge, d) substantial
knowledge, and e) extensive knowledge. While the majority of the leaders responded well to this
response scale, a few respondents preferred to respond with a yes or no answer. Common skills
needed to conduct successful strategies, which lead to policy outcome achievement, include: a)
analyzing legislation or policy, b) preparing a briefing note or position paper, c) writing and
delivering a presentation, d) building relationships with political decision makers, e) possessing
persuasion skills, f) having negotiation skills, g) working from inside the system, h) writing and
using press releases, and i) carrying out media interviews (ICASO, 2003; see appendix D for
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more details). The leaders were asked, “to what extent did at least one active member of the
organization have experience” with each skill. Capacity can also refer to the infrastructure of the
organization, such as establishing a hierarchical structure, increasing financial or technological
resources, etc. Respondents were asked about the current knowledge and skills and also about
any projects to build the knowledge, skills or infrastructure of the organization. The question that
solicited information about capacity knowledge and skills was asked as: “Does your organization
have an active project to build the knowledge and skills of your members?” If they responded in
the affirmative, they were asked to describe the project. The question which solicited information
about organizational infrastructure capacity was, “Does your organization have an active project
to build the infrastructure of the organization?” If respondents became confused or did not know
how to respond, they were probed with the following examples, “projects that would increase the
use of technology, increase finances, or projects that would change the governance structure to
become more efficient or effective in implementing strategies”.
Structure. In order to gain an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the
members, interviewees were asked about the structure of the organization. Information was
collected about leadership positions and subcommittees. Additionally, respondents were asked if
the organization included any elements of formalized organizations, such as: a) incorporation, b)
tax-exempt status, c) organizational charter, d) bylaws or constitution, e) annual report, f) board
member manual, g) holding of business meetings, and h) those involved in decision making for
the organization. Grassroots (Horton Smith, 2000) and social movement researchers (Kriesi,
1996) suggest that these elements are found in more formalized organizations.
Resources. The interviewees provided information on human, material and socioorganizational resources. Information about human resources included: a) the number of paid
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staff; b) the number of staff that are voluntary; c) the number of members, both active and
inactive; and d) the professional expertise of the membership. To assess material resources,
leaders were asked about the previous year’s operating budget, and the percentage of the budget
that is comprised of: a) donations, b) external funding sources (ex. grants), c) proceeds from fund
raising events, and d) membership dues. These were considered to be the most common sources
of monetary resources of non-profit organizations; and thus, were included in the interview
guide. These financial aspects are surmised to impact the activities that the organization is able to
implement in order to achieve its policy goals. The socio-organizational indicators include the
medium (e.g. face-to-face meetings, email, blogs and forums, Skype) and frequency of
communication among the active members.
Members. Leaders were asked about the individuals who participate in the SORN SMO.
Research shows that work-group diversity across demographic variables has positive and
negative impacts on performance (Knippenberg, et al., 2004). Membership diversity can be
positive when different skills are brought to the organization; however, studies have shown that
more homogeneity in an organization leads to higher member commitment and group cohesion
(O’Reilly, Caldwell & Barnett, 1989). Thus, membership diversity may help explain an
organization’s ability to make progress towards its goals. This dissertation accounted for workgroup diversity by considering the motivation of members to participate in the organization:
those who are personally motivated and those who are professionally motivated. Leaders were
asked about the participation of both groups in relation to: a) the time when members first
became involved in the organization; b) their level of current participation; and c) their
participation in current strategies to bring about policy change. This was asked for each type of
member in the organization: the personally motivated members included: a) a registrant or b) a
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family member or friend of a registrant, and the professionally motivated members, which
included: a) judges, b) attorneys, c) sex offender treatment providers, d) parole, probation or
police officers, e) therapists/social workers/ case managers, other than sex offender treatment
providers, f) university researchers, g) members of the state or local Chamber of Commerce or
others from the business community, and h) a representative from a victims’ rights organization.
Activities
The activities, or strategies that social movement organizations use include: a) grassroots
organizing and mobilization, b) electronic outreach/social media, c) polling the public, d) voter
education, e) briefings, presentations and public education, f) coalition and network building, g)
media coverage, h) issue or policy analysis and research, i) relationship building with key
stakeholders, j) lobbying, k) policy maker and candidate education, l) testifying at bill hearings,
m) legal advocacy or litigation, n) demonstration projects or pilots, o) political candidate
endorsements, and p) rallies and marches (HFRP, 2009, see appendix D for more description).
First, leaders were asked if the organization had ever used the strategy. Second, they were asked
about the strategies they used to achieve a previous policy outcome and strategies currently being
used in relation to two current policy goals. These strategies are critical to understanding the
processes used by SORN SMOs that may impact the attainment of desired policy outcomes.
Additionally, SORN SMOs were assessed for their adaptability to the political environment.
Leaders were asked, “Has a situation arisen where you were going to employ an advocacy
strategy, but the organization changed the strategy?” Leaders were then probed as to why they
changed the strategy and what resulted from the change in strategy. These questions were asked
in order to investigate the flexibility and adaptability of SORN SMOs, because this has been
shown to lead to successful policy outcomes (Kingdon, 2003). The outcomes that SORN SMOs
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are able to achieve are highly dependent upon the political context in which they are operating.
This can be influenced by those who have power and status in government positions, such as
politicians and government bureaucrats, and this environment is shaped by the media,
corporations and the public (Van Horn, et. al., 2001). Thus, these constant changes require that
SORN SMOs mobilize their resources to support activities that adapt to this type of environment.
Policy Outcomes
Policy outcomes are the desired goals of SORN SMOs. Participants were asked about the
most important previous policy outcome achieved by the organization. These prior successes
were coded as one of the following outcomes: a) policy development, b) placement on the policy
agenda, c) policy adoption, d) policy blocking, e) policy implementation, f) policy monitoring
and evaluation, or g) policy maintenance (HFRP, 2009, see appendix D for a description of each
outcome). The organizations were then clustered into two categories: reactive and proactive
organizations. Reactive organizations included SORN SMOs who reported their most successful
policy outcome as blocking a bill. Proactive organizations are those that reported developing a
policy. The organizations that reported policy amendments as their most successful outcomes
were placed into the category where they fit best (see results chapter for more details about these
organizations).
Participant Recruitment
The theoretical population included in this dissertation was state-level SORN SMOs.
SMOs in any of the 50 United States whose mission it is to advocate for less punitive SORN
policies were considered for inclusion. To participate, the organization had to have been
operating for more than three months. This limitation was chosen because the pilot interviews
conducted at the conference demonstrated that organizations that had been operating for less than
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three months were unlikely to be able to answer many questions included in the instrument.
Also, participants had to be over the age of 18. The unit of analysis for this dissertation is the
organization. This unit was chosen because the overarching inquiry is to investigate how
collective action, through the inputs and activities of SORN SMOs, is able to influence policy
outcomes. Therefore, information needed to be gathered at the organizational level to answer
these questions.
Potential participants were identified through a website of state-level organizations
focused on this issue (www. reformsexoffenderlaws.org) and also through snowball sampling.
This researcher used this website for the sampling frame because it was the only place where a
list of these organizations was found. Since this listing may not have been representative of all
existing SORN SMOs across the country, a snowball sample was used to gain further
participants. Snowball sampling is a non-probability technique used when the population under
study is difficult to locate (Rubin & Babbie, 2010). There are questions regarding the
representative nature of the sample when this technique is used; however, it was necessary when
considering that the stigma associated with this topic is likely to cause these organizations to
keep a low profile. At the end of the interviews, participants were asked to provide names of
similar organizations that were potential participants. Four additional organizations were found
as a result of the snowball sampling technique, and two participated. As of October 15th, 2011,
this website included contact information for organizations in the following 39 states:
Arizona

Maryland

North Dakota

Arkansas

Massachusetts

Ohio

California

Michigan

Oklahoma

Colorado

Minnesota

Oregon

Delaware

Mississippi

Pennsylvania
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Florida

Missouri

South Carolina

Illinois

Montana

South Dakota

Indiana

Nebraska

Tennessee

Iowa

New Hampshire

Texas

Kansas

New Jersey

Vermont

Kentucky

New Mexico

Washington

Louisiana

New York

Wyoming

Maine

North Carolina

The unit of analysis was the organization; therefore, there was potential for more than
one organization from each state to be involved. Additionally, it is possible to have organizations
that operate in more than one state. While this dissertation had a specific focus on advocacy
efforts related to youthful offenders, these organizations may advocate for offenders of any age.
Attempts were also made to find SORN SMOs in states that were not listed on the RSOL
website, through two other organizations: The Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers
(ATSA) and Department of Corrections Offices at the state level. The doctoral candidate
contacted five state chapters of ATSA to seek referrals for groups known to them in their state.
Only one ATSA state chapter responded with an organization, and it was already known to the
doctoral student. Additionally, there were five states that did not have a RSOL group or an
ATSA chapter. This researcher sent an email to the state’s Department of Corrections’ (DOC)
email address that was linked to prison- based treatment or community re-entry for the sex
offender population. While two responses were received from these emails, these DOC contacts
did not know of any SORN SMO in their states.
In order to get an illustrative sample of organizations across the country, it was important
to include organizations from states with various qualities. These qualities included various: a)
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regions of the country, b) levels of total population, c) political partisanship, d) rates of registered
sex offenders, and e) compliance with the Adam Walsh Act. The regions of the country included
the official census locations of: Midwest, Northeast, South and West (U.S. Census Bureau,
2011). The various levels of total population included a mixture of states with the highest total
population (top quantile), states with the lowest population (bottom quantile) and states in the
middle (US Census, 2010). Political partisanship includes states that are known as either “red”;
those that vote Republican; or “blue”, that vote Democratic. A map of voting behavior in the
2008 presidential election was used to ascertain state political partisanship (Newman, 2012).
To gain an illustrative sample of SORN SMOs from various states across the country,
two specific indicators were used specifically related to sex offender registration: a) per capita
rate of registered sex offenders and b) compliance with the Adam Walsh Act. A map of the
number of registered sex offenders per 100,000 people in each state was used to determine if the
organizations that participated in this dissertation came from a variety of states: those with the
highest (300 or more per 100,000 state population), middle (200 to 299 per 100,000 state
population) and lowest (199 or fewer per 100,000 state population) per capita rates of registered
sex offenders (National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, 2011). The dissertation
expected to include SORN SMOs from states that have substantially complied with the Adam
Walsh Act (Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and
Tracking, 2011) and states that have publicly objected to compliance (Clark, 2012; see updates at
National Conference of State Legislatures, 2012).
Preparing Data for Analysis
All of the interviews were transcribed from the audio recordings. The transcribed
documents were sent to the corresponding participants for member checking (Creswell, 2000),
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which gave participants the opportunity to verify that the transcriptions accurately reflected their
statements and intentions. Four participants responded with comments about their transcripts.
The feedback that these participants provided was incorporated into the transcript because the
comments were considered to add more trustworthiness to the responses.
The researcher created themes for each question on the instrument using “open coding”
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Open coding is a process by which the phenomenon under study is
categorized during a thorough examination of the data. During open coding, a list of themes was
created to include all potential responses for each question on the interview guide. This doctoral
candidate then used this list of themes to code each transcript in the software program NVivo 9.
This software was used because it helped organize the text from all interviews into the codes for
each question. To begin, the transcripts were imported into the software. A hierarchical tree was
created in the software to include the codes for each question that corresponded to the three
guiding theories of this dissertation (see figure 3).
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Figure 3. NVivo Coding Process
Data Analysis Strategy
The data analysis strategies used for this dissertation include content analysis (Rubin &
Babbie, 2010) and a site-ordered predictor-outcome matrix for cross-site analysis (Miles &
Huberman, 1984). Content analysis was used to tabulate the number of responses within the
codes for each question on the instrument. The side-ordered predictor-outcome matrices “…array
sites on a main outcome or criterion variable, and provide data for each site on the main
antecedent variables that the analyst thinks are the most important contributors to the outcome”
(Miles & Huberman, 1984, p.168). The outcome variable was the achieved policy outcome, and
the key antecedent categories included the messages, capacity (i.e. knowledge, skills, structure,
financial resources, and membership) and the strategies used to achieve a previously achieved
policy outcome. The sites were then clustered by categories for analysis (for example, by
proactive and reactive organizations or by organizations that do or do not focus on youthful
offenders).
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Chapter 5
Results
A total of nineteen (19) interviews were conducted for this dissertation. One interview
was conducted with a leader whose organization was operating in two different states and two
interviews were conducted with leaders whose organizations were operating in the same state;
therefore, there were a total of 19 interviews with leaders of SORN SMOs that were operating in
19 different states. These SORN SMOs were operating in states from each region of the country
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2011) and from states in all four quantiles of states ranked by total
population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Organizations were also evenly split by political
partisanship, with nine SORN SMOs representing Republican states and ten representing
Democratic states (Newman, 2012). Additionally, there was participation from SORN SMOs in
states with the highest (300 or more per 100,000 state population), middle (200 to 299 per
100,000 state population) and lowest (199 or fewer per 100,000 state population) per capita rates
of registered sex offenders (National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, 2011). As of
March 2012, fifteen states across the country had substantially complied with the Adam Walsh
Act (Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking,
2011). Organizations from five of these fifteen (15) states participated in interviews for this
dissertation. Conversely, SORN SMOs from two states that have publicly objected to compliance
with this act have also participated in this dissertation (Clark, 2012; see updates at National
Conference of State Legislatures, 2012). To protect the identity of the leaders and their
organizations, specific information about individual organizations is not provided.
While each interviewee represented the perceptions of his or her respective organization,
it is only one perception among many that may exist within the organization. For example, the

55

doctoral candidate/interviewer asked respondents about the most successful policy outcome that
the organization has achieved to date. For organizations that have achieved many outcomes, the
one that is chosen by the interviewee may be the one that that person worked on the most; thus
being successful personally, as well as to the organization. However, another member may have
chosen a different outcome that was most meaningful to that person within the organization.
Even though the unit of analysis for this study is the organization, the term used throughout this
chapter is “organizational leaders” or “leaders” to make clear that it is one individual’s
perception of the organization.
The quotes that have been selected for inclusion in this chapter were chosen as
representative of dominant themes or to reflect when one organization’s response differed
noticeably from the others. Minor edits have been made to some quotes for ease of understanding
for individuals who are not able to read the entire transcript of the interview. These minor edits
included grammatical changes and spaces between major points of a long quote. Three dots (…)
have been used when text was taken out between two sentences of the transcript. This was done
to reduce the length of quotes and to capture only the major points made by the leader.
Additionally, brackets [ ] were used to add in words that were not used by the leader, but were
required so that the sentence would be clearer or when identifying information was removed.
This researcher took special care to edit quotes only when necessary and to be sure that the
words and meanings of the leader were not taken out of context.
The results are organized by the purpose of this investigation (see pages 16-17). First, an
overview of the responding SORN SMOs’ current capacity will be provided. This will include a
synthesis of their history, structure, resources, and knowledge and skills within the organization.
Second, this chapter will present the leaders’ perceptions of stigma experienced by individuals
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listed on the registry. This is an important concept when discussing the work of SORN SMOs,
because stigma influenced many aspects of these organizations, from organizational resources
and chosen strategies, to barriers to success and the achievement of policy outcomes. Third, the
chapter continues with a discussion of the ways that organizations frame their message, to: a)
make claims about the issue, b) mobilize different stakeholders for change, and c) react to those
who challenge the SORN SMO’s position. Fourth, an overview of previous policy outcomes will
be provided. This section also includes a discussion of the range of strategies that have been used
and the barriers that have been faced. The final section of this chapter will present the current
policy goals, strategies and capacity building projects of these SORN SMOs. A purpose of this
investigation is to see if any differences existed in the way SORN SMOs advocate for juvenile or
young adult offenders. Therefore, results specific to organizations that focus on youthful
offenders will be presented in the sections mentioned above where they are most pertinent.
Current Capacity
History. The historical variables assessed in this dissertation include the length of
operation and the reason that the SORN SMO was started. The length of operation for
participating SORN SMOs ranged from four months to six years. Many leaders reported that
their organizations had been started by someone else prior to their participation. A common
experience for some leaders was that they took over the organization after a period of time when
a previous leader had been disengaged. Thus, the current leader who was interviewed for this
dissertation could not trace the date that the organization started with the previous leader.
Therefore, the start date for some of these SORN SMOs is from the time that the current leader
restarted the organization. Five organizations began between 2006 and 2008; however, the
majority of the organizations (13) began in 2009 or 2010. One organization started in 2011.
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When leaders were asked why the organization was started, the majority suggested that
the leader (or a few leaders) was personally impacted by the issue, either as a registrant or a
family member of a registrant. One leader, who is also a registrant, stated, “We started because
of the insanity of the whole situation. You just get tired of being pushed around, you get tired of
the insanity that is involved”. The majority of the organizations were started by family members
of registrants: most often a mother, daughter or wife of someone on the registry. One leader told
a story of how she started the organization in her state:
My husband and I were forced to move from our home that we have lived in, owned and
lived in for over 10 years, because of retroactive application of residency restrictions. We
didn’t handle it real well…We just wanted to deny the whole sex offender registry. He
filled out paperwork, nobody talked about it, and all of a sudden this came up. And at that
point, I just had enough….When we were forced to move, that punished me and our
children because that was our home, too. So really our only choices at that point were to
have him not live with us; which punishes us, or move from a home that was ours. And at
that point, I really felt it had gone too far because I was being punished for something he
had done 25 years ago. At that point I’d had enough.
Almost all of the leaders stated that sex offender management policies have caused harm to
registrants and their family members. Moreover, it was these consequences that instigated their
participation in the SORN SMO.
While the majority of the organizations began as a result of the impacts that SORN
policies have on registrants and their family members, three of these organizations began as spinoffs of other organizations. Two organizations began as spin-offs from support groups for
registrants and their family members and the third grew out of an organization that focused on
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the rights of prisoners, regardless of the type of crime committed. All three leaders explained that
the prior organization was not doing enough to address the needs of sex offenders who are listed
on the public registry.
Two leaders did not have a personal connection to the issue (i.e. they were not a
registrant or a family member). Both of these leaders started their organizations out of a sense of
injustice when they learned about the collateral consequences of these policies. Both had
previous work experience in the policy arena and wanted to use their skills to help advocate for
better policies. One leader became knowledgeable about this issue while working as a prison
volunteer. While volunteering, he began working with a prisoner who was a sex offender, and
who would become a registrant once he was out of prison and on parole. While the offender was
still in prison, these two men worked together on sex offender bills. This leader stated:
I started following all the legislation and sharing with him [the prisoner he befriended]
what I was hearing. There was one horrendous bill in 2006…that was so bad that we
vowed to work together to stop it or change it. I talked lawmakers into coming into the
prison to talk to sex offenders and he picked the people to talk to. They came out of the
meeting determined to drop or kill the legislation that leadership in both houses and the
Governor’s office very badly wanted. That’s how we got started.
The other leader became involved in the issue after reading a book written by a registered sex
offender. This leader stated:
It changed my life because I cannot believe that anybody, any group of people in our
society at this time, is being treated in this manner. They’re being treated like lepers,
whatever we want to use as the analogy. But anyway, I decided I wanted to do
something.
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Structure. To assess the level of formality of the SORN SMO, leaders were asked about
the leadership and structure of the organization. This section of the interview included questions
related to a formalized leadership, an executive board, incorporation, and other elements of
formalized organizations.
Table 1 SORN SMO Structure (N=19)
Elements of Formalized Structure
Identified Leader(s)
Executive Board
Incorporation
Written Document (at least one)
Types of Written Documents:
By-laws
Organizational Charter
Annual Report
Board Member Manual
Business Meetings
Decision-making by Active Members only
Subcommittees (at least one)
Types of Subcommittees:
Legislative
Recruitment/Membership
Outreach/Public Education
Communications/Website
Organizational Structure/Resources
Research
DOC/Police Liaison
Youthful Offenders
Litigation

N
19
11
12
11

%
100%
58%
63%
58%

10
3
4
3
14
9
13

16%
53%
21%
16%
74%
47%
68%

11
7
6
5
5
4
3
2
1

58%
37%
32%
26%
26%
21%
16%
11%
5%

All of the organizations had an identified leader. Eleven had an executive board, which generally
consisted of four positions (i.e. president, vice-president, treasurer, and secretary). Of the eleven
organizations that had an executive board, four had executive boards that were appointed, while
two had executive boards that were elected. Twelve of the leaders reported that their
organizations were incorporated at the time of the interview, or had filed the paperwork with the
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state to become incorporated. Three are currently incorporated as not-for-profit 501(c)3’s; eight
are incorporated as 501(c)4’s; and one is filed as a different type of non-profit organization.
Over half (11) of the organizations had at least one type of written document, with bylaws being the most common (10). A few leaders stated that they did not currently have an
annual report, but that they needed to produce one in the future to meet the requirements for IRS
incorporation. At the time of the interviews, some organizations had not been incorporated for
one year, and thus had not written the first annual report. Over half of the leaders (13) noted that
the organization had at least one subcommittee. There was a total of 44 subcommittees across all
of the SORN SMOs. Among all of them, there is a clear focus on making legislative changes to
these policies, evidenced by the number of organizations that have a legislative subcommittee
(11). The average number of subcommittees per organization was 2.3, and ranged from zero to
six.
SORN SMOs have various types of formalized and non-formalized structures. More
formal organizations show signs of incorporation (12), hierarchy (executive board, 11) and task
delegation (subcommittees, 13), and through written documents (11). While some may believe
that formalization will bring legitimacy in the political arena, some of these organizations
insinuated that they do not want to be formalized to the extent that funding is required for
sustainability. One leader stated:
Some organizations I’ve seen have great goals and aspirations and serve their
community, and then they start becoming more and more professional, more and more
expensive, and they begin to make commitments: office space and professional staff. And
soon they spend all their time fundraising and don’t have any time to commit to their
constituents. So that’s the last thing I want to do, is become that financially
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burdensome...If we could just keep it to printing and mailing and everybody’s responsible
for getting to where they need to get on their own. I know that sounds like an ad-hoc kind
of local organization, but I just dread the thought of making that step to a professional,
expensive organization. If you’re working for crippled children or for pets or whatever,
you can engender support from the community financially, but if you’re working with sex
offenders, no organization is going to support you with grants.
Resources. Leaders were asked about the SORN SMOs’ financial and socioorganizational resources. Financial resources were coded by the presence of an operating budget
and the sources of income. The socio-organizational resources were assessed by the number and
types of members in the organization, and the type and frequency of communication among the
active members. Six organizations had a current operating budget. Four reported that their
operating budget was between $1,200 and $4,000 of income in the previous year. One leader
stated that the budget for the organization’s first year, which had not yet ended, was set at
$20,000. One of the leaders was unable to provide the amount of the current year’s income. All
of the organizations who detailed income for the year received the money from donations. Four
of these five organizations also received income from membership dues.
One of the most important resources of any SMO is the membership. These human
resources, or members, implement the strategies designed to impact policy outcomes. Leaders
were asked about three types of individuals participating in the organization: a) those that run the
organization as volunteers, b) the active members of the organization who participate in the
strategies toward achieving the organization’s policy goals (active members), and c) the number
of individuals who belong to the organization, either those who are on an email list or receive the
organization’s materials (total members). The median number of volunteers that run the day-to-

62

day operations of these organizations is 10, and ranged between one and 15. The median number
of active members, who participate in the strategies of the organization, was 15 members (range
1-230). Most of the leaders recounted a total membership between 100 and 300, with a median of
110 members (range 1-500).
The interview included a question asking leaders if their organization had a support group
component, where registrants and their family members could meet to support each other in
coping with the negative consequences of sex offender registration. The purpose of this question
was to assess the multiple tasks that organizations take on in addition to policy work. Answers to
this question aided in assessing whether the organization had a source of potential recruits into
the policy work of the organization. Eleven of the leaders affirmed the existence of a support
group, either a formal or informal one. Some of these leaders expressed, without prompting, that
they used the support group as, what one member called “a training ground” for legislative work.
While one organization stated that it did not have a support group, the leaders referred members
to a sister organization when personal issues arose. Two other leaders notified the interviewer
that the organization was considering adding a support group as a component of their SORN
SMO.
Although registrants and their friends and family are the most likely to be negatively
impacted by sex offender laws, the stigma that is associated with this population is likely to
delegitimize the organization. One way to regain some legitimacy is to have non-personally
impacted members in the organization who have some expertise related to the population that is
impacted by the policy. Therefore, leaders were asked about any professional members that have
taken part in the organization. All but five leaders described the involvement of one of the
following professionals: a) legal personnel (N=12), b) sex offender treatment providers (N=11),
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c) researchers (N=7), d) victims’ rights advocates/groups (N=5), e) parole or police officers
(N=4), f) clergy (N=2), and g) individuals from the business community (N=2). Table 2 shows
how different types of professional members participated in SORN SMOs. Legal personnel and
treatment providers participated in the greatest range of strategies. Two leaders stated that
victims’ rights organizations and the SORN SMO worked together on public education. One
leader reported that they work on policy analysis, with a goal of formulating policies that will
reduce sexual recidivism rates in sex offenders. The role of police, probation and parole has
generally related to legislative work; however, these professionals provide much-needed research
about the states’ registry information and recidivism rates of sex offenders. Additionally, legal
and criminal justice members participated in grassroots organizing and mobilization, along with
networking and coalition building, by passing out information about the SORN SMO to potential
members or other professionals. Clergy were helpful in networking with other organizations and
educating their parishioners about the impact of SORN policies. While leaders recognized
business people as members, to date business related members had not participated in any
organizational strategies, outside of attending meetings.
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Table 2 Strategy Participation by Professional Members

Lobbying & Policy
Maker Education
Testimony
Grassroots Organizing
& Mobilization
Networking &
Coalition Building
Media
Interviews/Stories
Research & Policy
Analysis
Legal Advocacy
Public Education

Victims’
Rights
Groups

Police/
Parole/
Probation

Legal

Treatment
Providers

Research

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X
X

Clergy

Business

X

X

X

X
X

This dissertation also explored socio-organizational resources, within SORN SMOs; specifically
the frequency and means of communication among the active members. Seven organizations
reported that they meet face-to-face, with some meeting quarterly and others once a week. The
most common form of communication was email (15), with many organizations emailing other
individuals in the organization multiple times per day. Just under half of the organizations
mentioned telephone, Skype or texting to communicate with other active members. Four leaders
reported using an on-line forum or blog. This technology was mostly used as a place for
documents that members could share within the organization.
Knowledge and Skills. All of the leaders expressed that someone in their organization
had knowledge related to the reasons that SORN laws were created, the assumptions that
underlie these policies, and the effectiveness that these policies have in reaching their intended
goals. However, only half revealed that they were able to find research on the impact that SORN
policies have on victims of sexual violence. Many of the leaders stated that they had attempted to
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find that kind of information, but these leaders were unable to find any. Additionally, all but one
organization’s leaders felt that their members had the necessary skills to analyze SORN policies.
Over half of the organizations have compiled information: a) regarding the impact that SORN
policies have on the community (15), and b) federal and state Supreme Court cases that
challenged these policies (17). One-third of the leaders (6) told the interviewer that they have not
been able to obtain the costs involved in implementing the sex offender registry in their
particular state; however, some have been able to obtain research on the costs in other states.
While these organizations are equipped with the foundational knowledge of SORN
policies, only half of the leaders recounted information about alternative approaches policy could
take to address the issue of sexual violence. The organizations that notified the interviewer that
they had knowledge of alternative policies expressed a desire to take a public education approach
to this issue. They noted that the registry is ineffective because it would not protect victims from
the predominant perpetrators of sexual violence: persons known to victims. Therefore, these
organizations believe that it is important to educate individuals, so they do not have a false sense
of security that the sex offender registry will protect them.
A few of the organizations mentioned an additional alternative policy: the need to focus
state resources on sex offender treatment programs. One leader stated:
We need to set up ways for persons who are needing treatment, and they self-report
needing treatment, are able to get help. The way a person who self-reports they’re using
illegal drugs. And they can report to a rehab center and it doesn’t necessarily prevent
them from getting any kind of punishment, but it is mitigated by it. And so that would
increase reporting and decrease the recidivism.
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Two more organizations viewed treatment as an alternative focus for SORN policies. While
some leaders mentioned an alternative policy, only seven reported that they had information on
the projected impacts that their preferred alternative policy would have on reducing sexual
violence. Five interviewees stated that they would be able to present the tradeoffs between the
current SORN policies and the alternative policy they proposed.
All of the SORN SMO representatives informed the interviewer that someone in the
organization had the necessary skills to building relationships with policy makers and
government bureaucrats. Fifteen leaders believed someone within their organization had the
necessary persuasive skills, and thirteen believed someone in the organization had negotiation
skills. A few leaders commented that there is no room for negotiation with policy makers in their
states. One leader put it this way:
There is no good way to negotiate with legislators. It is a discussion with a legislator that
can be split between good and bad [they either support or do not support the position of
the SORN SMO]. There is no way to negotiate this. If they do not like it they will not
vote for it.
Conversely, another leader reported that the lack of negotiation skills was due to the idealism of
some of the members. He said:
Certain people in our organization are idealists, and they don’t like to compromise, and
life’s all about compromise. You go after the best you can get, and then better it. And to
some, that is a bit of a challenge. That’s sort of a personality driven thing: idealism versus
realism.
Only half of the leaders believed that someone in their organization was able to “work from
inside the system”, most likely because of previous difficulties in getting their voices heard.
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When one leader was asked about working inside the system, she analogized, “I’m trying, but
boy, sometimes it feels like we’re David and they’re the Goliath.” Many have not been offered a
seat at the table to begin to work within the system. Seven of the leaders suggested that their
organization had obtained a seat, and that they have been effective in advancing their cause when
they have interacted with policy makers for committee work in the legislature or when asked to
provide research for drafting/amending new policies.
The interview covered a final set of skills: the ability to articulate the organization’s
position. Thirteen are able to write a policy analysis or a position paper; seventeen could write
and deliver a presentation, and fifteen said they were able to write and use a press release.
Seventeen believed that someone in their organization was able to give an interview if needed;
however, only eleven leaders reported that someone in their organization had already given a
media interview.
Stigma
Leaders were asked about stigma in relation to the SORN SMO’s target population, The
questions asked about how much this population is stigmatized by the general public and by
policy makers. Additionally, the interviewer inquired about variations in the level of
stigmatization experienced by different types of sex offenders. Lastly, leaders were asked about
the impact of stigma on the organization’s ability to achieve its mission.
The majority of the organizations (16) expressed a high degree of stigma exhibited by the
general public. One leader stated, “I think that they are probably the most stigmatized of
convicted offender of any sort. And I would say that very likely, the most stigmatized group of
citizens in the United States…The person convicted of a sexual offense is publicly destroyed”.
Another leader said, “The term “sex offender” these days is synonymous with “monster”, and so
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the public thinks that anybody who is on the registry is a monster, anyone who is on the registry
is a pedophile”. When asked why they felt the level of stigmatization was so high, one
respondent commented, “because of political grandstanding and media frenzy”. This quote
exemplifies many of the leaders’ beliefs, that the media demonizes sex offenders and policy
makers use the public’s fear to get elected into public office. In a similar sentiment, another
leader noted, “Primarily this is due to how the media presents these issues and the lack of a
balanced presentation of the facts relating to sex offenders and their issues”.
One organizational leader described the level of stigmatization exhibited by the general
population as a mixture of high and low. Some individuals highly stigmatize sex offenders, while
many in the general public do not. This leader noted that there are definitely individuals who
demonize sex offenders, “but then I think there is an informed group of people who realize that
there is something more to it.” Surprisingly, two organizations declared that the general public in
their states do not greatly stigmatize registered sex offenders. One leader informed the
interviewer that registrants were not experiencing the same level of stigmatization and its
resulting consequences in her state, because individuals are judged based on their reputation,
rather than a public list with one’s criminal history. Both of the organizations that reported low
levels of stigma were located in less densely populated states.
Organizational leaders were also asked about the degree of stigma expressed by policy
makers in their state. Six of the organizational leaders noted that the stigma is approximately as
high as that from the general public. One leader commented:
The policy makers are responding to their constituents. Policy makers or elected officials
don’t get reelected by being soft on crime, and sex offenders are the low hanging fruit
that they can pluck to show how tough they are. And so the laws that they’re passing tend
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to not only limit access of sexual offenders to their community, but that limitation can
stigmatize.

Just under half of the leaders (8) believed that there was a mix of high and low levels of
stigmatization expressed by policy makers. These leaders expressed the sentiment that some
politicians have come to understand that registration policies need to be amended; however, they
are not willing to take the first public step towards less punitive policies. One leader stated,
“They are very concerned that looking like they support sex offenders is in fact going to be the
kiss of death for them, and they won’t get re-elected”.
In response to questions about whether they believed that the level of stigma varied for
different types of sex offenders, five of the leaders reported that there was no difference in level
of stigmatization by the type of sex offender. These five leaders explained that the general public
believes that individuals listed on the public registry are all considered to be pedophiles, or as
one leader reiterated, “the worst of the worst”, regardless of their actual offense. Since
registration has become synonymous with pedophilia, all registrants are stigmatized to the same
degree as the worst offenders.
For leaders who mentioned varying levels of stigma, six reported that the greatest levels
of stigma were for those who committed a crime against a child, such as cases of child
molestation or child pornography. Conversely, half of the leaders believed that statutory rape
cases between minors and juvenile offenders had lower levels of associated stigma. Additionally,
a minority of leaders believed that cases which involved public urination, pornography, a female
offender, or a first time offender had lower levels of associated stigma. These results show that
the greatest level of stigmatization is held against registrants that offend against a child, and
those who were a child or young adult when they committed their crimes are stigmatized less.
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The majority of leaders (14) recognized that stigma was a barrier to their organization’s
mission. Unexpectedly, however, three of the leaders did not feel that stigma had caused any
barriers to their organization’s mission, despite the fact that two of these leaders reported a high
level of stigma from the general public towards sex offenders. One-third of the leaders (6)
described registrants’ sense of fear about becoming involved in the organization. These leaders
stressed that registrants and their families have encountered consequences from registration that
have negatively impacted their lives. For this reason, they do not want to get involved in any
high-profile situations that may cause further harm to their families. One leader expressed the
fear of registrants to become active in the organization, and additionally explained the financial
consequences that impede registrants from contributing financially to the organization:
Well, many of them are afraid to speak out. They’re afraid to use their names. They’re
afraid to participate in media, in newspaper—to let the public know who they really are
and why they’re on the list. And most of them don’t have the finances to help in a
financial manner because of the registry. And the stigma has kept them from getting good
jobs.
This fear deters members from participation because of reports of vigilante justice, when
someone has taken the law into their own hands and has killed someone listed on the public
registry. One leader noted that the stigma that is associated with sex offenders leaves some of the
members with fear about what could occur at their public meetings, “There’s some fear even in
the organization with who’s going to show up at a meeting. Somebody could come in and shoot
the place up”. This fear has made it difficult for these organizations to recruit members and also
to have a pool of members willing to publicly tell their stories for mobilization. Regarding the
level of member participation one leader described it this way:
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There is an unwillingness to do anything. You could say it’s being scared…that it’s been
beaten out of them, I don’t know, but it’s just getting the members to care…but people
are afraid, ashamed, but by and large, a lot of times they’ll say they’re gonna do
something and then they’ll just not follow through”.
Similarly, another leader explained, “its embarrassment and shame and the stigma that is a big
barrier, and fear. Fear for their families”. Another member spoke to the anger that causes some
members to obstruct the work of the organization:
Another barrier that I think all of us in this advocacy nationwide experience is that we
often are our own worst enemy. People who are convicted of sex crimes, or who are on
the sex offender registry, are often people who don’t play well with others--people who
have struggle[s] [with] social issues. So when we ask for volunteers to come and testify,
we have to be very careful who we let come up and speak for our organization. Because
you can have people who are just filled with rage and don’t engender any sympathy.
People who are in denial of their offense…Again that creates a real problem. We need
to—whenever we are asked by the press to provide people for interviews, we have to be
very selective in who we promote as a spokesperson of [the SORN SMO]. And, at times
it feels like we’re really censoring ourselves. Sometimes you have to do that.
Almost one-third of the leaders (5) informed the interviewer that the stigma related to sex
offenders has made it difficult to be accepted as a legitimate organization by politicians; and to a
lesser extent, by the media. One leader explained, “Newspapers and legislators do not want to
hear what we have to say. It is very hard to get a response. Cases in the media put stories out
there that just create hysteria and misinforms the general public. The media and legislators just
ignore our group”. Two leaders told stories of politicians publicly discrediting registrants when
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they spoke at public hearings. Both of these leaders implied that it was best for their organization
to have family members or professionals who work with sex offenders do the majority of the
testimony and lobbying, as registrants would not help the organization achieve their goals. One
of these leaders noted, “I think if they were the ones going out and trying to advocate, it would
not be as effective towards our mission because in the eyes of the legislature it looks selfserving”.
Not only have politicians publicly humiliated registrants, some leaders have also
experienced difficulties when trying to engage politicians on this issue. Many leaders have felt
disdain from politicians, or their aides, when requesting meetings. These organizations have
predominant strategies of lobbying and policy maker education. It is difficult to follow through
with these strategies if the organizations are unable to establish a meeting with policy makers.
One leader suggested that politicians do not want to be associated with this population or the
issue because of the high level of stigmatization.
When asked what barriers stigma has caused for the organization, one member believed
that the stigma has perpetuated misinformation about this population. This leader stated that
stigma deters:
…people [from] believing the truth. People believing the statistics versus the hysteria that
the media produces. It’s just trying to get the truth to them and getting them to realize the
truth. We’ve got so many PhD’s and people that have written so many articles, they just,
they don’t know.
This leader implied that the stigma associated with sex offenders overshadows the research about
this population. She went on to explain that the organization spends substantial resources on
educating the public against all the misinformation.
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Another leader suggested that stigma has changed the way she frames the issue when
talking to people who do not know the work she does with the SORN SMO. When people ask
what she does, she does not lead with the topic or population, because this repels people from the
discussion. She reported that she must be gentle in how she brings up the topic so that she can
disarm individuals before they can call on the images and stigmatizing statements that are
manifest throughout this society.
Framing the Issue
The way SORN SMOs frame this issue is greatly influenced by the public attitudes and
perceptions that surround sex offenders. SORN SMOs have an overarching position about SORN
policies, in which they construct meaning for the cause. Then, many of the organizations craft or
tailor this overall message to different stakeholders; which is how they construct meaning for
mobilization. Additionally, there is another type of meaning-making when SORN SMOs
counteract the messages that are put forth by their challengers. These three ways of framing the
issue are discussed in the section below.
For the Cause. Leaders were asked about the organization’s mission and the primary
points they make when talking to individuals about the goals of their SORN SMO. Five topics
were found within the mission and messages that these leaders reported. The most frequently
discussed topic within the mission and messages of these SORN SMOs was the goal to educate
the public and politicians about research that refutes the assumptions that underlie SORN
policies. A few leaders went so far as to suggest that this is their organization’s primary focus.
One leader stated that legislators “don’t have time to sit around and research these laws. So by
doing that [research], we can then turn that information to them and hope that they do some
better bills in the future”.
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Among all of the organizations, there is a sense that the general public is not aware of all
that is included in SORN policies. For example, three leaders reported that the public was
unaware that all registered sex offenders in their state are subject to lifetime involvement with
the criminal justice system, either through lifetime registration, parole or treatment. These
organizations felt compelled to bring this issue to the public as a violation of individual rights.
SORN SMOs are educating the public and policy makers about the research that refutes
the assumptions on which these policies were based. One leader commented:
Of course we are trying to change the law, but we’re also trying to educate the public,
and generally speaking, I find that their heads are full of misconceptions. A big
misconception that is out there is recidivism. I have discovered, gathering all the
information that I put together for our website, one particular thing that has been
misunderstood by the press and misquoted is the recidivism rate from the Department of
Justice. The Department of Justice’s report is kind of confusing. It says that recidivism
for sex offenses is 3%, but then there’s another piece of information back there that
mentions another percentage figure. And because it is higher, the press has stuck on that.
And what that one was, if I remember correctly, that figure that is higher is the number of
people who’ve committed a general population [non-sexual offense] type offense who are
registered sex offenders.
Many of these organizations have obtained statistics from their State’s Department of
Corrections office, which have similarly low statistics related to sexual recidivism rates for sex
offenders. One leader stated that one of the facts they try to educate people about is that of
treatment efficacy, “We need to revise the sex offender treatment program in prison so we can
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more swiftly move people through this successful program and get more people involved in it.
Get more people through it”.
Half (9) of the organizations interviewed suggested that an aspect of their messages is
that there are different types of sex offenders. There are offenders who are the most dangerous to
society, from which society needs to be protected; however, there are other classes of sex
offenders who are not a risk to society. These organizations believed that the current laws are
written to treat all sex offenders as if they were dangerous and violent predators. These SMO’s
conveyed a message that juvenile cases have even lower recidivism rates than those reported for
adults, or ‘Romeo and Juliet’ offenses. These offenses present minimal risks to society,
compared to individuals charged with pedophilia or rape. One leader stated, “Who wants an 18
or 19 year-old to be labeled like this for sleeping with a 15 or 16 year-old? Whether they agree
that they should be punished or not, or whether they agree it should take place, there’s not a lot
of people who agree that this is the right solution”. Therefore, these organizations contend that
lower level crimes should not be subject to lengthy prison or registration sentences.
Safety is the underlying goal of SORN policies. The goal is to protect children and
families from sexual violence. Therefore, safety is included in the mission or message of most
(15) SORN SMOs. One leader, when asked about the mission, stated:
Our mission is to help make communities safer and help reduce recidivism, and that is
one area where everyone can agree. The way we accomplish this may be different. We
think for example that residency restrictions make communities less safe, and increase
recidivism. We think that a publically accessible sex offender registry makes
communities less safe and increases recidivism. And there are laws being placed on the
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books every year that do that, so we are lobbying to have sane, workable, cost effective
laws.
Discussing sex offender management policies, one leader noted, “A lot of times it’s less
safe. You’re actually destabilizing a population”. In regards to residency restrictions, many
registrants have been removed from their homes or find difficulties obtaining housing. Reacting
to this reality, one leader said:
We argued that these residency restrictions make sex offenders homeless, driving them to
the outskirts of communities where they can’t walk to work or walk to treatment or walk
to their parole board’s parole office. And it breaks up their families. It would evict them
from a home they own. And those are bad things to do.”
One leader explained that many individuals tell her that the goal is to protect children. She
responds:
Which children are you trying to protect? You know, is it only the few that you’re trying
to protect? And then I go into the few cases that may be in the news…then I’m going,
you know, all these people who allegedly committed all of these latest crimes- not one of
them was on the registry. So, how did the registry help these people?
This leader’s point is one that was reiterated by many of the organizations, that these policies
harm children that either have a parent on the registry or who were youthful offenders. Many of
the leaders stressed that youthful offenders should be held less culpable for their crimes, as
echoed in the principles of the juvenile court; and therefore, should not experience the collateral
consequences and shame that results from sex offender registration.
A general point made by seven of the organizations is the unintended or collateral
consequences that registrants and their family members endure because of these policies. One
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leader pointed out that their primary message is, “to make the citizens of [state name] aware of
the offenses that can place a person on the public registry and the consequences that will follow
long after his or her sentence has been completed”. Another leader reported, “Our primary focus
is the belief that once someone has completed their punishment: parole, probation, prison
sentence; treatment, whatever it is, that they should be allowed, they and their families, should be
allowed to live a free life.”
Eight of the leaders stated that their mission or message includes a focus on the rights of
offenders. Many leaders recounted that sex offenders serve their time through the sentence they
were given for the crime, but then they are subjected to further sanctions after completing their
initial sentence. One leader commented, “It’s like a double jeopardy thing and it seems totally
unconstitutional…You’ve [the offender] complied, but oh well, you’re going to have to register
for life.” Another leader stated that part of their primary message reads, “that anybody who is
listed on our state registry is being denied their basic civil rights on a daily basis.” Some of these
leaders suggested that the stigma associated with the label of sex offender, and the collateral
consequences that result, are considered harsh and punitive.
Thirteen of the leaders disclosed that part of their message is citing the high cost to states
for implementing and maintaining SORN policies. These policies cost states, counties, and local
law enforcement personnel to update the registry with the personal information of registrants, as
well as to identify and follow those registrants who do not comply. These costs are exacerbated
by the inclusion of offenders who are at low risk for reoffense. Leaders reported that they present
the high cost of these policies in conjunction with research that shows that these policies have
not been effective at reducing sexual violence. Six of these organizations pointed out that the
high cost for SORN policies has been one of the most effective arguments with legislators in
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their state, due to strained state budgets. One leader, when asked about the mission, revealed, “I
think in general, the message is, by and large, that most of the laws have really gone way too far,
and are really ineffective at achieving the purpose of preventing sexual abuse, and that we are
putting far too many resources in policies that don’t work”.
For Mobilization. To mobilize different stakeholders (i.e. members, policy makers or the
general public) organizations may stress different aspects of their message. The majority of
participating organizations (16) reported that they tailor their message differently to different
stakeholders. Of the leaders who reported this, twelve believed that tailoring resulted in greater
support for the cause. One leader believed that it was successful because “different groups of
people are looking for different answers. For example, legislators want to know how they can
present this to the public, without appearing soft on sex offenders”. A leader of an organization
that predominantly focuses on juvenile or ‘Romeo and Juliet’ cases stated, “I think that
politicians are more empathetic and sympathetic to the children and more apt to listen when it
does pertain to the children. These children [either registered children or children of registrants]
are going into schools and being publicly ridiculed by teachers and peers, so it does catch their
attention”.
When SORN SMOs talk to members of the public who have not been personally
impacted by these policies, they focus on one or a combination of these messages: a) the myths
that underlie SORN policies, b) the cost to the public, and c) the impact that it has on children. In
total, nine of the organizations discussed how they frame this issue to the public. One leader
stated, “When we are talking to the public, we’re trying to educate them about the sex offender
registry, because the public believes that sex offender equals child molester, when in fact that is
probably a small percentage of people who are on the list”. Another leader acknowledged:
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When we talk to the general public we emphasize how smarter criminal laws would make
them safer at less cost. We don’t talk about the rights of the bad people they are scared
of-- or not as much. The message ‘your rights are in danger if you let anybody’s rights be
trampled on’ doesn’t resonate the same way as, ‘we can make you safer for less money’.
When asked specifically about the message given to the public about this issue, three leaders
specifically stated that they tell the public about ‘Romeo and Juliet’ cases, or ‘sexting’ cases,
because the public is generally not aware that these types of offenders are required to publicly
register. One leader told the interviewer that when she explains that consensual sex between
teens is a registerable offense in her state:
They’re usually shocked those people are on the registry. And then they soften up a little
bit. And that’s when they’ll listen. So trust me, when it comes to getting the message out
to the public…it is that this is a broad spectrum of people who are on the registry, so I
really want to educate them.
Two organizations suggested that they typically tailor their message to the public based on the
individual interests of the group they are talking to. For example, when they talk to church
groups, they focus on rehabilitation and an ethic of redemption, but when they talk to an
organization of criminal defense attorneys, they focus on what one leader reported as, “the
challenges of working within the system, and especially things with probation and parole. Every
group has a different need that they want to address”.
Nine organizational leaders suggested that they tailor their message to members of their
organization. One leader stated that this message is difficult because, “Really, the message they
want to hear is that I’m here to help them get off the registry. And that’s not it”. These SORN
SMOs generally keep their membership abreast of the current policies, new bills being
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introduced in the legislature, new research or reports that discuss the impact of these policies,
and also how the members need to become involved to help the organization change the laws.
Five of these nine leaders recounted that they also try to counteract the effects of stigmatization
when talking to members. One leader commented, “One main message that we have for our
members is that ‘you are not your crime’…and our members who are family members, we make
sure that they know that they are not their loved one’s crime.” Another leader avowed:
The biggest challenge is changing the hearts and minds of the people, but you also have
to change the hearts and minds of the men, and women, and children on the registry. Say,
‘I do have value, I can speak out, I do have rights that are abridged, and not just sit there
and hide in shame and fear.
Sixteen of the leaders in this dissertation conveyed that they tailor their messages to
policy makers. The majority of these organizations noted that they focus on topics similar to
those for the general public: a) the cost of the policies, b) that the laws are not effective at
reducing sexual violence, and c) that there are impacts on the populations for which these laws
are designed to protect: children and families. In the current economic times, with the tightening
of state budgets, many of these leaders reported that the cost of these policies has become the
dominant discussion with political stakeholders.
Five leaders, who noted that they tailor their message differently for politicians, (5 of 16)
suggested that they extend this tailoring to the interests of the politician they are speaking with at
the time. One organizational leader would bring a different member of her organization that fit
well with the specific interest of the politician with whom she was meeting, “For example, if the
legislator worked in law enforcement previously, the juvenile judge and juvenile probation
officer would attend that meeting. If they had background in education, the school social worker
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would attend that meeting”. Another leader would make specific reference to the number of
registrants in the legislator’s district so the lawmaker would be more aware of constituents.
Another leader reviews the voting history of the legislator, and she tailors her message
depending on, “if they’re real tough on crime or if they’re a little bit lax”. This leader follows up
with specific legislators who voted against the bills her organization supports, and she refers
them to the research which contends that these policies are not meeting the intended goals.
Four leaders modified messages, depending on the political party of the legislator, or the
political ideology revealed by the statements or voting patterns of each legislator (4 of 16). One
leader stated, “I really try to frame it—a lot of times—as a public safety issue for those that are
pretty conservative. And that we’re all concerned about public safety and try to lead that into
how the registry itself does not promote public safety”. Another reported that there are many
legislators in his state that are strict constitutionalists; therefore, he focuses on the issue of civil
liberties and rights related to SORN policies. The other two organizations frame their issue
differently with Democratic and Republican legislators, as they have found that there are
different aspects of the message that resonate with each type of legislator.
Leaders were asked if they tailored their message differently when advocating on behalf
of young registered sex offenders, as opposed to the general population. Half (9) of the
organizations said they specifically talked about this group of offenders with legislators. One of
these leaders highlights the research showing that SORN policies do not protect children of
registered offenders or children who are registrants themselves. She stated, “A lot of people
believe that, you know, the laws were created to protect all children and they don’t see the
opposite, that they’re really hurting children”. She goes on to mention that this position has
gained support for the cause from many legislators. Another leader declared that youthful
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offenders are a specialized population that deserves different sanctions, because their recidivism
rates are low. She asserted:
What we basically try to let people know is that these are children. And most laws are put
in place to hold up, quote ‘to protect children’. So we are talking about children
here…With proper counseling and care, most will never reoffend again.
Another leader insisted that advocating on behalf of youthful offenders opens doors to further
policy discussions. This leader stated:
I think it’s a starting point for me and then you can move up to different avenues of the
law. I think that’s what got a lot of media attention—here’s this kid, that all he was in
love and making stupid decisions…I start with the Romeo and Juliet laws and how it
basically ruins their futures, and then I sort of talk about how the law itself should be
looked at.
Regarding youthful offenders, half of the organizations reported that they start talking about this
group to open doors to talk about all SORN policies, to engender sympathy for this population,
and to discuss their lower level of culpability, compared to their adult counterparts. These
organizations hope to either abolish or reduce the sanctions for youthful offenders.
As a Reaction to Challengers. Nine (9) leaders suggested that their organization has
encountered individuals or organizations in their state that are opposed to the mission of the
SORN SMO. The challengers include individual politicians, a political party, a government
organization (such as the state police department), a victims’ rights organization, or a prominent
state lobbyist. Leaders were asked to discuss why they believed these challengers opposed the
position of the SORN SMO. The reasons, discussed further below, included: a) that children and
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families need to be protected from sex offenders, b) that a governmental organization does not
want to lose its funding, and c) offenders deserve the sanctions they are given.
When challengers state that sex offenders deserve the sanctions they are given, one leader
reported, “I talk about the fact that the current laws are not effective, and achieving its stated
objectives and also the fact about wasting taxpayer dollars…that the resources need to be used
more efficiently and more wisely”. When the opposition is a governmental entity that is
concerned about a potential loss of funding (if the state was to lose federal dollars for noncompliance with the Adam Walsh Act) one leader stated, “We testify that a loss in funds will be
significantly less than the cost of maintaining what they’re doing.” In addition to reporting about
the high cost, this organization testified with other governmental agencies that reinforce these
statements (i.e. a local Sheriff’s department) to balance this discussion. In two cases, leaders
explained that they tried many times to counteract the message of their opposition, but the
research evidence was not accepted as proof in the eyes of the opposition. Therefore, these
SORN SMOs have resorted to ignoring the claims of these particular opponents. When asked
how the organization frames its counter argument to these challengers, seven organizations noted
that they highlight the research which shows that the assumptions that underlay SORN policies
are not accurate. Likewise, four organizations refer the challengers to the high cost to the state to
maintain sex offender management policies. One leader stated:
The overall costs are high, especially when you factor in all the efforts of the counties—
because it really falls on the counties to enforce these laws…The cost is much more
localized. I don’t know if the [challengers who do not want to lose federal funding]
recognize this.
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This leader mentioned that local law enforcement officials have requested changes to the
policies, in order to have a more manageable registry. While this organization does not have an
official collaboration with local law enforcement, they highlight that these local agencies are
struggling with the requirements to maintain the current system.
Two organizations suggested that they try to engage challengers in order to find common
ground on the issue. These two leaders specifically focused on safety as a common goal, and
they use this position to engage their challengers. Both of these organizations reported that
finding common ground can be effective with some challengers, but it is not always successful.
When talking about the inability to engage challengers over a common goal, one leader noted:
A lot of people perceive us as being akin to NAMBLA [North American Man-Boy Love
Association], or some organization that supports sexual abuse, because they don’t really
understand. I’ve spoken ‘til I’m blue in the face [with challengers], and they hear what
I’m saying, but they either don’t believe or don’t trust [what I am saying]. They are sort
of fundamentally opposed to our goals, and I don’t know why.
After several attempts were made to engage a challenger in a discussion about the research
evidence one leader decided that the best way to deal with them was to ignore them.
Previous Policy Outcomes Achieved
All leaders were asked about the most successful previous policy outcome their SORN
SMO was able to achieve. Three of the organizations explained that, by the date of the interview,
their organization had not successfully achieved a policy outcome. These organizations are not
included in the results for the rest of this chapter. The remaining leaders (16) described a
previous success as either blocking, amending, developing or adopting a policy. None of the
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organizations reported any of the following policy outcomes as successful: placement on the
policy agenda, monitoring and evaluating policy, or policy maintenance.
Seven of the 16 leaders said that blocking a bill was their most successful previous policy
outcome. Three of these policies were related to residency restrictions; two organizations
blocked a bill that would bring their state into compliance with the Adam Walsh Act; one bill
would have limited the use of the Internet for registered offenders; and the final bill would have
put an identifying stamp on the driver’s licenses of registered sex offenders.
Three organizations reported that their most successful outcomes were policy
amendments. One delayed the effective date of a residency restriction bill, in order to allow
registrants more time to find suitable housing. Another removed language from a bill that
suggested treatment was not effective for sex offenders and that all offenders were an equal risk
to society. Additionally, this organization was also able to include language on this bill that
would bring the state’s Sex Offender Management Board (SOMB) under review every 5 years,
as opposed to every 10 years. The third organization stated that it was able to amend its state’s
bill that complied with the Adam Walsh Act mandates, by removing ‘Romeo and Juliet’ cases.
Five of the 16 leaders declared that their organization’s most successful policy outcome
was the development of a new policy. One of these policies was coming up for a vote soon, and
the other four did not pass. While these policies were not passed, the leaders still consider them
to be their greatest successes. One of these bills was to remove ‘Romeo and Juliet’ cases from
the state’s sex offender registry. One policy was developed to completely re-write the state’s sex
offender registry law to limit the types of offenses that must register and decrease the time on the
registry. Another SORN SMO developed and introduced a bill that would ban residency
restrictions across the state. Another organization developed a policy that would create a tiered
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risk system so that offenders had different registration requirements based on their risk of
reoffending. The last policy involved a mechanism for registrants to request removal from the
state’s sex offender registry. One leader described the most successful policy outcome as a
policy adoption. That leader worked with one legislator to develop and adopt a policy to remove
‘Romeo and Juliet’ cases from the state’s sex offender registry.
Strategies. The most common strategies reported by the leaders of the 16 SORN SMOs
that achieved policy outcomes were: a) lobbying and policy maker education, b) research and
policy analysis, c) testimony, d) network and coalition building, e) media stories or interviews, f)
grassroots organizing and mobilization, and g) electronic outreach. A handful of strategies
sometimes used by other SMOs (HFRP, 2009) that were not used by any of these SORN SMOs
included: a) polling the public, b) voter education, c) public education, d) legal advocacy or
litigation, e) demonstration projects or pilot programs, f) endorsement of political candidates, or
g) rallies or marches.
The groups used lobbying and research and policy analysis strategies, regardless of the
policy outcomes previously achieved by the organization. Lobbying and policy maker education
occurred through emails, letter writing, or face-to-face meetings with legislators or legislative
aides. One leader described it this way:
So it’s meeting with the individuals on a particular committee and educating them one by
one, giving them tools and facts, and approaching it from, ‘look, my purpose here is to
give you the tools you need to have to make an informed decision so that you don’t fall
prey to the misinformation, public panic and hysteria, but you can base your decisions on
fact’. And you know, we always ask [legislators] the question, ‘tell me how I can help
you to educate your constituents, so that you can do the right thing’.
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Additionally, SMO’s educated legislators regarding sex offender management policies by
testifying at legislative committee hearings. Research and policy analysis was explicitly or
implicitly noted as useful in all of the achieved policy outcomes, by all but two of the
organizations. In these two remaining cases, the SORN SMO relied heavily on the constitutional
rights argument, as opposed to research or policy analysis. SORN SMOs used grassroots
organizing and mobilization and electronic outreach when a quick response was needed from the
membership, generally to attend a hearing on short notice. The media was used by only three of
the 16 organizations. There was a suggestion by quite a few of the organizations that the media is
highly stigmatizing to SORN SMOs; and, therefore, these organizations limit their use of this
strategy.
Leaders who specifically mentioned that they have advocated for policy changes related
to juvenile or youthful offenders were asked if they believed that there are strategies that are
more useful when advocating on behalf of this population. One leader speculated:
I would think that all strategies would be more effective when advocating for juvenile
offenders. There’s just a natural sympathy for juvenile offenders or the perception of
juvenile offenders. And when people hear that you can be 13 years old and be on the state
sex offender registry it shocks many people.
Another group reported that they did find that one-on-one, face-to-face lobbying was more useful
when advocating on behalf of youthful offenders. When asked, “Does this change your strategy
at all, knowing that the people you’re speaking to have more compassion for this group?” one
leader stated, “Not really. No, the thing is we don’t advocate only for juveniles, so we don’t want
to come across as only advocating for juveniles when there’s other people out there that need
relief”.
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SORN SMOs were assessed for their adaptability to the political environment by asking
if they have taken advantage of any political opportunities or have changed their strategies to
achieve a previous policy outcome. Six leaders discussed cases in which the organization had
changed the strategies or goals. Three organizations noted that the changed strategies came out
of the general growing pains that new organizations must confront when they begin to
understand the political reality of advocacy work. One leader suggested that they changed the
way they testify in committee hearings, by reducing the number of individuals who testify and
separating the key points that need to be covered. This leader stated, “It’s hard though, starting
out as a group like this and growing. Getting to know what you should and shouldn’t do and how
to say things appropriately. It takes a while”. Another organization had to change the goals they
set for the organization:
I think early on we had some ideas for bills that we wanted to try and get sponsored, and
as time went on we realized that these bills weren’t going to work. We needed to switch
our way of thinking and go along a different line.
The third organization changed a focus of one of their policies after receiving pertinent
information from political insiders. The leader said, “We got some very strong negative feedback
in terms of going forward with [the bill] from both the legislature and from some of the lawyers
we worked with and someone who really tried to help us.” This organization was advised to take
up this particular bill at a time in the political process when it would be more likely to be passed
by the legislature.
One organizational leader discussed a situation in which her group changed the
particulars of a policy that they wanted to amend once they realized that a new bill created room
for negotiation with the state legislature. She put it this way:

89

We really wanted to address our other issues, but we had to focus on this because they
were moving on this [policy], so it forced us to put our attention on this [policy], and
diverted our attention away from the things we really wanted to see changed in the law.
We still always talked about it, but it’s hard to talk about it when you know they’re not
going to entertain it…So our energy was focused more on what we could do within the
law…It gave us an opportunity to get changes in there that might have taken longer to get
otherwise.
Another leader told the interviewer that, when her organization realized that juveniles and
youthful registrants garner more sympathy from policy makers, her group changed the way they
frame the issue. She commented:
In a sense, we sort of use that [type of registrant] to help open the door for other ones,
because when they recognize that these kind of individuals are labeled and yet they’re
low risk for reoffense, then that’s when it sort of opens the door to talk about risk
assessment and what really is the kind of person you’d have register.
After one organization was ignored by policy makers, its members decided to change their
dominant strategy from political advocacy to legal advocacy and litigation. That group’s leader
said:
They basically disrespected us last spring at the legislature by killing our bill
unanimously in committee and not listening to us. Our answer to that is, OK, if you won’t
listen to us we’ll do it ourselves…They better take us seriously if we raise $10,000 for
litigation that takes everybody off the registry convicted prior to 2002. That will get
attention.
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Leaders were also asked about any opportunities that arose in the legislature, the media,
or the courts that may have had an impact on the organization’s previously successful policy
outcome; five leaders noted that they used an opportunity in the state legislature; four used
something that occurred in the media; and two used a court case. When one SORN SMO was
working to develop a bill that would ban residency restrictions, they used a district court decision
which stated that such restrictions are unconstitutional. The group’s leader stated, “We
capitalized on the court decision to say, ‘you have an unconstitutional law. What are you going
to do about it? You took an oath to uphold the constitution of [state name]’”. The other
organization also used an appellate court case that found registration of ‘Romeo and Juliet’ cases
to be cruel and unusual punishment under the state constitution, in their successful quest to
remove similar laws altogether from state legislation.
The leader of the organization above also used a story that was portrayed in the media to
secure and expand public support. This organization worked with individuals in the media to
present a sympathetic ‘Romeo and Juliet’ case, that showed the negative consequences that
extensively impact young people, once they become registered as sex offenders. A similar
situation was reported by another organization that used a sympathetic case in the media to block
a bill. A third leader described the use of a different type of media portrayal. At the time, this
organization developed a policy requiring the removal of ‘Romeo and Juliet’ offenses from
public registration. There was a national news story about university athletes who were falsely
accused of rape. This leader added, “I believe it helped because the politicians, especially the one
I was working with, saw how girls and young ladies can lie.” The final organization that used the
media as an opportunity happened when a state was working to develop residency restrictions.
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There were news reports regarding concerns that the policy would remove sex offenders from
their homes; thus, making them homeless.
Five organizations noted that they used an opportunity in the legislature to their
advantage when achieving a policy outcome. While many leaders noted that they used the high
cost of implementing sex offender management policies as a way to frame this issue for
mobilization, only two leaders explicitly stated that they used their states’ budgetary issues to
their advantage. Two other organizations used their established rapport with a particular political
party to advance their policy goals. One of these leaders was worried about pushing these
relationships too far during an election year:
We’ve already got our foot in the door, but I can’t go out there right now on other areas,
because this is an election year…So absolutely during election time you just kinda take a
whole new avenue. That sucks, it really does, ‘cuz you want to scream out, ‘hey, you can
help us ‘cuz I’ll teach you the truth’, but they’re like, ‘oh, no’.
This leader suggested that, to push a political ally too much during this time period, would deter
future opportunities for the SORN SMO.
One leader explained that policy makers share information among themselves, especially
when they work on the same committees. This leader described a situation in which they gained
support from an unlikely policy maker, by the spread of information through other policy
makers. She stated:
The individual that was the chair last year, I’ve had multiple conversations with, and he’s
very instrumental, and this year they switched it up, so this year it was a new chair on the
committee…I contacted the chair and I had about eight or ten conversations with her and
kept giving her information…She has really skewed so much misinformation to the
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committee. It was just a lack of information, so we made it a point to go see her several
times, and she was not really all that receptive, but by the time we left, we at least had her
to agree to read our information and to look at some stuff that we were going to forward
her and to allow us to follow up with her, which we did several times. Then we started to
go see her in [state capital]. And then, interestingly enough, all the input…and all the
information that we funneled through her [made it around]…When we had an
opportunity to meet with another Republican member of the house, we went to meet with
her to ask her some stuff we had about a bill we had and she said, ‘look, I can’t support
you on that this year, it’s just not going to happen, but what we have done is written a
mechanism to get people off the registry’. Bingo…She didn’t even really know that it
came from us necessarily. And so then, we started meeting with everyone on the
committee, and had conversations with everyone about it, and gathered support for it that
way.
This same leader reported that the SORN SMOs bills can get caught in the crossfire between
different politicians. In order to decrease the chances of this happening, one leader commented
that they do much of the legwork for legislators, regarding who is going to support the bill. She
described it this way:
What I’ve learned is politics is a game, and who’s the best player, and I’ve had politicians
come straight out and tell me, ‘look, the reality is I have this piece of legislation, if I want
to get this moved forward I need to know whose votes do I need in order to make this
happen’. And so sometimes it’s leveraging, ‘if you don’t help me on this, I’m not going
to help you on that’. So, it’s a game that they play. So they will sacrifice even if they
know that it’s damn fine legislation. They’ll sacrifice that because they now deal with a
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specific legislator or group of legislators on another bill…A lot of it is personalities and
relationships, which is stupid but it’s a fact, it’s how it works.
Another organization noted that one opportunity that they used to their advantage was a situation
in which they gained the support of two legislators who controlled the bills that would be heard
at a committee. The respondent stated, “they worked very closely to manipulate the agenda, to
eliminate the [bill]”.
Comparing Different Types of SORN SMOs
Figure 4 was created to portray differences or associations between different types of
SORN SMOs, using the process lens previously discussed in this dissertation. The process lens
looks at the inputs, activities and outcomes of these organizations. The inputs include the
structure, resources, knowledge and skills, and perceived stigma. Activities are related to the
strategies that SORN SMOs use to achieve their policy outcomes and how they frame the issue
for mobilization. This analysis investigated the differences in organizations that advocated
differently for youthful offenders, compared to those that believed advocacy efforts should be
kept the same for all types of sex offenders. The policy outcomes previously achieved are
blocking, amending, developing and adopting policy; and also if the policy was focused on
young offenders.
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Figure 4. Process Model for Analyzing SORN SMOs
Indexes were created for both the inputs and activities of the organization. Refer to table
3 for a description of how the variables were created. Indexes were created for each of the inputs
included in this model: structure, resources, knowledge and skills, and perceived level of stigma.
The index for formalized structure ranged from zero to 18, and includes seven items. The index
for resources ranged from 0-13, and included 7 items. The index for knowledge and skills ranged
from 0-20 and included 2 items. The index for perceived level of stigma ranged from 0-3, and
included 3 items. The activities included the number of strategies used to achieve the previous
policy outcome, how the SORN SMO framed the issue, if they used adaptable strategies and if
they used an opportunity in the political environment to their advantage. The only index created
for the activities was related to how the organization framed the issue. There are three types of
arguments that SORN SMOs used to appeal to different stakeholders: a logical argument based
in research evidence, the collateral consequences of registration that appeals to the emotions and
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sympathies of the stakeholder, and the argument that address the rights of offenders, which calls
on the individual values of stakeholders. This index assessed whether the organization drew on
each of these arguments, depending on the stakeholders it was trying to persuade (0-3). Thus, the
index also includes the various stakeholders that were given a tailored message: members, the
public and policy makers (0-3). The index ranged from 0-6.
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Table 3 Index Description for Variables in the Process Model

Index:

Resources

Total Members
(>= median
number= 1, <
median
number= 0)

Number of
Written
Documents
(0-4)

Number of
Number of
Subcommittees types of
(0-9)
professional
members (0-7)

Active
Members
(>= median
number=1, <
median
number= 0)

Decision
making not
open to all
members
(yes=1, no=0)

Business
Volunteers
Meetings
(>= median
(yes=1, no=0) number= 1, <
median
number= 0)

Formalized
Structure

Knowledge &
Skills
Perceived
Stigma

Number of
Strategies
Used
Arguments
made when
discussing
previously
achieved policy
outcome
covered any of
the three areas:
a) Research
b) “Heart
strings”
c) Values
1 point for each
type (0-3)

Framing the
Issue for
Mobilization
Adaptable
Strategies

Use of Political
Opportunity
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0
2
5
1

3
5
1

0.6

7

N= 10

0.4

3.6

2.9

2

0

0

1

7

0.6

0.4

4.6*

2.6

2.3

16.5

5.5

6.5

1

1

1

1

0.8

0.5

3.5

3.3

2

16.5

6.8

7.3

0

4

2

6

0.7

0.3

4.3*

2.6

2.2

15.9*

5.3

7.8

Non-Youth
Focused Policy
Outcome
Achieved
(N=12)

0

0

1

4

0.6

0.4

4.8*

2.2

2

16

5

7.2

1

5

2

3

0.6

0.4

3.8

3

2.2

16.1*

6

7.8

Do not Advocate
Advocate differently
differently for
for Youthful Offenders
Youthful Offenders
(N=11)
(N=5)

*Index could not be calculated for one organization because the leader was not asked these questions.

Adopt

Develop

Amend

Block

Outcome/Policy Type

Average of SMOs that
used a Political
Opportunity

N=6

3.9*

Frame Issue for
Mobilization Index (0-6)

Average of SMOs that
have used an Adaptable
Strategy

2.8

2.1

15.6*

5.9

5.7
16.1*

8.5

Proactive Reactive
(N=8)
(N=8)

7.6

Number of Strategies
(0-7)

Activities

Perceived Stigma Index
(0-3)

Knowledge & Skills Index
(0-20)

Resource Index (0-13)

Formalized Structure
Index (0-18)

Inputs

All SORN
SMOs
(N=16)

Youth
Focused
Policy
Outcome
Achieved
(N=4)
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Table 4 Comparing SORN SMOs
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A table was set up to analyze the SORN SMOs by: a) the proactive and reactive
organizations, b) youth focused policy outcome achieved, and c) organizations that do not
advocate for young offenders differently than the general population of sex offenders; to assess
differences in inputs, activities and outcomes (see table 4). The proactive and reactive
organizations were not created a priori, but emerged from the data during analysis. Reactive
organizations included SORN SMOs who reported their most successful policy outcome as
blocking a bill (7). Proactive organizations are those that reported developing or adopting a
policy (6). The three organizations that had amended a policy were not easily categorized as
either a proactive or a reactive organization. The organization that delayed the effective date of a
residency restriction policy was put into the reactive group because they did this in response to a
bill that was going into effect, with no amendments that would have a long-term impact on
registrants. The other two organizations made substantial changes to their amendments that
would result in longer term outcomes for their constituents; therefore, they were placed with the
proactive organizations. When comparing the proactive and reactive organizations, it was found
that proactive organizations are more formalized, have more resources, and have used more
strategies, compared to reactive organizations. Conversely, proactive organizations have lower
knowledge and skills, perceived stigma, and frame the issue less than reactive organizations.
This dissertation looked at differences in how SORN SMOs related to issues of youthful
offenders in two ways: a) to see if there were differences in SMOs that had previously achieved a
policy outcome that was focused on a youth issue or b) to see if there were differences in
organizations who did not advocate differently for this sub-population. SORN SMOs that had
achieved a policy outcome that was focused on youth ranged in the type of policy outcome they
had achieved; one in each category: block, amend, develop, and adopt. These SMOs had more:
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resources and knowledge and skills, and used more strategies and political opportunities, than
non-youth focused organizations. However, these organizations were less formalized, had lower
perceived stigma, and framed the issue less than organizations without a youth-focused policy
outcome. The organizations that did not advocate differently for youthful offenders have either
blocked or amended policy outcomes. The organizations that advocate differently for youthful
offenders are spread across the four policy outcomes that have been achieved by SORN SMOs.
Organizations that do not advocate differently for youthful offenders are less formalized, have
fewer resources, have lower levels of knowledge and skills to advocate effectively for this issue,
have lower perceived stigma, and used a lower number of strategies to achieve their previous
policy outcomes. Conversely, these organizations have higher levels of framing for mobilization.
Table 5 Number of SORN SMOs Using Each Strategy for Successful Policy Outcome
Total Number of
SORN SMOs

Proactive

Reactive

N

%

N

%

N

%

Lobbying & Policy Maker Education

16

100%

8

100%

8

100%

Research & Policy Analysis

14

88%

6

75%

8

100%

Testimony

9

56%

3

38%

6

75%

Networking & Coalition Building

5

31%

3

38%

2

25%

Grassroots Organizing & Mobilization

4

25%

3

38%

1

13%

Media Interviews/Stories

3

19%

2

25%

1

13%

Total

16

100%

8

100%

8

100%

The proactive and reactive organizations were assessed for the different strategies they
used to achieve the previous policy outcome. Reactive organizations used testimony and research
and policy analysis more than proactive organizations. Proactive organizations used network and
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coalition building and grassroots organizing and mobilization and media interviews more
frequently than reactive organizations.
Barriers. Participating organizations were asked about the barriers they experienced
when trying to achieve any of their policy outcomes. Aside from stigma, which was previously
discussed, the most common barrier experienced by SORN SMOs was a lack of organizational
resources. This barrier included time to implement the strategies, such as lobbying and policy
maker education and testimony. Many of the leaders reported that time is a barrier, because the
active members work full-time and then spend their off-work hours focused on the needs of the
organization. One organization suggested that time is also a barrier when working with
professionally motivated members. She discussed the difficulties in getting members to the state
capital, “The people you want to testify are the professionals that you want the legislators to hear
from, but it’s hard with such short notice, to just drop everything and head to [state capital].”
Half of the organizations (8) believed that lack of money to run the day-to-day operations or to
employ an individual for the organization was a barrier. Another leader noted, “The fact is,
there’s only 24 hours in a day…trust me, I get calls early in the morning, late at night, and every
time in between”. One leader explained that the organization had funding of over $5,000 last
year. One leader stated, “the greatest threat to this movement is no money…and it takes money
to do this kind of stuff. Even if you are talking about driving to the capital—that is gasoline
every day, and a day off of work. Somebody has to get paid. That is the biggest barrier”. The
lack of time and resources have been especially challenging for five organizations operating in
geographically large states. For holding meetings, the distance between members has been a
challenge, as well as the difficulty of getting members to travel to the state capital to lobby or
testify at committee hearings.
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Two more organizations expressed barriers which relate to organizational resources or
structure. One pointed out that money was offered to their organization by a single donor, with
the request that the organization only work to abolish the state’s public registry. The leader of
this SORN SMO stated that this goal is nearly impossible to achieve, and, therefore, they cannot
promise her it can be reached. This leader stated that another barrier is the lack of political
astuteness of those interested in the issue. The second barrier described by an organization is the
desire to have both a 501(c)3 and a 501(c)4. They want to be able to lobby, but also be able to
make contributions tax deductible.
Leaders reported that the political will of legislators is a barrier to their organization’s
mission. One leader stated, “I think the only barriers that we’ve found so far is that legislators are
scared. They’re scared to go back and ask any bill that can be looked at as being soft on sex
offenders…Most of them know what’s going on. They’re scared to death to put it out there.
They’re like, ‘Not me. I’ll support it if someone else puts it out there, but I’m not going to do
it’”. Another commented:
When I talk to legislators behind closed doors they’re pretty sympathetic…They agree
with me in a lot of ways, but you get out to the public and that changes quite a bit. I’m
not sure that they exactly know what to do to balance out their need to keep their
constituencies happy to get votes, because if they step out on a limb to make better
changes in the law they won’t get them. It will look like they’re being soft on sex
offenders.
Nine of the leaders suggested that challengers were a barrier to their organizations’
mission. These challengers are generally legislators or representatives from government
organizations, such as the police. One leader also conveyed that common challengers include not
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only government organizations, but the vendors who provide services to parole and police, such
as geographical positioning system (GPS) companies or those that provide transportation for the
Department of Corrections (DOC). Respondents from a few states reported that a victims’ rights
organization was a challenger on the issue; however, the challengers were predominantly
governmental organizations and legislators.
The political climate of the state was also mentioned as a barrier to the organization’s
mission. Some leaders (5) reported that the state is dominated by a political party that has a
‘tough on crime’ philosophy; therefore, there is an unwillingness to reduce the sanctions that are
given to any type of offender, and specifically the sex offender population. One leader suggested
that the legislators use sex offenders as an opportunity to gain votes. She stated, “You got the
ones that just, they’re gonna use it to their advantage”.
In a few states, political processes were described as a barrier. In one state, the short
legislature session is a barrier. Two leaders reported that their legislatures only meet every other
year to create new policies; then the alternate year is only focused on appropriations. Another
leader believed that legislative term limits have led to a process of re-education of new policy
makers every time a major election occurs. Three leaders declared that the upcoming election
year will make for difficulties in getting legislators to sign or develop a bill that is related to this
cause. She sarcastically stated, “Yeah, so it’s an election year, so I don’t think anybody is going
to stand up this year and say, ‘let’s really go out there and save the sex offender population’ ”.
Leaders were also asked if a lack of research was a barrier for their organizations. Two leaders
reported that they were unable to find research about the connection between viewing child
pornography and the act of committing an offense against a child. This research is important to
these organizations because current policies are preemptive in that there is an assumption that
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individuals who view child pornography will commit an actual offense against a child. These
organizations would like to know if this has been found in a research study.
Current Policy Goals
Leaders were asked about the two most important policy goals their organizations were
working on at the time of the interview. One leader did not have a current policy goal, because
the organization had intended to spend its time blocking the state’s bill to come into compliance
with the Adam Walsh Act. Much to this leader’s surprise, no bill had been introduced. This
organization has decided to focus on building the membership and structure of the organization.
Similar to the previous successful policies, this dissertation found that SORN SMOs are
currently working on blocking, amending, and developing policies. In addition to these three
policy outcomes, two leaders reported that one of the current policy goals is to monitor the
implementation of a state policy. Leaders were asked to discuss their two most important policy
goals; for example, an organization could be working on blocking one policy and also
developing a different policy. There appears to be a larger proportion of organizations that are
focused on developing policies (10 organizations, 14 policies) than blocking policies (5
organizations, 5 policies). Nine organizations (10 policies) were also working on amending
policies.
The two organizations that reported monitoring current state policies are monitoring: a)
the governmental organization that is charged to comply with the Adam Walsh Act, and b) the
governmental organization that manages the state’s sex offender registry. Five organizations are
currently focused on blocking policies in their respective states. Three of these are specifically
focused on bills that would bring their states into compliance with the Adam Walsh Act. One
organization is working to block a residency restriction bill. The other organization was getting
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ready to block a bill calling for sanctions for registered sex offenders. At the time of the
interview, the leader noted that only a one-line summary of the bill had been released, and that
the full bill was going to be released in the next week. This leader was under the impression that
the bill intended to increase sanctions for sex offenders.
Nine organizations are focused on amending current state policy. Six of these
organizations are specifically focused on amending their state’s residency restriction policies.
Two organizations are focused on amending their state’s policies related to compliance with the
Adam Walsh Act. One organization is working to remove the requirement of including a
registrant’s employer’s information from their profile on the public registry. Another state’s
organization is working on amending its state’s sex offender registration policy that requires
individuals who committed an offense prior to the state’s passing of SORN policies, to be
registered. This is an issue of retroactively applying a policy to individuals who committed their
crimes prior to this new sanction for sex offenders.
Ten organizations reported that they were developing policies in their state. Four
organizations were interested in developing policies related to the use of risk assessments as a
way to classify offenders who are the greatest risk to reoffend; therefore, those who are low risk
are able to receive reduced sanctions. Two organizations that were interested in using risk
assessments were also developing policies that would reduce the over-inclusion of individuals
who are required to register, by specifically developing policies that would set up a better tiered
system to classify offenders and assign sanctions based on these classifications. Two
organizations were developing policies that would remove some cases from public registration
and also create a mechanism for removal from the registry.
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Contrary to the logic behind the mission of SORN SMOs, one organization is working to
develop a policy for its state to come into compliance with the Adam Walsh Act. This leader
reported that her state’s policies are more punitive than that of the federal policy, and compliance
would reduce many restrictions on sex offenders in their state. Another organization was
developing a policy about child pornography possession. Currently this group’s state gives
harsher sanctions for individuals who possess child pornography than for those who create or
distribute child pornography. This organization seeks to reduce the current charging policy for
possession.
A group in another state was developing a policy that would limit residency restrictions at
the municipal level, thus banning residency restrictions across the state. One SORN SMO was
developing a ‘Romeo and Juliet’ policy to remove consensual acts between minors and young
adults from public registration. One organization is developing a policy that would create a sex
offender management board in the state. This board would include a wide ranging, diversified
group of professionals that work with individuals who are charged with sex offenses. The goal is
to create objective, effective policies for the reduction of sexual violence.
Finally, two organizations were developing policies that are specific to the sex offender
prisoner population. One organization would like to see mandatory treatment for those convicted
of a sex crime; the other is developing a policy for an early release program for sex offenders
because, the leader asserts, “Statistically, they are less likely to recidivate than other types of
offenders”.
Table 6 shows the type of current policy goal by the strategies that will be used to
achieve that type of policy goal. Lobbying and policy maker education were used in almost the
same frequency across all policy goals. Like the strategies reported in the “previously achieved

107

policy outcomes” category, testimony is more frequently used by organizations that are
attempting to block policies. Research and policy analysis was used most often in monitoring
and blocking policies. The media was rarely used as a strategy, but when it was reported, it was
more likely to be used for blocking policies than for the other policy goals. Organizations that
are amending or developing policies use grassroots organizing and mobilization most often.
Organizations that are amending policies were the only ones to report the use of public education
and marches and rallies. Those that are developing and monitoring policies were the only
organizations to report the use of legal advocacy.
Table 6 Strategies used for Current Policy Goals
Block

Amend

Develop

Monitor

Lobby & Policy Maker Education

N
5

%
33%

N
9

%
32%

N
8

%
33%

N
1

%
25%

Research & Policy Analysis

4

27%

4

14%

4

17%

2

50%

1

6%

4

14%

4

17%

0

0%

Network & Coalition Building

0

0%

4

14%

4

17%

0

0%

Testimony

3

20%

2

7%

1

4%

0

0%

Media

2

13%

2

7%

1

4%

0

0%

Legal Advocacy/Litigation

0

0%

0

0%

2

8%

1

25%

Public Education

0

0%

2

7%

0

0%

0

0%

Marches or Rallies

0

0%

1

4%

0

0%

0

0%

Total

15

100%

28

100%

24

100%

4

100%

Grassroots Organizing &
Mobilization
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Capacity Building Initiatives
Leaders were asked about projects their organizations were undertaking to increase the
knowledge and skills of the membership or to build infrastructure. Most leaders suggested that
they were training the general membership on how to effectively articulate the organization’s
message to legislators, whether through face-to-face meetings, on the phone, in a letter, or
through email. Some of these organizations produce literature for members to read, while others
run a training session. In order to increase the general membership’s knowledge of the issue, one
organization has a website and a forum on which they post new research produced by the active
members. Two organizations conduct trainings with the members at the state capital, during
which they shadow a more experienced member, then lobby on their own. On the other hand,
one leader stated her hesitance about training the general membership to lobby at the state
capital:
We really don’t want them out there speaking to legislators, because one of the
detrimental things is when you have a bunch of people under this same organizational
name talking about different issues, talking about their personal stories, talking about this
bullshit that really, the legislators don’t care about. And it wastes the legislators’ time, so
it will turn them off, and they will be difficult to get them back to the table…Most
people, when they get in front of a legislator, they get very nervous, they ramble, they
talk about stuff that has nothing to do with the big picture, and I don’t mean to be
cold…they just whine about their own story and their own difficulties. These individuals
that are in there—that are not up to snuff on how to deal with these legislators—they
waste your opportunity.
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To build the infrastructure of the organization, SORN SMOs were working on three types
of projects: a) increasing membership, b) changing organizational structure or goals, and c)
increasing financial resources. Half (9) of the leaders reported that they are working to increase
membership, especially in different areas of their state. In order to increase membership, a few
organizations were conducting letter-writing drives to individuals listed on the public registry.
One organization teaches current members how to rally support for the cause, with the goal of
bringing in new members.
Five leaders mentioned projects that would change the structure or goals of the
organization. Two organizations have had outside consultants conduct organizational retreats to
create strategic plans. One of these leaders stated, “It was invaluable. And he essentially
summarized the decisions we made and wrote a long-range plan for us. We have very little
reworking to do, but it basically stands for what we’re gonna do in the next three years.” Three
organizations expressed a desire to bring in skilled individuals that can develop different aspects
of the organization. One leader believed that the organization needed a leadership team, instead
of one sole leader doing the majority of the work:
Well, I’m really trying to get more structure to our organization. I’m going to
incorporate, I’m going to set up as a non-profit, and then set up a leadership team, and
then have some specific roles. I think that’s been kind of the problem—we didn’t
designate specific jobs for people, so I’m really trying to frame out some things [to help]
me as the director: have a membership director, and get somebody who can be our
webmaster.
Another leader disclosed that there is a need for another leader in the organization to take over,
because, “We have people on our board that will be better than me at this stage of our
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growth…folks who have been Executive Directors….I’m a good writer, so I’m gonna focus on
that. I can help our group much more if I focus on those things”. One leader noted that he has
tried to reach out to individuals in his state that are crusaders for similar causes, requesting their
participation with his SORN SMO. To date, he has not been successful in increasing the number
of skilled individuals in the organization.
To boost their financial resources, a few organizations were focusing on fundraising. Two
organizations had recently established a committee to explore ways to bring in more money.
Another organization has started to have conversations with other SORN SMOs across the
country to see how their peer groups have raised funds. One organization is working on bringing
in a volunteer who has the skills to do fundraising, and will take that on as their primary task. To
raise funds, another organization is creating a resource manual for offenders re-entering into the
community. This bound resource manual will be for sale to parole officers, offenders and their
family members. As an additional source of revenue, the manual will also have sponsored
advertisements.
These results show the various types of SORN SMOs that are operating across the United
States. While many of them are relatively new to the political arena, they are mobilizing to
change SORN policies. These signs can be found in their resources, activities and outcomes. The
next chapter will further discuss these results, in relation to the theories and research questions
that guide this dissertation.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
The sample included in this dissertation shows that these SORN SMOs have influenced
the policy environments in which they are operating, with 16 of 19 organizations achieving a
policy outcome by the time their leaders were interviewed. This is especially important when
considering that none of the organizations had been in existence for more than six years. This
dissertation is the first analysis of SORN SMOs; thus, the three dominant theories of SMOs were
used to garner an overall picture of these organizations: cultural/cognitive approaches, resource
mobilization and political opportunities. This chapter is organized by these theories, and the
research questions will be addressed within these theory sections. It is important to point out that,
while this chapter separates these theories, the respective theoretical concepts do not operate in a
silo. These theories are commonly used in combination to evaluate the interactions of their
corresponding concepts (McAdam, et al., 1996); therefore, when appropriate, these interactions
will be discussed within the most appropriate theory section. Finally, the section on implications
for practice and policy discusses similarities and differences between SORN SMOs and the
organizations with the most similar levels of stigmatization: prisoners’ rights and poor peoples’
rights movements.
Cultural/Cognitive Approaches
Cultural/cognitive approaches use a constructivist paradigm to evaluate the context and
culture that surrounds the issues that SMOs are trying to change (Shafer Caniglia & Carmin,
2005; Williams, 2007). These theories facilitate discussion of the ways that SMOs make claims
about their issue in order to frame the topic and mobilize others to action. Leaders in this study
were asked about the organization’s mission and the primary points they make when talking to
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individuals about the goals of the SORN SMO. These leaders reported five major topics found in
their mission and message.
Cultural/cognitive approaches highlight the importance of issue framing. The first two
topics discussed by SORN SMOs use a rational, research-based argument to frame their position
for changing SORN policies. First, the message focuses on educating the public about the current
sex offender management policies and research that refutes commonly held misinformation
regarding sex offender recidivism and treatment that are the foundation of these policies. Second,
leaders reported that they frame the issue in the same light under which these policies were
written: safety. However, they discuss how these policies do not create a safer environment for
families or the community. The leaders discussed how the stigma and isolation experienced by
registrants and their families put these families at risk for harm, and that this isolation may put
registrants at a greater risk to reoffend (Edwards & Hensley, 2001), which reduces community
safety (Prescott & Rockoff, 2008). Many leaders described how SORN policies have harmed
registrants in their groups, from harassment and isolation to the loss of their homes. Likewise,
leaders reported that these policies are unlikely to stop a new offense from happening. Thus, the
issue of safety is paramount to SORN SMOs, and they frame the issue by highlighting that these
policies are not accomplishing this goal. While the leaders reported extensive knowledge of the
research regarding sex offender treatment and recidivism, and many highlighted the positive
responses they have gained from this education process, others reported that their organizations’
challengers and policy makers are not always influenced by these arguments. Many scholars
have suggested that registration policies are not driven by research evidence (Chaffin, 2008;
Fedoroff & Moran, 1997; Levenson & D’Amora, 2007; Quinn, et. al., 2004; Turner, 2002), but
are more likely to be driven by misinformation, moral panic (Cohen, 1972), and popular
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punitivism (Bottoms, 1995). Misinformation takes the place of valid research, and has created
cultural beliefs that “once a sex offender, always a sex offender (Turner, 2002) and that sex
offenders are unresponsive to treatment (Faniff & Becker, 2006; Hanson, et. al., 2002). Moral
panic, as termed by Cohen (1972), suggests that the public’s fear of sex offenders is out of
proportion to the actual threat that they pose (Jenkins, 1998). Popular punitivism occurs when the
public’s desires for harsh sanctions has a greater influence on the decisions of policymakers.
Therefore, the research evidence may not able to overcome the dynamic between these three
forces. However, Sabatier (1991) suggests that a single piece of research is unlikely to impact
policy, but that, over the course of time, and as the research accumulates, policy makers are
likely to understand the issue and investigate the causes and consequences of social policies.
The third topic discussed by SORN SMOs is the collateral consequences, for both
registrants and their family members that result from these management policies. The leaders
highlighted the harm that is done to the family members of registered sex offenders, such as their
spouses and children (Comartin, et. al., 2010; Levenson & Tewksbury, 2009). These collateral
consequences range from loss of friends and family members because of the stigma associated
with public registration to loss of employment or housing (Tewksbury, 2005). To draw on the
sympathies of their audience, organizations have also used this frame for youthful offenders.
Leaders reported that they do not believe that the public would agree with these extensive
punishments for youthful offenders. Thus, this frame is used to appeal to the hearts of the public
and policy makers, and may be more useful in political environments, where the research
evidence argument is unlikely to be useful.
Fourth, some SORN SMOs expressed that these policies, and the collateral consequences
that ensue, violate the rights of offenders. These organizations stressed that everyone in the
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United States of America has a basic level of rights. They believe that once individuals have
been convicted of a sex offense and have completed their court requirements, they should be able
to re-secure these inalienable rights. However, sex offender management policies continue to
keep sex offenders from having these rights long after they have paid their debt to society. These
include rights to privacy, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, ex post facto violations,
and due process of the law (Finn, 1997; Griffin & West, 2006; Lewis, 1996). This argument is
not a rational argument, such as those that are based on the research evidence, and it is not used
to gain the sympathies of the public, such as the collateral consequences argument. This
argument is used to tap into the individual’s beliefs in the values of this nation. This message
was used by some organizations, because there was an indication that this was particularly
important in their states; however, other leaders stated the opposite: that the message of
offender’s rights is not one that will mobilize key stakeholders towards policy change in that
area. Therefore, the usefulness of this message seems highly dependent on the context in which
the organization is operating.
The fifth and final point is the high cost to tax payers for implementing and maintaining
current sex offender management policies (Justice Policy Institute, 2008). This argument comes
at a time when states have had to make extensive budget cuts. This argument has primarily been
used when talking to legislators and is greatly influenced by the current political opportunity of
state budget reductions (Kingdon, 2003). Many SORN SMOs state that this is one of their most
effective arguments when lobbying and educating policy makers and during legislative
testimony. SORN SMOs have used this argument with the general public but it has not had the
same level of influence as it does on policymakers.
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Are there differences in how SORN SMOs frame the SORN policy issues when
advocating for policy changes specific to registered juvenile sex offenders? The answer to
this research question is that most of the organizations framed the overall message differently
when advocating on behalf of youthful registrants. These organizations suggested that juvenile
and youthful (i.e. ‘Romeo & Juliet’) offenders may have made a mistake instead of acting out of
malicious intent. Therefore, there is a belief that these youths should not be subject to the same
sanctions as adult offenders. These organizations emphasize rehabilitation and redemption for
this type of offender; both of these concepts are grounded in the philosophy of the juvenile court
system (Repucci, 1999).
One-third of SORN SMOs interviewed do not advocate differently for young registrants.
These organizations believe that once individuals have been labeled as ‘sex offenders,’ they are
all treated as ‘monsters’. The analysis of these organizations showed organizational differences:
a less formalized structure, fewer resources and fewer strategies used, when compared to the rest
of the organizations. This researcher thought that maybe these organizations did not advocate
differently for young offenders because these states do not register this population; however,
only one organization was from a state that registered juveniles. While this dissertation
specifically studied how these organizations operated in their individual states, an interesting
focus for the future, if the movement decides to take a national stage, is how the national
movement will resolve these conflicting frames, through what Zald (1996) called an “internal
competitive process” over which frame comes to dominate the movement.
Are there differences in how SORN SMOs frame the SORN policy issues when
trying to persuade different audiences for mobilization, such as the potential or current
members, policy decision-makers, and the public? The majority of SORN SMOs tailor their

116

messages differently for different audiences, as a form of “strategic activity” and “external
competitive processes” (Zald, 1996). Strategic activity is when the organization tailors the
message so that it resonates with a person or group (see also Snow & Bedford, 1988), and
external competitive process is where the issue is tailored to those who challenge the SORN
SMOs’ position. SORN SMOs generally use the five arguments discussed above as the
overarching framework for the claims they make about SORN policies. However, the majority of
the organizations stated that they emphasize some points more than the others, depending on
which group they are speaking to: members, the public or politicians. Furthermore, some
organizations tailor the message even further, based on the person or group with whom they are
speaking. Those organizations that reported having challengers to their cause used the
challenger’s arguments to reframe the issue. These different frames for mobilization are
discussed below.
SORN SMOs that tailored the message to members reported that they generally frame the
issue in response to the work and rhetoric that is being discussed in the state legislature. An
interesting finding from the standpoint of a micro social work lens is that a few organizations
spend time empowering the members, by letting registrants know that they are not their crime.
This is a therapeutic technique used to help registrants de-identify with the label of “sex
offender,” to rise above the problem and create change within themselves, and also to empower
ex-offenders to mobilize for change within the movement.
The messages to the public and politicians are generally the same. However, there is
more emphasis on the misconceptions about sex offenders and the impacts on children and
families with the public, while the costs to the state was one of the dominant points of emphasis
with legislators. Less than half of the leaders reported that their organizations tailor the message
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to each specific audience they address. Williams and Demerath (1991) suggests that mobilization
to particular audiences is likely to garner more support for one’s cause, as in the case where one
SORN SMO focused on an ethic of redemption when asking for the support of religious
organizations or clergy. Tailoring the organization’s message to this level of intricacy is
necessary because the policy process is greatly impacted by values and beliefs of individual
policy makers (Ostrom, 2007); therefore, all of these organizations may wish to investigate their
audiences to this depth before implementing the advocacy strategies, thus increasing support for
their cause.
Under cultural/cognitive approaches, there are external competitive processes (Zald,
1996), which is how SORN SMOs frame the issue in reaction to a challenger’s frame. This
particular frame of the SORN SMO is greatly influenced by the arguments of the challenger. It
has been mentioned that many organizations have tried to use research evidence to counter the
arguments of challengers, but this has not proven effective in all cases. At this point, some of the
organizations have noted that they end up ignoring the statements of the challenger. While there
was no question on this dissertation’s instrument to probe for other strategies or tactics used with
challengers, it is important that SORN SMO leaders find a way to work with, or work around,
immovable challengers. One organization reported that they attempt to find common ground
with any individual or group that opposes the organization’s position; however, there is a point at
which discussion is no longer useful or successful. If this individual or group is particularly
important in bringing about change on SORN policies, it may behoove the SORN SMO to
network with an individual or organization that can act as a mediator to present the issue to the
challenger and engage them in an open discussion (Rucht, 2007).
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What role does stigma play in how organizations frame their issue? The stigma
associated with sex offenders has greatly influenced the way that SORN SMOs frame their
issues. The majority of the organizations reported that the public highly stigmatizes this
population. Only two organizations reported a different situation. Both of these SORN SMOs
operate in rural states where most people know individuals in their town by name. Here, an
individual’s reputation is likely to cause the stigmatization more than a publicly available list of
registered sex offenders. For the remaining states, SORN SMOs tried to appeal to their
audiences’ logic and reasoning, compassion and values to overcome the stigma mind set.
Additionally, some used more sympathetic cases, such as young offenders and children of
registrants, to reduce the level of stigmatization among the public.
Approximately half of the organizations reported that policy makers are less harsh in
judgment than the public; however, legislators are unlikely to put this issue on their agenda,
because it would negatively impact their political careers. The unwillingness of politicians to
take on this issue due to public support for harsh sanctions is backed by the concept of popular
punitivism (Bottoms, 1995). SORN SMO leaders reported that politicians understand that these
policies are a violation of the offender’s rights, that the impacts on registrants and their family
members are extensive, and the policies are unlikely deterring future sexual offenses; yet, they
shy away from fixing these problems. The misconceptions that the public holds about sex
offenders is reflected in the way constituents vote, and politicians are aware that the public is
unlikely to elect them if they appear to be “soft” on crime. Thus, proving that stigma is
associated with this population is a sizeable challenge to the work of SORN SMOs. Again, the
argument that has been most effective with policy makers is the high cost to tax payers for
implementing registration policies.
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Resource Mobilization
Resource mobilization theory focuses on the history, structure, resources and membership
found within the target organizations. SORN SMOs have been operating for only a relatively
short period of time and are most often lead by a family member of a registrant or a registrant
personally, which reveals that this social movement is relatively new and deeply personal to
those within these organizations. Using the process lens, this dissertation investigated additional
inputs: resources, formalization, organizational legitimacy, and the knowledge and skills that are
necessary to do advocacy work. The resources of SORN SMOs take on material and human
forms, which have been directly connected to the success (or failure) of SMOs (Edwards &
McCarthy, 2007). SORN SMOs have very few material resources, with only five participating
organizations reporting an operating budget. With lower levels of material resources than other
social movements, one might conclude that SORN SMOs are destined for failure; however, the
type of movement (Kriesi, 1996) may have a greater impact on the longevity and success of
SORN SMOs. These organizations are part of an identity-driven movement, which suggests a
high level of commitment on the part of the membership that will sustain the group despite
having lower resource levels than other movements (Kriesi, 1996). Even though identity
movements have been found to contain more committed members, the relatively low levels of
membership across SORN SMOs (1-500) may not be high enough to combat the stigma,
misinformation, moral panic and popular punitivism urge to punish sex offenders that are driving
registration policies. A greater number of advocates are needed to achieve policy changes. A
barrier commonly reported is that SORN SMOS have difficulties mobilizing current and
potential members because they fear what will happen to themselves and their family members if
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they take another high-profile position. Members as an organizational resource should be a focal
point, as these organizations move forward towards their desired policy goals.
The indicators of a formalized structure used in this dissertations (i.e. identified
leadership, executive board, incorporation, written documents, business meetings, centralized
decision making, and subcommittees) shows that SORN SMOs are between a high and low level
of formalization. This is evidenced by one-half to two-thirds of the organizations reporting these
indicators and also through the use of McCarthy’s (1996) dimensions of movement-mobilizing
structures; where SORN SMOs are more formal than local activist networks because they were
not founded within the social circles of the member’s daily lives, but are less formal than SMOs
with highly professionalized national offices. Kriesi (1996) suggests that most SMOs begin with
power in the hands of a few members, but as these organizations grow and develop, they begin to
build resources that make the structure more formal. Kriesi states, “The process of internal
structuration is virtually inevitable, if the SMO is to have success in the long run (p.155)”.
SORN SMOs are developing the four elements of “internal structuration”: formalization,
professionalization, internal differentiation and integration (Kriesi, 1996). Formalization includes
the documentation and integration of organizational documents, and the creation of formal
leadership and office structure. Professionalization is occurring on a minor level, as SORN
SMOs build the capacity of their organizations through trainings and the integration of
professionalized volunteers; however, none of the organizations have paid professional staff.
Almost half of the organizations exhibit differentiation, through role division (sub-committees).
At the same time, decisions are centrally decided upon by the active members, and there are also
coordinating mechanisms for organizational integration (executive boards and business
meetings) (Kriesi, 1996). An important point that SORN SMOs should consider is a concern
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which was reported by one organizational leader regarding what Kriesi (1996) calls
“organizational maintenance”. This is when the goal of the organization has moved from a focus
on policy change to a focus on maintaining organizational structure and resources. If this shift
occurs, then the policy outcomes become less central to the mission of SORN SMOs.
An interesting finding related to the structure of these organizations is that the SORN
SMOs have different tax statuses. While these organizations focus on policy change, a few
reported that they are incorporated as a 501(c)3. This status limits the lobbying efforts of the
organization under Internal Revenue Service (IRS) code, which ultimately hinders the ability of
these organizations to reach their policy outcomes. Conversely, eight organizations are
incorporated as a 501(c)4, which does not place limits on their advocacy efforts but does not
allow a tax deduction for individuals who contribute funds to the organization. This status causes
a barrier for organizations that require financial resources for their work. The choice of which tax
status to use is an important element for these organizations to consider, which will ultimately
impact their mobilization efforts. McCarthy (1996) suggests that these choices in structure will
expand or constrain the range of policy goals that these organizations can achieve.
Resource mobilization theory suggests that organizational legitimacy determines
successful advocacy (Edwards & McCarthy, 2007). SORN SMOs have had difficulties in
establishing themselves as legitimate organizations, as evidenced by the difficulties in obtaining
meetings with policy makers and gaining access to the political arena. It is likely that the stigma
surrounding ‘sex offenders’ contributes to this lack of legitimacy. Some SORN SMOs have
integrated professionals who work with this population to strengthen their legitimacy (Edwards
& McCarthy, 2007). In addition, some professionals who work with sex offenders participate in
the strategies of SORN SMOs, most commonly attorneys and treatment providers who are likely
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to speak to the misinformation that is perpetuated about sex offenders. These professionals
participate in a wide range of efforts made by these organizations. Building a list of professional
allies, who are not personally impacted by this issue, will increase SORN SMO legitimacy. This,
in turn, will assist SORN SMOs in gaining access to the political environment.
SORN SMOs have the foundational information and skills needed to conduct their
advocacy work, which Edwards and McCarthy (2007) label as the human capital that individuals
bring to a social movement. However, there are two voids of information: the impact that SORN
policies have on victims of sexual violence and alternative approaches that states can take to
achieve the desired outcomes of SORN policies. While half of SORN SMOs have developed an
alternative approach, only a few are able to discuss projected outcomes from these alternatives.
Even fewer organizations are able to talk about the tradeoffs between current SORN policies and
an alternative policy. If organizations are able to fully articulate a plan to address the goals
intended by SORN policies, then they may be more successful. Kingdon (2003) writes that major
reform occurs when a window of opportunity opens and policy advocates are ready with a welldeveloped policy proposal that is technically, financially and politically acceptable to decision
makers. SORN SMOs should be ready with an alternative policy proposal that addresses the
issues with current policies, and also discusses the projected outcomes from the new proposal
and the tradeoffs between the new proposal and existing policies. It may be more likely that
SORN SMOS will achieve greater outcomes if the proposal is ready to go when a political
opportunity arises.
What barriers have SORN SMOs experienced when trying to reach their policy
outcomes? The participating leaders were asked about the barriers they experienced when trying
to achieve previous or current policy outcomes. A range of barriers were reported: stigma
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towards sex offenders, a lack of political will on the part of policy decision makers, challengers
to the issue, the state’s political climate or political processes, organizational resources and
structure, and lack of research evidence. The most significant barrier that SORN SMOs need to
overcome is the high level of disdain both the public and politicians feel toward sex offenders.
These attitudes have likely influenced the lack of political will on the part of politicians, as well
as challengers to the issue. Political climate and political processes are likely to remain barriers,
as politicians cling to ways that make policy change difficult, especially for SMOs that are
outside of the decision-making process.
SORN SMOs are relatively new organizations, so the resources they have acquired and
the structure they have implemented are in the beginning stages. As groups build a grassroots
movement and gain new members, the resources and structure are likely to progress; otherwise
the organizations are likely to perish (Kriesi, 1996). Two leaders noted that part of their
advocacy work is specific on behalf of registrants who have been convicted of child
pornography. They noted that a lack of rigorous research to either confirm or deny the theoretical
claim that individuals who view child pornography are likely to commit an offense against a
child deters more effective forms of management and treatment of this type of registrant.
What do SORN SMOs do to increase the capacity of their organization to
implement advocacy strategies in an effort to reach their desired policy outcome goals?
SORN SMOs are undertaking projects to build the skills and knowledge of the membership and
to change the infrastructure of their organizations. To increase the skills and knowledge, some
organizations take a hands-on approach by training their membership to lobby through courses
and shadowing. Others are doing their best to provide information about how to do these tasks
using email or a group forum. Leaders are also changing the organization’s infrastructure, by
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increasing membership levels, revising the organizational structure for more effective delegation
of tasks, and increasing the organization’s financial resources. These projects are intended to
make the organizations more effective at implementing their strategies to achieve their desired
policy goals.
Political Opportunities/Processes
Political opportunities/process theory was used to investigate the influence that SORN
SMOs have had on their political environment. SORN SMOs conduct various activities in order
to reach their goals. The activities they use are specifically related to advocacy strategies and
policy fulfillment (HFRP, 2009). While there are eight different policy goals, the SORN SMOs
included in this dissertation have achieved four: blocking, amending, developing and adopting a
policy. The remaining goals: placement on the policy agenda, policy implementation, policy
monitoring and evaluation, and policy maintenance have not been achieved. However, two
organizations are currently focused on policy monitoring. The range of SORN policies that these
organizations have achieved or are currently working on include: reductions or elimination of
registration and community notification requirements, easing or eliminating residency
restrictions, establishing or improving sex offender treatment programs, encouraging the use of
risk assessments to distinguish between offenders who are at greatest risk to society from those
who are not, and reducing sanctions for youthful offenders. It is surmised that the remaining
policy goals have not been the focus because of the newness of their efforts and because
organizations need to react to the multiple policies that are being introduced that increase
sanctions for registrants through policy blocking.
SORN SMOs have difficulty establishing organizational legitimacy. This leads to their
initiatives not being given serious enough attention to be placed on policymakers’ agendas.
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Policy implementation would be more likely to occur if policies were adopted that fit the mission
of these SORN SMOs. Additionally, these organizations might be more likely to monitor,
evaluate and maintain policies that were in agreement with their position on sex offender
management policies. As they amend and adopt policies that support their position, SORN
SMOs may act as a watch-dog to be sure that policies are implemented correctly.
What strategies do SORN SMOs use that they perceive had an impact on a
successful policy outcome? For the previously achieved policy outcomes, SORN SMOs used
six of the 13 strategies commonly used by SMOs: a) lobbying and policy maker education, b)
research and policy analysis, c) testimony, d) networking and coalition building, e) grassroots
organizing and mobilization, and f) media interviews or stories. Proactive organizations, those
that adopted, developed or amended policies, used networking and coalition building, grassroots
organizing and mobilization, and media stories more than reactive organizations. Reactive
organizations, which blocked and amended policy, used research and policy analysis and
testimony. Both the proactive and reactive organizations reported using each of these strategies;
however, these strategies were reported as being used by one type of organization more than the
other. The strategies that were not used by any of the SORN SMOs to achieve their policy
outcomes were: a) polling the public, b) voter education, c) public education, d) legal advocacy
or litigation, e) demonstration projects or pilot programs, f) endorsement of political candidates,
or g) rallies or marches. Strategies directed toward the general public are unlikely to be used by
these organizations because of the public’s perceptions associated with the target population. For
example, rallies and marches, polling the public and voter education may lead to a backlash on
this issue. Additionally, SORN SMOs are unlikely to publicly endorse a political candidate
because of the general public’s punitive attitudes, making policy makers unlikely to advocate for
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this issue. Some organizations used public education and legal advocacy or litigation, but they
were not specifically tied to the achieved policy outcome. It is speculated that demonstration
projects or pilot programs were also unlikely to be used because these are costly to undertake.
Currently, SORN SMOs do not have the financial resources for such programs. An interesting
finding in this dissertation that differs from what is known about other social movements is the
reluctance of SORN SMOs to use the media as an advocacy strategy. Generally, this strategy has
been used to create political opportunities for social movements (Gamson & Meyer, 1996);
however, many SORN SMOs believe that the media has created hysteria about sex offenders and
continues to perpetuate misinformation. Therefore, some SORN SMOs do not see the media as a
way to open up political opportunities.
SORN SMOs are working to change policies related to sex offender registration and
community notification, ease residency restrictions, encourage the use of risk assessments to
classify offenders at greatest risk to society, push for the creation of a state level sex offender
management board, urge mandatory treatment for sex offenders in the state prison system and
advocate for reductions in sanctions for certain offenders: youth and individuals charged with
child pornography possession.
What strategies do SMOs’ use to reach their current goals? SORN SMOs are using
more strategies to achieve the current policy goals, as opposed to their previous focuses: a)
lobbying and policy maker education, b) research and policy analysis, c) grassroots organizing
and mobilization, d) network and coalition building, e) testimony, f) media interviews/stories, g)
legal advocacy/litigation, h) public education and i) marches or rallies. All of the organizations
are now using lobbying and policy maker education and research and policy analysis.
Organizations that are blocking a policy are also using grassroots organizing, the media and
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testimony. Organizations that are blocking a policy use testimony more often than the
organizations focused on other policy goals. Organizations that are blocking a policy are also
using the media more often than organizations that are achieving another policy goal.
Organizations that are developing a policy are using the same strategies as the organizations that
are blocking policies, but, in addition, they are using network and coalition building and legal
advocacy and litigation. Organizations that are amending policies are using the same strategies as
organizations that are developing policies, except they are not using legal advocacy and
litigation; and, interestingly, they are using strategies that take a high profile position on this
issue: public education and marches or rallies. Organizations that are monitoring policies are
using three strategies: lobbying and policy maker education, research and policy analysis, and
legal advocacy and litigation.
What adaptive strategies have resulted in an SORN SMO’s perceived effectiveness
towards an identified policy outcome? SORN SMOs were asked about times in their
organizations’ past when they changed their strategies or their policy outcome goals due to
events that were occurring in the policy environment. Kingdon (2003) suggests that opportunities
for policy change are likely to occur unpredictably and that the window of opportunity will only
be open for a short period of time. Therefore, SORN SMOs must be flexible in the ways they
engage with policymakers. Six SORN SMOs reported that they have changed their strategies or
goals in the past. As three organizations became more familiar with their state’s political
environment, two changed their goals to fit with the current policy climate, and the other held off
on a policy goal until it was more likely to pass in the legislature. Three organizations reported
changes in strategy. One organization changed the way it framed the issue to policymakers, by
focusing on more sympathetic cases first to gain interest in the issue. Another organization
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changed the way its members testified, after realizing that policy makers wanted to hear different
perspectives on the issue, instead of hearing that many individuals have the same opinions. The
final organization, after realizing that lobbying and policy maker education was not going to gain
attention, decided to take the issue to the courts and began using legal advocacy and litigation.
Two of the organizations that changed their goals achieved a successful policy outcome after
these changes.
How do SORN SMOs use opportunities in the political environment to make
progress towards their policy outcome goals? SORN SMOs used three opportunities in
conjunction with their achieved policy outcome: court cases related to SORN policies that were
likely to influence new legislation; media portrayals of issues for registered offenders; and events
in the state’s legislature. Court cases have been used as a means of testing the constitutionality of
SORN policies in relation to cruel and unusual punishment and retroactivity. These cases,
especially the Supreme Court cases in Ohio, have resulted in high costs to the state to implement
a new policy that was subsequently found unconstitutional, forcing the state to eventually go
back to earlier policies. When courts find these policies unconstitutional, the goal is to have
legislators amend the policy to make it constitutional (Van Horn, et. al., 2001). The costs to the
state have been exorbitant, creating another opportunity for SORN SMOs use at a time when
state budgets do not allow for irresponsible spending. SORN SMOs have used the media to help
frame the issue in respects to the unintended consequences experienced by registrants and their
family members, which is reflected in the SMOs literature, which states that the media can help
shift public opinion (Gamson & Meyer, 1996).
Adaptability of strategies and the use of political opportunities did not vary by the
clusters of organizations, other than when comparing the youth-focused organizations. Those
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that had previously achieved a policy outcome that was youth focused used more adaptive
strategies and more political opportunities than the organizations that did not have a youthfocused achieved policy outcome. It seems as though youth-focused organizations would gain
greater access to the political environment and would not need to adapt as much as the
organizations focused on all types of sex offenders.
Tarrow (1996) suggests three elements that open opportunities in the policy environment:
creating an opening in the environment, using of influential allies, and dividing elites in the
environment. SORN SMO leaders mentioned that an opening in the environment and the use of
influential allies (professionals and individual policy makers) have created opportunities for
engagement in the political environment; however, none reported the division of elites.
What organizational factors, including structure, resources, issue framing, and
perceived stigma, are associated with SORN SMOs reporting a policy goal that was
achieved? The following discussion should be interpreted with caution, as the sample was small,
and statistical significance testing was not used. The differences found between different types of
organizations should be investigated more intensely in the future. SORN SMOs were clustered
by different types of organizations (i.e. proactive/reactive, youth focused/non-youth focused, and
organizations that advocate differently for young offenders/organizations that do not advocate
differently for young offenders) to look for differences in structure, resources, issue framing and
perceived stigma. It was found that organizations that are proactive, not youth-focused in the
previously achieved policy, and organizations that do not advocated differently for young
offenders have more formalized structures. This may be due to the length of operation and
number of active members to build the organizations’ infrastructure.
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Proactive organizations, organizations that had previously achieved a goal that was youth
focused, and organizations that advocate differently for young offenders have more resources
and use a greater number of advocacy strategies. This may have occurred because young
offenders are likely to gain more support than other types of registered offenders. Additionally,
proactive organizations may have acquired more resources because people are motivated to take
charge of their own destiny to make things better, as opposed to only stopping things from
getting worse (i.e. blocking policies).
Reactive organizations, non-youth focused organizations, and organizations that do not
advocate differently for young offenders exhibited more developed issue framing. These three
types of organizations are facing greater levels of stigma and are generally facing challengers;
thus, it is not surprising that they have tailored their messages and used frames that address the
individual characteristics of the individuals they speak with, by advocating with research,
emotions and values in the way they frame the issue.
Reactive organizations, non-youth-focused organizations and organizations that advocate
differently for young offenders had higher perceived stigma. A higher level of perceived stigma
makes sense for reactive organizations and non-youth focused organizations, because they are
less likely to directly face challengers to the issues, or they are dealing with the general
population of sex offenders, which leads to greater levels of stigma. However, it is possible that
organizations that advocate for young offenders differently would have lower levels of perceived
stigma. Again, these findings should be viewed with caution, and the reasons for these
differences should be studied more thoroughly in the future.
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Implications for Practice and Policy
This dissertation takes the first comprehensive look at SORN SMOs, by investigating
these organizations on three levels: a) how they use their message or position to gain support for
their cause; b) the resources that they have, and the strategies they use to reach their desired
policy outcomes; and c) their interactions with the policy environment to use or create
opportunities for public policy change. Additionally, the process lens allows for an investigation
of the resources and activities that are employed to achieve various policy outcomes. While
social work researchers have called for the use of a process lens on advocacy organizations,
(Netting, O’Connor, & Fauri, 2007) there is a paucity of examples in the literature. Unique to
SORN SMOs is the high level of stigma associated with the sex-offender population. Little is
known about the influence of stigma on the policy change process for advocacy organizations.
Therefore, this dissertation informs social work practice by adding to the literature related to
advocacy work with stigmatized populations.
Since the literature does not currently include SORN SMOs, the closest types of SMOs or
movements were used as comparisons. Most notably is the prisoners’ rights movement and, less
notably, the poor peoples’ movement. From the 1960s to the 1980s, prison reform was taking
place within the court system, through legal activism (Jacobs, 1980). Prisoners’ rights
organizations were made up of prisoners; however reform was heavily dependent on individuals
on the outside; mostly lawyers. Major Supreme Court cases ruled that the treatment of inmates in
some prisons was cruel and unusual punishment. This stimulated state and local corrections
departments to follow suit. Some lawyers utilized other advocacy strategies to bring attention to
the issue of prison reform. For example Alvin Bronstien of the American Civil Liberties Union
championed the cause through lobbying, public speaking, and presenting at national conferences
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(Jacobs, 1980). Near the end of the 1980s, there was an assumption that Supreme Court rulings
would do little to interfere with prison reform, so alternative strategies for change were needed.
Contrary to what has occurred in the prison reform movement, few SORN SMOs have used legal
advocacy/litigation as a strategy for policy change. SORN SMOs should evaluate the advantages
and disadvantages of using legal advocacy, compared to other advocacy strategies to achieve
their desired reforms.
Recently, legislators and administrative officers have played a role in prison reform
(Jacobs, 1980; Schuhmann & Wodahl, 2001). Jacobs (1980) writes, “The point is that a
preoccupation with the courts should not blind us to the role of legislatures in both stimulating
and impeding the goals of prisoners’ rights advocates and their allies” (pg.447). A more recent
case that used various advocacy strategies towards prison reform is the passage of the federal
Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) (Schuhmann & Wodahl, 2011). Schuhmann and Wodahl
(2011) highlight the significance of the passage of this law at a time when there is little political
will for reform on behalf of offenders. They highlight five components that successfully led to
the passage of this policy: a) engagement of a policy entrepreneur, b) coalition building with
evangelical organizations, c) putting a minimal financial and administrative burdens on the states
to implement the policy, d) allowing states to implement the policy through their respective
corrections department, thus abating a criticism of federalism, and e) re-framing the issue to put
the focus on the benefits to the community, rather than the benefits to offenders. The similarities
between this most recent prisoner reform policy and SORN SMOs is emphasizing cost reduction,
focusing on state’s rights through state-level reform, and highlighting the negative impacts that
SORN policies have on community safety. Additionally, some of the organizations have begun
to build their advocacy network with other like-minded SMOs.
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The stark difference between SORN SMOs and the advocacy undertaken for PREA is
that SORN SMOs lack a policy entrepreneur. A policy entrepreneur is someone who: a) has a
level of credibility in the political arena, b) possesses political skills and holds connections with
key stakeholders, and c) persists in policy change goals (Kingdon, 2003). Michael Horowitz, a
lifelong civil-rights and sex-trafficking reform activist, took up the prison rape issue, and used
his connections as an appointee to President Reagan’s administration to put this policy on the
agenda. He organized conservative SMOs (i.e. evangelicals) around this issue. This difference
suggests a gap in SORN SMOs’ strategies, when reflecting on how a similar SMO successfully
achieved its desired federal policy, thus suggesting that SORN SMOs should focus on finding a
policy entrepreneur to build a groundswell of advocates.
Another stigmatized population that has been investigated in the research literature is the
poor peoples’ movement. A landmark exploration of this movement by Piven and Cloward
(1977) de-emphasizes the use of organizations, because the lack of resources among these
members is not likely to support an organizational structure and activities. In fact, it is suggested
that organizational development and maintenance would detract from the implementation of
advocacy strategies. These authors further note that the focus of the poor peoples’ movement has
been to implement contentious and unruly strategies to call attention to the plight of the poor.
Since the Piven/Cloward writing, however, another author (Hall, 1995) has shown that
organizations, in fact, have been effective in the poor peoples’ movement. These two findings
are unlikely to be useful for SORN SMOs or any similar organization. For SORN SMOs,
organizational capacity and the collective voice of the membership is essential to combat the
high levels of distaste for sex offenders among the public. Additionally, this dissertation found
that organizations making proactive change were more formalized, had more resources, and
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implemented various types of strategies. The use of unruly or contentious strategies would draw
too much attention to the issue, which may exponentially increase the current societal ethic of
being “tough on crime”. The use of such tactics would attract media attention, which has, in the
past, demonized sex offenders and perpetuated misinformation about them. Thus, there are few
similarities between the SORN movement and of the organizations that are part of the poor
peoples’ movement.
This dissertation also adds to the research literature regarding registered sex offenders, by
including information about SMOs that are advocating for changes to SORN policies. There are
many studies across disciplines that have highlighted the problems with SORN policies;
however, to date, the research literature lacks information about the ways that advocacy
organizations are influencing the policy change process. This dissertation pays particular
attention to differences between the advocacy work of SMOs on behalf of two segments of this
population: youthful offenders and adult offenders. Differences found across SORN SMOs that
have a youth focus and those that do not may contribute to our understanding of successful
advocacy work on behalf of protected groups of people.
The findings contribute to research related to SMOs, as there is a paucity of research with
organizations that focus on offenders; and more specifically, juvenile offenders. Much of the
work on SMOs has focused on the civil, women’s and gay rights movements, as well as
environmental and health care reform movements (see Snow, Soule & Kriesi, 2007 for more
movements). Additionally, little is known about movements that die out, i.e. organizations that
are unable to meet their policy goals, and thus disengage from the political process. A few
organizations whose leaders were interviewed for this dissertation have not built their resources
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and structures, which may lead to their failure (Kriesi, 1996). If the result of this movement is
that an SMO disassembles, this dissertation may highlight factors behind that failure.
Limitations
This dissertation is the first study to explore SORN SMOs. As an exploratory study, there
are weaknesses one must consider in assessing the findings in regards to the study’s method,
sample, and instrument. The method used was qualitative: telephone interviews. The intention
was to gain an in-depth understanding of SORN SMOs. While SORN SMOs from various states
participated, the influence of the state’s political environment may make for difficulties with
transferability (Padgett, 2008) to other SORN SMOs. While results were produced that look at
different types of SORN SMOs, these were only used to examine associations and cannot be
used as a means of predicting which inputs and activities are likely to predict the type of policy
outcome. While attempts were made to reduce researcher bias, this qualitative study is likely
influenced by the doctoral student’s personal biases as a participant in an organization similar to
those whose officials participated in interviews for this dissertation.
While the sampling unit was SORN SMOs, only one leader from each organization was
interviewed. It is unlikely that everyone in an organization would reply in the same way to all of
the questions on the instrument. Therefore, the findings for this study may have been different if
other individuals from the SORN SMO had been interviewed. Additionally, the findings may
have been different if other SORN SMOs that were found on ROSL’s website and did not
participate had decided to participate, or if more organizations had been found through snowball
sampling.
The major outcome variable used for this policy process lens asked the leader about the
SORN SMOs most important policy outcome that had been achieved to date, thus suggesting a
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dependence on the individual perceptions of the interviewee. A different policy outcome may
have been chosen had another individual in the organization been interviewed. Therefore,
organizations that fell into the reactive cluster may have been included in the proactive cluster
had another individual reported a different policy outcome. Furthermore, it is assumed that the
strategies the leader reported directly impacted the outcome that was achieved. While it may be
the case that these strategies did impact the policy outcome, there may have been alternative
events occurring at the same time that also influenced the outcome. Since all of the data for this
analysis were retrieved from self-report interviews of individuals on one side of this issue, it is
unlikely that a well-rounded view of SORN policies was achieved (Rubin & Babbie, 2010).
A few errors occurred during data collection that may have led to further limitations in
this dissertation. One interviewee was not asked the knowledge and skills questions because time
constraints cut the interview short. Additionally, a few interviewees had difficulty choosing an
appropriate response option for the knowledge questions that were predetermined by the doctoral
student: no knowledge, limited knowledge, moderate knowledge, substantial knowledge, and
extensive knowledge. Therefore, the interviewer allowed them to answer with a “yes/no”
response. Another leader was not asked about the arguments that the organization made in
relation to its achieved policy outcome. The interviewee from the newest organization that
participated in the study was unable to answer the questions about the organization’s “message”.
This qualitative, exploratory dissertation used the instrument as a guide for the interview and was
not treated as a highly standardized tool. However, the removal of questions for some
participants may have influenced the findings of the study.
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Future Research
This study highlights the influence that public attitudes have had on these organizations.
Future studies should also consider the dynamics of stigma and popular punitivism from the
perspective of policy makers. It is also important to gain a balanced perspective of this issue by
incorporating policy makers into this study. Other social movement and political science scholars
have suggested frameworks (Sabatier, 2007) and methods (Minkoff, 2002; Kriesi, 2007) to
achieve this balance.
While the doctoral candidate who wrote this dissertation investigated the inputs, activities
and outcomes of the organizations, additional concepts could have been included to understand
what is associated with achieving a successful policy outcome. For example, Morris and
Staggenborg (2007) suggest that leaders of social movements greatly impact the resource
mobilization, issue framing and policy achievement of SMOs. Therefore, more variables
regarding the leadership of SORN SMOs should be included in any follow-up study. To make
predictions about the inputs and activities that impact policy outcomes, these organizations
should be followed over time, tracking policy developments, along with the organizational inputs
and activities (Exworthy, 2008). Additionally, an in-depth look at the cultural contexts in which
these organizations operate is needed to gain a full picture of exogenous variables that impact
SORN policy outcomes.
Future studies with SORN SMOs should include interviews with other members of the
organization to capture differing opinions. It may also be useful to conduct case studies of
particular SORN SMOs to further understand the different clusters in this dissertation: a
proactive and a reactive organization, a youth-focused or a non-youth-focused organization, and
an organization that does not differentiate between types of registered offenders.
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APPENDIX A: Connection between Theory, Concepts, Research Questions and Interview
Questions
Theory/Pop Research Question Concept
Survey Question
ulation
RQ #3: Are there
What is the mission of your organization?
differences in how
Construct
What is the message of your organization?
SORN MOs frame
Meaning for
What are the arguments your organization has
the SORN policy
the Cause
made when trying to gain support for your
issues when
previous and current policy outcomes?
advocating for
Does your organization tailor the message
policy changes
Construct
depending on the audience (potential
specific to
Meaning for
members, politicians, the public)? If so, do
registered juvenile
Mobilization you believe that this has resulted in gaining
sex offenders? Are
more support for your cause? Please explain.
there differences in
Do you have a counter argument to the
how SORN SMOs
individuals or groups in your state that oppose
Cultural
frame the SORN
the changes you would like to see to these
Cognitive
policy issues when
policies? If yes, what is your counter
Approaches
trying to persuade
argument?
Construct
different audiences
Meaning as a
for mobilization,
Reaction to a
such as the
Challenger’s
potential or current
Frame of the
members, policy
Social
decision-makers,
Problem
and the public?
What role does
stigma play in how
organizations frame
their issue?
What year was your organization established?
History
Why was the organization established?
Is the organization incorporated? Does the
RQ #1: What
organization have an identified leader? If yes,
organizational
what is their title? Does the organization have
factors, including
an executive board? If yes, are they elected or
structure, resources,
appointed? What are the names of the
issue framing, and
Resource
positions? Does your organization have any of
perceived stigma,
Mobilization
the following elements: Registered taxare associated with Structure
exempt status with the state or IRS,
SORN SMOs
organizational charter, bylaws or a
reporting a policy
constitution, annual report, board member
goal that was
manual, subcommittees (if so, what are the
achieved?
names), business meetings, and/or
participation in decision-making from
members?
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Theory/Pop
ulation

Resource
Mobilization
(con’t)

Research Question Concept

RQ #1: What
organizational
factors, including
structure, resources,
issue framing, and
perceived stigma,
Resources
are associated with
SORN SMOs
reporting a policy
goal that was
achieved?

Survey Question

Does the organization have an operating
budget? If so, what is the annual budget in
2011? What percentage of your budget is
comprised of each of the following: donations,
external funding sources, fund raising events,
membership dues (how much), other?
How many paid staff members are in your
organization? How many volunteers are in
your organization? How many total members
are in your organization? How many active
members are in your organization? Does your
organization have a support group for
registrants and/or their family members?
What are the barriers your organization has
experienced related to the policy outcomes
you have attempted to, or are currently
attempting, to reach? (lack of studies/statistics
for your case, lack of time or resources for
advocacy strategies)
How do the active members of the
organization communicate? (by what means
and how often?).
What types of personally (registrants and
family members) and professionally (judge,
attorney, parole, probation, sexual offender
treatment provider, other therapist/social
worker, researcher, business community,
victims’ advocate organization) motivated
individuals are members in your organization?
Are they currently active? What strategies do
they participate in?
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Theory/Pop
ulation

Research
Question

Concept

RQ #2: What
strategies do
SORN SMOs use
that they perceive
to have had an
impact on a
successful policy
outcome? What
strategies do
SMOs’ use to
reach their current
goals? What
adaptive strategies
have resulted in
Resource
an SORN SMO’s
Mobilization perceived
Strategies
(con’t)
effectiveness
towards an
identified policy
outcome? What
barriers have
SORN SMOs
experienced when
trying to reach
their policy
outcomes? How
has stigma
impacted the
work of these
organizations?

Survey Question
What strategies has your organization used
related to a policy outcome (goal)? How
successful has your organization been at this
strategy since the organization started? Why
do you think this strategy has been
successful? List of strategies:
 Grassroots organizing and
mobilization
 Electronic outreach/social media
 Polling the public
 Voter education
 Briefings/presentations/public
education
 Coalition and network building
(which organizations? Which
legislators? How long did it take to
cultivate a relationship with these
legislators?)
 Media connections
 Policy analysis and research
 Lobbying/Policymaker and
candidate education
 Legal advocacy or litigation
 Demonstration projects or pilot
programs
 Endorse a political candidate
 Rallies and marches
What types of personally (registrants and
family members) and professionally (judge,
attorney, parole, probation, sexual offender
treatment provider, other therapist/social
worker, researcher, business community,
victims’ advocate organization) motivated
individuals are members in your
organization? Are they currently active?
What strategies do they participate in?
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Theory/Pop
ulation

Research
Question

RQ #1: What
organizational
factors, including
structure,
resources, issue
Resource
framing, and
Mobilization perceived stigma,
are associated with
(con’t)
SORN SMOs
reporting a policy
goal that was
achieved?

Concept

Current
Capacity &
Capacity
Building

Survey Question
How much knowledge does your
organization have about the following?
 Reasons that SORN policies were
created
 Assumptions that underlie these policies
 Effectiveness/ineffectiveness of these
policies
 Impact of these policies on victims
 Impact of these policies on registrants
 Impact of these policies on the
community at large
 Costs involved in implementing these
policies at the state level
 Major federal and supreme court
decisions about SORN
 Alternative courses of action to reduce
sexual violence
 Projected outcomes from the above
alternative course of action
 Knowledge about the tradeoffs between
SORN and alternative courses of action.
To what extent does your organization have
experience related to the following skills:
 Analyzing legislation or policy
 Preparing a briefing note or position
paper
 Writing and delivering a presentation
 Building relationships with political
decision makers
 Persuasion skills
 Negotiation skills
 Working from inside the system
 Writing and using a press release
 Carrying out a media interview
Does your organization have an active
project to build the knowledge and skills of
the members? If so, please tell me what you
are doing?
Does your organization have an active
project to build the infrastructure of the
organization? If so, tell me more about this
project?
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Theory/Pop
ulation

Research
Concept
Question
RQ#1: What
organizational
factors, including
structure,
resources, issue
framing, and
perceived stigma,
are associated with
SORN SMOs
reporting a policy
goal that was
achieved?
RQ #2: What
strategies do
SORN SMOs use
that they perceive
to have had an
impact on a
successful policy
outcome? What
strategies do
Resource
Mobilization SMOs’ use to
Policy Goals
reach their current
(con’t)
goals? What
adaptive strategies
have resulted in
an SORN SMO’s
perceived
effectiveness
towards an
identified policy
outcome? What
barriers have
SORN SMOs
experienced when
trying to reach
their policy
outcomes? How
has stigma
impacted the
work of these
organizations?

Survey Question
Tell me about the best example of a
successful policy outcome in your
organization’s history? Can you tell me
about the strategies you used to bring about
this policy outcome? What are the barriers
your organization has experienced related to
the policy outcomes you have attempted to,
or are currently attempting to reach?
(political climate, political will, challengers
to the issue, etc.). Does stigma associated
with registered sex offenders cause any
barriers for your organization’s mission? If
so, how? How do you address these
barriers?
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Theory/Pop
ulation

Research
Question

RQ #4: How do
SORN SMOs use
opportunities in
Political
the
political
Opportunitie environment
to
s
make
progress
towards
their
policy outcome
goals?

Concept

Survey Question
Thinking about the previous and current
policy outcomes of your organization, was
something happening in the political arena
or in the media at the time that influenced
these outcomes? Has a situation arisen
where you were going to employ an
advocacy strategy but you changed your
strategy? If so, why? What happened in this
situation?
By political opportunities I mean any of the
following:
 A change in a position of power related
to SORN policies that may occur out of
an election, a change in bureaucratic
leadership, change of leadership in the
judicial subcommittee.
 Media coverage of a sympathetic case
 Supreme court rulings
 Research studies/statistics suggesting
SORN policies are ineffective or too
costly to implement
Are there any individuals or groups in your
state that oppose the changes your
organization would like to see to SORN
policies? If yes, what are the reasons or
justifications these individuals or groups
have for opposing your changes?
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Theory/Pop
ulation

Research
Question

Concept

Juvenile vs.
Adult
population

RQ#2: How has
stigma impacted
the work of these
organizations?
RQ#3: What role
does stigma play
in how
organizations
frame their issue?

Stigma

Survey Question
Do you tailor your message differently if
you are advocating on behalf of juvenile
registrants? If so, how? If so, do you believe
that this has resulted in gaining more
support for your cause? Please explain.
Is stigma more or less of an issue when
advocating on behalf of juvenile or young
adult sex offenders? If so, why do you think
so? How does this change your approach, if
at all?
Have you found any of these strategies
more or less useful when advocating for
juvenile registrants, as opposed to adult
registrants? If so, how?
How likely is it that the politicians in your
state will amend SORN policies for juvenile
registrants over the next 5 years? Why do
you believe this? How likely is it that the
politicians in your state will amend SORN
policies over the next 5 years for adult
registrants? Why do you believe this?
To what degree do you think registered sex
offenders are stigmatized by the general
public? By policy makers? Are there any
types of sex offenders that you advocate for
where there is more or less associated
stigma? If so, which ones? Why do you
think this is so?
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APPENDIX B: Study Information Sheet
Research Information Sheet
Title of Study: “Collective Action for the Rights of Sex Offenders: Evaluating Social Movement
Organizations”
Principal Investigator (PI):

Erin Comartin, LMSW
School of Social Work, Wayne State University
(313) 577-9917

Purpose
You are being asked to be in a research study of sex offender registration and notification policy
reform organizations because you are listed as the contact information for your state’s affiliate
organization on the Reform Sex Offender Laws website. This study is being conducted at Wayne
State University.
Study Procedures
If you take part in the study, you will be asked to participate in a telephone interview about your
organization’s history, structure, processes, resources, membership, and also to discuss the
strategies your organization has used to bring about policy changes in your state. The
information we are collecting is not of a personal nature, but relative to your experience as the
contact for your state affiliate organization.
You must be 18 years of age to participate in this study. Your participation in this study is
voluntary, and you can choose to answer all, some or none of the questions during the interview.
The telephone interview will take approximately 1 hour. You may choose to answer all, some or
none of the questions during the telephone interview.
Benefits
As a participant in this research study, there is no direct benefit for you; however, information
from this study may benefit other people now or in the future.
Risks
By taking part in this study, you may experience the following risks:
Emotional risks (e.g., feelings of sadness or anxiety). If these feelings arise, feel free to not
answer any questions that they do not want to.
Social risks (e.g., possible loss of confidentiality, possible effect to employment status). There is
potential for confidentiality to be breached in this study. No names of individuals or
organizations will be used in the results of the study as a means to minimize potential social
risks.
Costs
There will be no costs to you for participation in this research study.
Submission/Revision Date: 10/26/2011

Protocol Version #2
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Compensation
For taking part in this research study, you will be compensated for your time and inconvenience.
You will be given a $20 amazon.com gift card for completing the telephone interview. After
completion, you will be sent an email with a link to your on-line gift card.
Confidentiality
You will be identified in the research records by a code name or number. There will be no list
that links your identity with this code. Once the interview results have been analyzed, identifying
information will be removed and placed in a separate password protected file that will not be
located with the interview results. All necessary steps will be taken to keep the information you
provide confidential. Since the information will be reported along with particular state policies, a
person who is familiar with such policies and your organization may be able to make the
connection that your organization participated in this study. This is the only known risk of
breaching your confidentiality.
Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to take part in this study, or if you
decide to take part, you can change your mind later and withdraw from the study. You are free to
not answer any questions or withdraw at any time. Your decision will not change any present or
future relationships with Wayne State University or its affiliates.
Questions
If you have any questions about this study now or in the future, you may contact Erin Comartin
at the following phone number (313) 577-9917. If you have questions or concerns about your
rights as a research participant, the Chair of the Human Investigation Committee can be
contacted at (313) 577-1628. If you are unable to contact the research staff, or if you want to talk
to someone other than the research staff, you may also call (313) 577-1628 to ask questions or
voice concerns or complaints.
Participation
By completing the interview you are agreeing to participate in this study.
Sincerely,
Erin Comartin, LMSW

Submission/Revision Date: 10/26/2011

Protocol Version #2
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APPENDIX C: Pre Interview Document

Below is a list of topics that will be covered during the interview. These questions are
based on my familiarity with an organization in Michigan, the research about sex offender
registration and notification, and research about social movement organizations (organizations
that advocate for public policy change). At the end of this interview, I invite you to ask any
questions that you would like to know about the other organizations that participate in the
interview. The goal of this study is to produce a report that will be useful to the organizations as
they proceed in their advocacy efforts; therefore, all of your input is greatly appreciated and will
hopefully benefit the other organizations across the country.
Attached is a list of terms and their associated definitions that are used in this study. I have done
this so that we will have a common understanding of these terms. Please do not feel as though
you have to know this information before we talk, I just would ask that you have a copy to refer
to during the interview.
The interview topics focus on:
1. The work your organization has or is doing to impact policy changes for registered sex
offenders in your state. It is not about any support group style services that are offered to
registrants and their families.
2. A specific interest of this study is to know about different things your organization may
be doing to change policies specifically related to juvenile registrants. Therefore, you will
notice that some questions are directly related to this population.
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The interview topics include:
1. The mission of the organization and the points the organization makes to gain support for
the organization’s cause.
2. A brief history of the organization: a) month and year started, b) why the organization
was started, c) structure, and d) members of the organization.
3. The experiences of stigma for your members and the organization in your state.
4. The strategies your organization uses to change policy related to registered sex offenders
(see the list of strategies for the types and definitions). An important piece I would like to
understand from this interview is how your organization may “adapt” strategies to what is
occurring in the political environment. For example, was the organization going to
employ one strategy but due to a change they used another strategy.
5. I’d like to know about any previous successful goals your organization has achieved in
the policy arena. For example, has your organization worked with legislators to: a) block
a bill, b) get on the state’s political agenda, c) develop a policy, etc. (refer to the policy
outcomes list for the types of successes). I’d also like to know about two current policy
outcomes your organization is working on.
6. What have been the barriers your organization has faced when attempting to reach a
policy goal or implement a strategy? This could include many reasons, such as: a) lack of
time or resources to implement advocacy strategies, b) the political climate was not
conducive to change, c) there was not enough political will for this issue, d) the
challengers to your organization are too strong in the state legislature.
7.

I also have some questions about two types of members that may be members of your
organization: personally motivated or professionally motivated. I want to know
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approximately when different types of each of these members: a) started participating in
the organization, b) their current level of participation, and c) the strategies they have or
are participating in on behalf of the organization.
8. I would like to know the knowledge and skills of your organization as a whole (refer to
these tables for the types and definitions). I would also like to know about any projects
your organization may be working on to build the knowledge and skills of the
membership.
9. I have one question about professionals or other organizations in your state that have
opposing views from your organization.
10. Finally, there are a few questions about your vision for the future regarding the key
decision makers in your state.
This list is provided so that you have an understanding of the questions I will ask. Please do not
feel like you have to answer all of these questions prior to our interview.
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APPENDIX D: Terminology Lists

Description: During the telephone interview you will be asked questions about the work your
organization has done and is currently doing to change state level policies for registered sex
offenders. We will talk about this on four levels related to your organization’s:
a. Goals related to policy change (policy outcomes list)
b. Strategies that the organization uses to bring about these policy changes (strategies list)
c. Skills your organization has to implement the strategies towards policy change (skills
list).
d. Knowledge your organization has to implement the strategies towards policy change
(knowledge list).
In the policy, strategies, and skills tables you will find the types associated with each table and a
definition of each type. I have provided these definitions to you so that we will have a common
understanding of these terms during our conversation. For the knowledge table I will ask to what
level your organization has knowledge of these specific topics. Please have these tables with you
to refer to during the interview.
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Policy Outcomes List
Policy
Outcome Definition
(Goal) Type
1. Policy Blocking
Successful opposition to a policy proposal. Member(s) of the
organization work with legislators to block bills that the
organization believes will decrease the quality of life for
registered sex offenders.
2. Placement
on
Policy Agenda

the The appearance of an issue or policy proposal on the list of
issues that policy makers give serious attention.

3. Policy Development

Developing a specific policy solution for the issue or problem
being addressed. Creating a new policy or policy guidelines.

4. Policy Adoption

Successful passing of a policy proposal through an ordinance,
ballot measure, legislation, or legal agreement.

5. Policy Implementation

Proper implementation of a policy, along with the funding,
resources, or quality assurance to ensure it.

6. Policy Monitoring and Tracking a policy to ensure it is implemented properly and
Evaluation
achieves its intended impacts.
7. Policy Maintenance

Preventing cuts or other negative changes to a policy.
Strategies List

Strategy Type
a. Grassroots
mobilization

b.

c.
d.
e.

Definition
organizing
and Creating or building on a community-based
groundswell of support for an issue or position, often
by helping people affected by policies to advocate on
their own behalf.
Electronic outreach/social media
Using technologies such as email, websites, blogs,
podcasts, cell phones, Facebook, or Twitter to reach a
large audience and enable fast communications.
Polling the public
Surveying the public via phone or online to collect data
for use in advocacy messages.
Voter education
Conveying an issue or position to specific groups of
voters in advance of an election.
Briefings/presentations/public
Making an advocacy case in person through one-on-one
education
or group meetings.
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Strategy Type
f. Coalition and network building
i. What
organizations
or
coalitions?
ii. How long have you been
working with this organization
or coalition on this issue?
g. Earned or paid media/public
service
announcements
/partnerships with someone in the
media

h.
i.

j.
k.
l.
m.

n.

Definition
Unifying advocacy voices by bringing together
individuals, groups, or organizations who agree on a
particular issue or goal, such as the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), Public Defender’s Office,
Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers
(ATSA), etc.
Pitching the print, broadcast, or electronic media to get
visibility for an issue with specific audiences. Paying
for media coverage through, for example,
advertisements and “open letters.” Getting a media
company to agree to promote a cause through its
communications channels and programming.
Issue/policy analysis and research Systematically investigating an issue or problem to
better define it or identify possible solutions.
Lobbying/Policymaker
and Attempting to influence legislation by communicating
candidate education
with a member or employee of a legislative body or
with a government official or employee who may
If they select this strategy ask:
participate in forming legislation. Telling policymakers
i. Who was the relationship with?
and candidates about an issue or position, and about its
ii. How long did it take to cultivate broad or impassioned support.
a good working relationship?
Testifying
Member(s) of the organization present information at a
hearing for a bill in the state legislature.
Legal advocacy or litigation.
Using the judicial system to move policy by filing
lawsuits, civil actions, and other advocacy tactics.
Demonstration projects or pilots
Implementing a policy proposal on a small scale in one
or several sites to show how it can work.
Endorse political candidates.
Notify the membership that a political candidate is
supportive of the organization’s stance on SORN
policies.
Rallies and marches
Gathering a large group of people for symbolic events
that arouse enthusiasm and generate visibility
(particularly in the media).
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Skills List
Skill Type
Definition
1. Analyzing
The skill of understanding the effects of a policy or law, or their
legislation
or implementation, is essential for advocacy work.
policy
2. Prepare a briefing A briefing note and a position paper are both documents that clearly
note or position state the position or opinion of an organization about a particular
paper
issue. The message of these documents is: ‘This is what we think
about this topic, and this is what we recommend’. They are different
from a press release, which is written specifically for a media
audience.
3. Writing
delivering
presentation

and A presentation is a formal way of delivering a message face-to-face
a to an audience. It can vary from a brief talk to a small group, to a
formal presentation to hundreds of people at a conference. The stages
in developing a presentation include planning, writing and delivering.

4. Building
relationships
with
political
decision-makers.
5. Persuasion Skills.

6. Negotiation skills:

A face-to-face meeting with a targeted decision-maker. Personal
contact provides the opportunity to build relationships with decisionmakers, which could prove very useful in future.
Involves being able to convince others to take appropriate action by:
a. developing a line of reasoned argument.
b. Backing up points with logic- using positive language.
c. Emphasizing the positive aspects of your argument.
d. Getting your points across in a calm, but assertive manner.
Involves being able to discuss and reach a mutually satisfactory
agreement, by:
a. Listening to the needs of the other party.
b. Getting an agreement acceptable to both sides: win-win.
c. Establishing trust.
d. Knowing when to compromise: making concessions for
agreement.
e. Using open, encouraging body language.

7. Working
from Participation in decision-making bodies. Decisions affecting your
inside the system.
advocacy issue or problem are made in many different forms, i.e.,
local council committees, sub-committees and working groups, joint
committees, etc.
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Skill Type (continued) Definition (continued)
8. Writing and using A press release is the standard method of distributing a story to the
a press release
media. Using the mass media is also an information, education and
communication (IEC) method.
It only becomes an advocacy method when:
• The general public has been identified as an ‘indirect target’ who
will go on to influence a direct target – for example, voters who will
influence a politician.
• Influential people are the targets of the article or broadcast item –
for example politicians reading a newspaper.
9. Carrying out a A media interview is a conversation between a reporter and a person
media interview
who has an interesting story that can be used as the basis for
publication or broadcast.

Knowledge List
Knowledge Type
Level of Organizational Knowledge
1. The reasons that Sex Offender Registration
a. no knowledge
and Community Notification (SORN) policies
b. limited knowledge
were created.
c. moderate knowledge
d. substantial knowledge
e. extensive knowledge
2. The assumptions about sex offenders that
underlie SORN policies. (Ex. Strangers
commit majority of sex crimes, treatment of
sex offenders is ineffective.)

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

no knowledge
limited knowledge
moderate knowledge
substantial knowledge
extensive knowledge

3. Studies or statistics about the effectiveness or
ineffectiveness of current policies.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

no knowledge
limited knowledge
moderate knowledge
substantial knowledge
extensive knowledge

4. Studies or statistics related to the impact that
SORN policies have on victims of sexual
violence.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

no knowledge
limited knowledge
moderate knowledge
substantial knowledge
extensive knowledge
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Knowledge Type (continued)

Level of Organizational Knowledge
(continued)
5. Studies or statistics related to the impact that
a. no knowledge
SORN policies have on registered sex
b. limited knowledge
offenders.
c. moderate knowledge
d. substantial knowledge
e. extensive knowledge
6. Studies or statistics related to the impact that
SORN policies have on the community atlarge.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

no knowledge
limited knowledge
moderate knowledge
substantial knowledge
extensive knowledge

7. Studies or statistics of the costs involved in
implementing SORN policies at the statelevel.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

no knowledge
limited knowledge
moderate knowledge
substantial knowledge
extensive knowledge

8. Major federal or state Supreme Court
decisions related to SORN policies.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

no knowledge
limited knowledge
moderate knowledge
substantial knowledge
extensive knowledge

9. Alternative courses of action that might be
taken to solve the issue of sexual violence.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

no knowledge
limited knowledge
moderate knowledge
substantial knowledge
extensive knowledge

10. Projected outcomes from the alternative
courses of action mentioned above. (in Q#9)

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

no knowledge
limited knowledge
moderate knowledge
substantial knowledge
extensive knowledge

11. Knowledge of the tradeoffs between current
SORN policies and the alternative policies to
solve the problem.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

no knowledge
limited knowledge
moderate knowledge
substantial knowledge
extensive knowledge
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Sex offender registration and community notification (SORN) policies have been
instituted across the country to manage individuals in the community who have been convicted
of sex offenses. A social movement, made up of registrants and their family members, has
sprung up across the country to address the resulting consequences that have ensued from these
policies. State organizations are now working towards policy change for these families. The
author of this dissertation conducted in-depth interviews with leaders of 19 of these social
movement organizations (SMO) to explore the organizations’ structure and resources, and the
strategies they use to achieve desired policy outcomes. Three social movement theories guided
this investigation: resource mobilization, cultural cognitive approaches and political
opportunities/processes. The findings were assessed using a process lens, which looked at the
inputs, activities and outcomes of these organizations. The findings indicate that SORN SMOs
share many similarities with other nascent SMOs, but are also characterized by a vital difference
from other SMOs found in the research literature: a significant degree of stigma that is associated
with this population. This stigma impacts both the organizations’ resources and the strategies
they use to achieve the desired policy outcomes. Previously achieved and current policy
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outcomes are described and barriers to success are discussed. Implications for social work
practice and policy are discussed, along with ideas for future research.
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